第一篇：哲學演講

王雷泉教授：

真正的引導需要大師。二千五百年前，在世界的東方和西方出現過偉大的老子、孔子、釋迦牟尼、蘇格拉底、柏拉圖等等。他們幾乎在同一個時代出現，哲學家雅斯貝爾斯稱那個時代為軸心時代。那么兩千五百年以后，在世界走入了21世紀，這個世紀有很多變化，我們的物質文明已經發展到爛熟的地步，但是危機也隨之而現，所以這個時代更加注重心靈的探求，心靈的重建，所以我們這次請來了浙江大學的教授、博士生導師、浙江大學基督教與跨文化研究中心的副主任王志成博士給我們講解第二次軸心時代文明，講解我們中國將怎么來解決自身的問題，同時考察我們中國能對整個人類的未來提供什么樣的貢獻。王志成博士雖然年紀比較小，比我小很多，可是著作等身，光翻譯就有40本，涉及到東西方的宗教，自己的專著也有10部，是一位非常勤奮的學者。現在，他的眼光也關注到宗教學核心的內容，現在我們就以熱烈掌聲歡迎王志成教授為我們演講。

王志成教授：

謝謝王老師，謝謝各位老師和同學。王老師跟我十多年前就已經認識，那時我準備去耶魯大學訪學，我們一起吃飯討論過哲學。我于1986年進入杭州大學（后并入浙江大學），90年畢業，同年讀研究生，我的導師是陳村富教授。1993年我跟隨夏基松教授研究外國哲學，攻讀博士學位。我的碩士論文研究古代希臘哲學中的懷疑主義神學，我的博士論文研究當代宗教哲學家約翰?希克（John Hick）的宗教多元論。之后，我一直和約翰?希克以及相關的人士保持聯系，并持續地做一些翻譯工作。1996年出版了我的博士論文《解釋與拯救》。之后，我一直在大學教學和研究。

今天我很榮幸來到復旦大學來談談關于我個人最近幾年思考的一些問題以及對此的一些想法。從2004年開始，我們開始在北京宗教文化出版社主編一套叢書：《第二軸心時代文叢》。這些書里面有些觀點和我今天晚上講的有一些關系。

今天晚上我要講的主題是：全球化、第二軸心時代與中國宗教的未來。這個主題講三個內容，第一是全球化問題，第二是第二軸心時代問題，第三是第二軸心時代與中國宗教的未來的關系。今天晚上的演講將是比較宏大的，并不是非常具體，并且說的重點也不平衡，但希望給大家一個整體全面的印象。

一、全球化問題

全球化是當今我們人類的處境。有人說人類進入全球化時間是在18世紀，有人說在19世紀。但全球化真正給人帶來一種強烈沖擊感受的是20世紀，特別是二次世界大戰之后，對我們多數中國人來說應該是改革開放之后。

這里，我要講二點：首先，全球化這個觀念發端于什么時候，一般來說我們不會把這個觀念的起源推得很遠，但是我在《中國宗教》上發表了一篇文章，談到了全球化觀念起源的問題，并提出該觀念應該發端于軸心時代，也就是說在釋迦牟尼時代、在耶律米時代、在老子和孔子的時代。因此，我的一個基本觀念是：全球意識發端于軸心時代。之所以出現這種意識，這是一個很神秘的事情。在軸心時代之前，人們的觀念發展受到了地域的限制，但在軸心時代（公元前8—2世紀）不同地區都出現了一批偉大的思想家、哲學家、宗教家、圣人。為什么會在那個時代集中出現這么一批偉大的人物呢？這是人們到現在都不能解釋清楚的現象。因為，從時間觀念來說，之前是比較原始的，而這時出現了一大批思想家，他們之間幾乎都沒有什么來往，他們的觀念卻又都在這個時代出現了，所以對于很多人來說這是一個神秘現象。

人類的智慧在那時發生了突變。對此，至今我們難以有一個理性的解釋。雅斯貝爾斯最早提出了“軸心時代”一詞。他自己也無法解釋人類這種智慧的神秘的集中性的爆發，其他思想家也難以解釋這個現象。但如果你是有信仰的，可能你說這來自于神圣的天啟。

與全球化相關的全球意識，在它出現之后自身就會運動。當今時代，人人都可以感受到全球意識，而且越來越多的人接受這種全球意識。例如，我們今天的一些學術研究或者我們各個領域的工作自然而然地都需要通過這種意識來思考、觀察和分析。

其次，我們不能說軸心時代的那些思想就可以被稱為宗教，只可以說是宗教的源頭思想，佛陀本人不是要創宗教，他實際上是覺悟者，孔子、老子以及莊子他們本人都沒有創立宗教。而他們的思想卻成了在此之后所創立的各種世界宗教思想的源頭。在中國，我們可以說我們在解讀先秦的思想家。先秦之后中國哲學幾乎沒有什么特別的原創思想。很多人因此說要重返軸心時代。對于基督徒來說，就是要回到圣經；對于佛教徒，就是要回到原始佛教；對于道教徒，就是要回到老莊時代。但是各個宗教的創始人的頭銜是我們后人給予他們的，他們是被給予者，而他們本人并不很主動地去創造一個宗教，后人沿著他們的思想道路發展出一個個不同的宗教體系。

比如在佛教中，首先是佛陀的經驗，而后沿著佛陀的經驗繼續踐行。我們的佛教不斷發展，我們不斷證悟佛陀的思想、體驗佛陀的思想，然后我們的意識因此也不斷的擴展。所以，它是以佛陀的經驗為根本，不斷地延伸，慢慢地形成佛教傳統。而這傳統由于我們對它的解讀上的差異以及在修行方法上的差異而產生了分化，細化為不同的宗派。慢慢地，它們共同構成一個巨大的傳統，所以宗教就成了傳統而不是單單一個人創立的宗教，不是依靠佛陀一個人構成的，它是一個包含了諸多亞傳統的巨大傳統。所以由一個原初的思想家變成一個傳統，這個傳統又有很多的亞傳統。這個過程不是短時間內完成的，而是有一個歷史的發生、發展的過程。所以佛教不是一下子到中國，也不是一下子到西方的，西方的佛教主要是在上世紀發展起來的。十九世紀時候的西方，沒有多少西方人認識佛教。可能尼采了解一點，可是尼采對佛陀的了解準確嗎？很多地方尼采對佛陀的了解是不準確的。叔本華對佛陀也了解一點，但叔本華對佛陀的理解很準確嗎？到現在為止，據我所知，西方人一般對佛陀都難有正確的理解。

今天看來，佛教的力量在西方不斷擴展，由一個人漸漸組成一個僧團，然后逐漸變成一個有經典文本、有自己特定組織的傳統，從小乘到大乘，再傳播到今天的西方，這是一個不斷物化、具體化的過程。實際上存在著這么一種說法，《史記》里就有秦始皇要滅佛的記載。也就是說在秦始皇的時代佛教就已經傳進了中國，但是我們對此并沒有多少證據。佛教的發展和傳播可以說是一個全球化的過程，是一個慢慢展開的過程。從歷史的角度看，我們要特別感謝阿育王，他是一個很特別的人。另外，大家可以讀一本佛經——《彌蘭陀王問經》。在這部經中，一個來自希臘的國王和龍軍菩薩展開對話。這個希臘的國王接受龍軍的觀念，皈依了佛門。這是一個很有名的經典。佛教的全球化過程，阿育王起到了非常大的作用。而且歷代的很多高僧對佛教的全球化起到了非常重要的作用。中國的佛教在解放后到文革這段時間遭到了根本性的打擊，但是在此之后佛教在中國開始了緩慢的恢復。

而西方基督教的全球化就要從耶穌開始說起了。耶穌說你們要把我的福音傳到地極。這個觀念給后來的門徒所指引的一個方向就是把他的福音傳播開去。基督教的興起是非常有意思的。理論上講，耶穌是一個猶太教徒，一個拉比。他不是基督徒，也沒有建立教會，但是他的思想、他的行動、他的榜樣作用以及他的門徒沿著他的路線走下去，就形成了一個小的共同體，然后這個共同體逐漸地就變成了一個組織化了的但較為松散的群體。由于歷史的偶然性，經過幾百年的掙扎和斗爭，這個宗教群體最后為羅馬當局所接受，成為了國教。基督教在地位上的“翻盤”對于基督教來說具有革命性的意義，基督教的優點從此得以彰顯、相應地，基督教的缺點也就被世人所知。這是一個國教化的過程。從今天來看，基督教的全球化是最為成功的。因為基督教的早期信徒大都為文化水平不高的民眾，他們只是憑著堅定的信仰把基督教變成了一個巨大的傳統，并且形成了三大亞傳統——天主教、東正教、新教。相比于其他宗教，它的每個亞傳統都非常強大，光天主教信徒就有十多億人。在它的全球化過程中，基督教從西亞到歐洲、印度，乃至后來漂洋過海來到美洲，取代了美洲原有的文化根基，從此，美洲文化也就成為了一種基督教文化。

在當時的美洲，本土的文化傳統和其信仰都是比較不牢固的，基督教進入美洲是比較容易的，并把其本土文化給吞并了。但是基督教進入亞洲如印度和中國情況卻是非常的復雜。在唐朝時，基督教就進入中國（被稱為景教），但是當時景教是依附于佛教的，在滅佛過程中，景教（基督教一支）也被打壓下去了。在元朝，也里可溫教（當時中國人對基督宗教的稱呼）傳入中國，但是隨著元朝的滅亡而在中國消失。明末清初天主教進入中國傳教。但是由于中國的文化自身的強大，直到清末，天主教在中國的傳教并不很成功。相比而言，佛教的本土化過程卻是非常成功的，因為它能夠在中國兩種文化傳統——儒道——之間達到一種和而不同的融合。

基督教和中國宗教（儒佛道）兩個異質的文化傳統很難和平相處，這樣，基督教的本地化過程不是很成功。而今天，從基督教人數上看是比較成功的，但是從思想上來看，至今我們也不能說基督教的中國化已經成功了。目前，中國大陸還沒有中國神學。丁光訓說要建立中國神學，但是還沒有成功。香港道風山為推進漢語神學而不懈努力，但至今還不能說已經成功，還需要繼續努力。在社會科學院世宗所，卓新平教授一直要推進學術神學，就是不依賴信仰進行純學術的宗教研究。而這剛剛起步，其發展前景尚難預料。

在全球化的過程中，基督教得到了成功的發展。但在中國和印度，情況就比較復雜。因為中國和印度都具有悠久且博大的文明傳統，長期以來，基督教的信徒人數在這兩個國家難以有大的增進。基督教進入美洲非常成功，進入非洲我們也不能說不成功。在進入西方世界、希臘世界的過程中，是很成功的。可是全球化的今天，人們發現中國是塊唐僧肉，是非常有發展前途的地方。因為，在英國、德國、荷蘭等國家，基督教人數不斷下滑，而在中國大陸，信徒人數直線上升。而在印度不大可能有一個大的量的飛躍。這是因為印度教本身就非常的強大，因此，基督教在印度的發展空間是很有限的。在中國，基督教的發展空間則非常巨大。很多人會擔心中國傳統文化的迷失，以及中國自己的文化身份認同感的喪失，而這樣的擔心也不是毫無理由的。

以上是我舉的兩個宗教全球化的例子，其實也可以舉伊斯蘭教的例子。伊斯蘭教的全球化也是很成功的。盡管伊斯蘭教出現在軸心時代之后，但也是沿著軸心時代的思想發展出來的一個世界性宗教。相比之下，中國的儒道的全球化不是很成功。并且現在我們多數人認為道教是一個地方性宗教而不是一個世界性宗教。印度教的全球化也在展開，在中國、在西方也會有所發展。現在還有一個所謂的新時代運動，新時代運動不屬于傳統宗教，但是新時代運動在推動宗教全球化的進程中的作用是非常巨大的。克里希拉穆提就是新時代運動的一個代表人物。他在中國很受歡迎。甚至有人把南懷瑾也歸于新時代運動的人物。更有人說從廣義上講，瑜伽也可以屬于新時代運動的一部分。瑜伽在全球化中非常成功，比“太極”成功多了。印度瑜伽在印度文明中是一個核心的東西，但是它在全球化的過程中發展沒有障礙，沒有受到意識形態的阻礙。瑜伽全球化的成功經驗很值得我們去研究。

第一點我所講的是世界的奧秘、神秘，在軸心時代出現了智慧爆發；第二點講的是世界宗教的擴張，這是一個從神性到理性的過程。

二、第二軸心時代問題

軸心時代的思想隨著時間的推移，在不斷發展之后，出現了很多有益的東西，但與此同時也出現了很多消極的東西。有關于這些積極方面和消極方面的東西在此我不多談。

軸心時代的思想發展到今天，或許由于現代人的自私以及自身存在的一些問題而未能得以完全的繼承，于是我們會說歷史墮落了、倒退了，比如現在經常提到的基督教的末世觀，佛教所講的末法時代，以及印度教所講的卡利時代。為了變革這個并不讓人滿意的時代，一些人認為我們要進行人類文明的轉化。最近，看了一個充滿個人魅力的科學家關于2012的演講，聽似神秘莫測，令人覺得百惑不解。他的思考角度是基于對全球化的考察，通過考察當代人類的技術能力來思考人類命運的問題。這樣的人在當今世界可能不少市場。而我們作為學術的探討，也有很多關于源頭的探討。軸心時代發展至今，將進入一個新的時代。雅思貝斯首先提出：我們可能正在醞釀一個新的文明時代，只是它還沒來到，我們正處在這個文明和軸心文明的間隙期。他說這話的時候，我們還不能說已經進入了新的軸心時代了。

但是，隨著科學技術的發展，計算機網絡的興起，特別是上世紀九十年代全球化進程突然加劇，發生了許多事件。有人把1993年作為一個關節點，認為這是我們進入新的軸心時代的標識時間，這是因為1993年召開了世界宗教會議。在會議上，通過了《全球倫理宣言》。它預示著：人們需要一套全球倫理，需要全球各個宗教的合作，形成一個巨大的宗教共同體。

早在1893年，在美國召開了第一次世界宗教會議。印度教的辨喜參加了，并引起了很大的反響。過了100年又舉行了第二次的世界宗教會議，在這過去的100年中，全球化進程加快了。在這種背景下，人們的時空觀念發生了改變，文化上發生了震蕩，人們之間的關系也有所變化。在這個過程中，我們有什么特別的改變？不同的思想家有不同的回答。迄今為止，研究新軸心文明的人中比較有影響的人是卡曾斯，但他已經去世。卡曾斯在1993年出版了一本叫做《21世紀的基督》的書，在這本書里他明確提出了“第二次軸心時代”這個觀念，可是他也說，第二次軸心時代文明的源頭應該回到圣方濟各，要延伸到哥白尼那個時候。他說在二十世紀里有個在中國工作過的人—德日進，他是一個古生物學家，他認為人類文明是從一個原點發展到歐米伽點的過程，這個點也就是基督。從這個角度看，德日進也可以算是第二次軸心時代文明的一個先驅。

但是在學者看來，我們會提及若干人，剛才提到的卡曾斯就算是一個。凱倫?阿姆斯特朗也是其中的一個代表，她是一個英國暢銷書作家，出版過許多著作。此外還有一個非常激進的哲學家叫庫比特，他自身也認為自己是一個第二軸心時代的學者。還有一個叫推進全球宗教對話的天主教思想家斯維德勒，稱第二軸心時代為稱全球對話時代。他在他的有關論文里討論了卡曾斯所說的第二軸心時代。人大出版社出版了他的一本書叫《走向全球對話時代》。另外我們也把孔漢思納入為第二軸心時代學者的范疇之內，但孔漢思本人沒有提第二軸心時代觀念。在我們的新儒家的代表中，杜維明是一個代表，他自己也在宣言第二軸心時代的觀念，想要對儒家文明進行第二軸心時代的轉化。在北京論壇上，他曾經公開宣揚第二軸心時代。在北京大學湯一介先生，也在宣揚第二軸心時代，他出版過一本書叫《走向新軸心時代》。但這本書只有很少的篇幅談論新（第二）軸心時代，但卻是結合中國儒家來談的。他認為我們儒家應進行一些變革、發展才好進入第二軸心時代。在美國，耶穌研究會的一些人在宣揚第二軸心時代的觀念，他們也在2003年召開了一個會議，核心主題就是關于第二軸心時代的觀念。

關于第二軸心時代的特征，我們可以概括為三點：第一，全球意識。各個領域里的學術研究都出現了從個體性意識上升到全球性意識的現象。第二，生態意識，也叫大地意識。這也被認為是第二軸心時代意識的一個基本觀念。第三，對話意識。它強調通過對話來處理不同信仰傳統之間的關系，不同文明之間的關系。我個人在做一個有關于宗教間以及信仰間靈性的探索。這方面研究比較少，但是在全球化時代這個問題卻是非常的緊迫，是我們不得不面對的一個問題，即探討儒教、佛教和基督教等宗教在相遇中我們應該如何修證、證悟，也就是說在一個人類共同體中如何共享靈性的境界。在軸心時代，印度、中東、中國、希臘各自的文明都是獨立形成和發展的，而在今天這一全球化的時代開始了越來越頻繁的互動，是否會出現一個共同的地球靈性，這個問題我個人在思考。很多時候我是從佛教的角度思考，很多時候我也很喜歡從印度教的角度去思考。而我翻譯得最多，寫得最多的是基督教方面的內容，所以我也不時地會從基督教的角度去思考。

有人會有疑問，說你這樣吃得消嗎。如果我們有了這種全球意識，我們的文明可能就要重新發展，很多問題就要重新思考。從個人層面，如個人如何在當今世界上活得有意義，有人說我需要一個宗教，可是當你面對很多宗教的時候，你能夠非常好的去相處，能夠從其他文明中去吸收營養，去發展，這就有很多值得探討的問題。所以我個人認為對話是一種靈性的探索方式，也是一種靈性的實踐方式，也是宇宙本身的一個動力結構。

為什么是宇宙本身的一個動力結構？這是因為，譬如從基督教來說，如果神是三位一體，父子靈是互動的。三個位格之間是互動的。在印度教里我們講三個主神是可以互動的。在佛教里面我們講報身、法身、應身是互動。這些似乎有些玄奧，但是從靈修學的角度看，不同層面之間也是可以展開對話的。作為一個佛教徒，在內心深處，三個層面就可以展開對話。印度教里面也是如此。這些我們不多談了，這就是說，第二軸心時代文明將是一個全新的文明，而這個文明基于軸心文明精神的弘揚。譬如說當時佛陀的慈悲以及實修證悟這些觀念一直以來可能沒有非常完整全面地展開，可是在這個全球化時代我們似乎有可能更快地展開，能夠體現出來。我們可能很少人能達到佛陀的那個層面，可是佛陀與你的最終層面是通的。在基督教中，按照神學家的研究，按照舊約里面的經文，每個人都是神（god），也就是說人人都是有神性的，也就是說在終極層面你與上帝是一體的，從神話層面上看你就是上帝的生命之氣。

第二軸心時代有多種意識，我們這里只談了其中的部分。事實上，讀者可以結合全球化時代的特征去反省第二軸心時代的意識特征。

三、第二軸心時代和中國宗教的未來

我在2007年參加過一次儒耶對話的會議，當時我就提出，儒家和基督教對話從明末清初就開始了（或許應該更早），到現在對話了幾百年，但是依然是不成功的。反之，佛教和中國文化的對話是非常成功，佛教已經成為中國文化的一個有機部分。到現在為止，基督教在某種意義上還沒有成為中國文化的有機部分，所以耶儒對話還要繼續。在那次的香港儒耶對話會議上，一些基督教學者和儒教學者吵起來了，有的儒家學者從內心說，對基督教不屑一顧，批評得很兇，認為基督教非常霸權。我那時是中間派。我的論文被評為很客觀，而基督教和儒教的學者基本上對對方多持有消極的態度。

但我們中國文明現在首先要面對的是基督教的進入。北派的一些儒家學者搞儒家報紙《儒教郵報》，宣言儒教文化。有一次我和他們談，我說儒家在對話這個方面的立場是開放的，我完全可以成為一個儒士。儒家一直來是主張開放的，如《論語》主張“和而不同”，并主張 “有朋自遠方來，不亦說乎”。2008年召開的北京奧運會上，我們就使用這個標語。我認為，儒家或者儒教從理論上說它是開放的，而且在走上全球化的道路上也沒有任何障礙。只是在儒教本身的發展中，有人把儒教的一些支流末節的東西凝固起來，作為寶貝，說是國學里必須保留的東西，這就會出現很多批評。但儒家的精神本身是可以全球化的，而且在我看來是最容易被接受的觀念就是儒家觀念，因為儒家很多觀念在發展中沒有障礙。也就是說，儒家很容易走向全球化，很容易為世界所接受，但是儒家現在很多都是很保守的，會出現很多張力。

我是主張儒家應和基督教互動的，這并不是說徹底成為一個凝固不變的儒家，而應該是作為一個開放的、發展的儒家。所以說，軸心時代的中國宗教思想先為我們中華民族帶來了福音，幫助了我們很多人，成為了我們中國的靈魂。道家其實也如儒家一樣也可以走上全球化，它在軸心時代以及軸心時代以后已經滋養了無數人的精神生活。佛教傳入中國以后已經成為了中國的佛教了，成為了中國文化的一部分，它也能并已經為中華民族提供營養。所以儒釋道三家是兄弟，它們都為中華民族服務。

宗教不是為教服務，而是為人服務，所以它們應該造福于中國人民，也應該面向于世界人民。如果宗教是服務人的，那么宗教很多信念層面的東西是可以變革的。在軸心時代發端的文明已經發揮了很多作用，在它凝固的過程中，它有積極的也有消極的。而到今天真正的全球化時代，我認為儒家的東西是可以改革的。道家有很多東西也是可以改革的。它們在服務于中華民族的同時也可以服務世界，讓這些軸心時代已有的資源在全球化的過程中可以重新展開，能夠哺育世界。這樣，這個世界就會更加和諧。

從靈修學的角度看，對個人靈性生活、個人靈性的成長可以提供非常好的營養。在中國，儒釋道以及一些較原始宗教，如少數民族中那種特別關注人與自然關系的宗教對于今天來說也是十分重要的，對于今天現代人來說具有借鑒作用。現在，很多環境災難都和我們人類自身的活動息息相關，從佛教上說，業很重，不僅中國的業很重，整個世界范圍內的業都很重。人類的很多問題和人類的共業有關。這就是說在我們全球化時代，我們可以讓儒釋道和其他文明共同凝聚、創造一個新的人類的靈性或者說新時代的靈性，并可以服務于這個世界。在這個全球化的世界中不同的文化一定會相遇，一定會發生碰撞，融合。這個過程中出現了很多問題，很值得我們的學者去探討去研究。從這個角度看，我們中國的儒釋道都可以為第二軸心時代做出貢獻！這不是為了迎合某個利益集團或者意識形態，而是這個信仰本身在宇宙里發揮它的功能，應該服務于這個世界的人，所以不是為了迎合某個利益集團或者意識形態講的，而是它自身的生命、命運運動本身所需要的。

在這個全球化過程中，不同的信仰、不同的宗教會共同形成一個非常巨大的松散的靈性共同體。我認為這對我們的未來會更合理一些、更好一些。我們說第二軸心時代來臨了，可是它不是說今天來了，明天世界就變了，它是一個進程。世界怎么走，未來是不確定的，因為在我們這個世界中我們本身就有很多不確定的因素。這只能說我們在努力創造一個未來，然后我們把這個軸心文明的精神或者靈魂在新的時代不斷弘揚。結合這個時代的特征，我們進一步去發揮它的功能，發展它的潛能，以及在這個互動過程中去發揮、發現、發揚更新的東西。

謝謝大家。

王志成：浙江大學教授，博士生導師。聯系地址：浙江大學西溪校區哲學系，310028；Email: dezxsd@126.com

第二篇：哲學與人生(演講)

按照我國著名哲學家馮友蘭先生的話說：什么是哲學？哲學，就是對人生有系統的反思。所以，我把同學們對人生的關切和對哲學的興趣結合起來，和大家談一下哲學與人生。

哲學：“使人作為人而能夠成為人”

學科學，我不說，你糊涂；我一說，你明白。而學哲學，我不說，你明白；我一說，你糊涂。

哲學就是對于人生有系統的反思。在這個命題中，包含幾層意思。一層意思是說，哲學是對于人生的一種反思。這種反思活動，應當說人人都會有。另一層意思是說，作為哲學的這樣一種人類活動，它是對于人生的有系統的反思，也就是說，能夠系統地反思人生的活動叫哲學活動；而進行這種活動的人呢，就是哲學家了。

系統地反思人生的哲學，它同其他科學的區別在什么地方？除了哲學之外的其他科學，使你成為“某種人”，也就是使你掌握某種具體的專業，掌握某種特殊的技能，扮演某種特定的角色，將來你可以從事某種特定的職業。我們把這稱為科學，使你成為“某種人”。

與此不同，哲學使你“作為人而成為人”。這句話的含義是極為深刻的。雖然說你是人，但是在真正人的意義上，缺少一種哲學的修養，還不是馮先生所指認的那種真正意義上的人。所以，他作了這樣的一種區別，其他學科使你成為某種特殊的人，用我們現在的通俗說法，就是成為一種“專門人才”；而學習哲學，使你作為人能夠成為人，做一個有教養的現代人。這是哲學與科學的區別，也就是哲學的特殊的意義與價值。

這種對于人生的有系統的反思哲學，怎樣才能夠獲得？ 馮先生說是“覺解”。我曾經寫過《哲學修養十五講》一書，在國內算一本暢銷書吧。前幾天這本書的編輯給我說，最近在臺灣重新出版這本書，更名為《哲學修養的十五堂課》。

在書里，我說學習科學和學習哲學是兩種完全不同的感覺。學科學是什么感覺呢？我不說，你糊涂；我一說，你明白。而學哲學則是，我不說，你明白；我一說，你糊涂。大家會覺得很怪，怎么會是這樣呢？大家想一想，科學是把一些個別的現象，單稱命題和觀察名詞，經過歸納推理，上升為理論名詞和全稱命題，然后再通過演繹推理，做出解釋和預見。例如，我一說，三角形三內角之和等于180度，再一說邊角關系，你就會作相關的幾何題了。這就叫作我不說你糊涂，我一說你明白了。

而哲學恰好相反，它是把人們當作不言而喻的、毋庸置疑的東西作為批判反思的對象。我不說的時候，你清清楚楚的；我一說，你卻可能糊涂了。例如，這里有一張桌子，我不說，它就是一張桌子，清清楚楚的；可是我一旦問你，你如果沒有桌子的觀念，為什么會把如此這般的一個東西把握為桌子呢？糊涂沒？這就是哲學的“思維和存在的關系問題”。

內地的同學都知道，臺灣的同學不知聽到過沒有？有一首歌叫《我心中的太陽》，歌詞是：“天上的太陽和水中的月亮誰亮？山上的大樹和山下的小樹誰大？心中的戀人和身外的世界誰重要？”我不知道在座的同學怎么回答？歌曲中是：“我不知道，我不知道，我不知道！”

這個世界是極為復雜的！哲學就是要把這個世界的復雜性，特別是人生的復雜性揭示出來。我不說的時候，你很清楚；我一說的時候，你可能更糊涂了，這就需要馮先生所說的那個“覺解”。如果沒有一種哲學的辯證智慧，你很容易走向極端，你今天是理想主義，明天可能是現實主義，最后可能是絕對主義，相對主義了，榮辱呀，禍福呀，你就不好把握了。所以，在這個意義上，哲學就是對于人生有系統的反思，使人作為人而能夠成為人，是一種“覺解”的活動。

哲學的這種“覺解”活動，要達到的目的是什么呢？馮先生說是“境界”。他講人生四境界：使人超越自然的境界、功利的境界、道德的境界，最后達到一種天地的境界。所以，中國哲學最講究天人合一、知行合一、情景合一、養吾浩然之氣。這是一種馮先生所理解的哲學，也就是哲學與人生的關系。

上面是談了馮友蘭先生對哲學的理解。下面，我就想從哲學與人生出發，從哲學層面上對人生有一個大體的解說，談一下自己的體會。我想分成三個問題具體地來談，一是人的存在；二是人的人化；三是人的世界。

哲學家馮友蘭

人的存在，是一種超越性的存在 人無法忍受單一的顏色、無法忍受凝固的時空、無法忍受存在的空虛、無法忍受自我的失落和無法忍受徹底的空白。人的這五種無法忍受，意味著人是一種超越性的存在。

怎么樣來理解人的存在呢？我的說法是，人是一種超越性的、理想性的、創造性的存在。我還有一本書《超越意識》。這本書開篇的第一句話：人是世界上最奇異的存在――超越性的存在。怎么理解呢？我首先是使用反證法:人無法忍受什么？尤其是青年人，我概括為五個方面：無法忍受單一的顏色、無法忍受凝固的時空、無法忍受存在的空虛、無法忍受自我的失落和無法忍受徹底的空白。人的這五種無法忍受，意味著人是一種超越性的存在。

世界就是自然，它自然而然地存在。那么人生呢，它也是自然。人自然而然地生，自然而然地死。然而，從自然當中生成的人，它恰好超越了這個自然！把自然而然的世界改造成了一個對于人來說真善美相統一的世界！這才是人！

我問在座的同學，你喜歡什么顏色？有的說喜歡紅色，有的說喜歡綠色，有的說喜歡藍色。但是，我說如果這個世界只是你所喜歡鮮艷的紅色、純潔的白色、嬌嫩的綠色，你還能不能在世界上生活了？！那就像馬克思所說的一段話，他說：“在太陽的輝映下，每一顆露水珠都會閃現出五顏六色的顏色。”人的世界是一個五彩繽紛的世界，豐富多彩的世界，人無法忍受單一的顏色。

生活的世界應當是豐富多彩的，這個豐富多彩的世界是人自己創造出來的，所以人無法忍受的第二個就是“凝固的時空”。用馬克思的話說：“時間是人類存在的空間。” 前些天看魯豫的一個訪談，被采訪的那個女士說，回顧自己的一生，我沒有浪費上帝給予我的時間。

時間構成了人真正的存在，所以人無法忍受凝固的時空，而是在時間中實現了自己的存在。人的生活是創造的過程，也就是改天換地的過程。人類世世代代的科學發現、技術發明、藝術創作、理論創新、政治變革，不都是在時間中構成自己存在和發展的空間嗎？“凝固的時空”是人無法忍受的。

正因為人給自己創造了自己的時空世界，所以人又無法忍受“存在的空虛”。什么叫人？人是尋求意義的存在。人無法忍受無意義的生活。大家都知道，國內近30年改革開放，發生了翻天覆地的變化。國內有一本暢銷的雜志叫《讀者》，這是一本有情趣的人都會喜歡的雜志。那里邊曾經先后登過兩篇文章，一篇是《當我沒有錢的時候》，另一篇是《當我有錢的時候》。這兩篇文章表達了一個共同的思想，叫做人不是為了生存而生存，而是為了尋求意義而生活的。

所以，現在哲學有一個說法，說所謂現代病就是“形象大于存在”，就是“包裝”，方方面面的“包裝”。可是上世紀80年代流行的一首歌里就有這樣的歌詞：“你不用涂紅又沫綠，只要你不斷充實自己，人人都會喜歡你。”充實自己，就是獲得存在的意義。人生的存在是大于它的形象的。它的存在的意義是最重要的。人無法忍受“存在的空虛”。

正因為如此，人又無法忍受“自我的失落”。大家都知道人本主義心理學家馬斯洛的層次需要理論。生存的需要、安全的需要、歸屬的需要、審美的需要，最終升華為一種自我實現的需要。我想，對于每一個年青人來說，最能夠使他激動起來的，就是自我實現的感覺。在心理學上稱之為高峰的體驗。最美的體驗就是一種自我實現的高峰體驗。每個人的人生，作為一個長卷，它是一部波瀾壯闊的小說；作為每個瞬間，它是一首感動自己的詩篇。人生的幸福，既是在目標的實現中所獲得的快樂的感覺，又是在快樂的感覺中實現自己的目標。所以人無法忍受自我的失落。

人生是有限的。人是一種能夠自覺到死的存在。系統地反思人生的哲學，是“向死而思生”，所以有人把哲學叫作對死亡的練習。人能夠意識到自己是一個有限的存在，人就想超越這種有限的人生，因為人無法忍受“徹底的空白”。哲人培根說，人的“復仇之心勝過死亡，愛戀之心蔑視死亡，榮譽之心希冀死亡，憂傷之心奔赴死亡，恐怖之心凝神于死亡”。這是心靈對死亡的超越。人的生命面對死亡，又以生命的追求超越死亡。古人講立功、立德、立言，用這三種方式來使自己有限的人生燃燒起熊熊的生命之火，使生命得到無限的延續。

這就是我所說的人的超越性。有了尋求意義的人生，才能對人生進行有系統的反思哲學。

那么，究竟怎樣理解人的存在？人既源于動物，又同動物具有根本性的區別。人和動物都是一種生命活動，兩者的區別就在于，動物是一種生存的生命活動，而人是一種生活的生命活動。

生存是一種無意義的生命活動，生活是一種尋求意義的生命活動。在這一點上區分了人和動物。人是一種尋求意義的生活活動，動物是一種本能性的生存活動，動物和人的區別就在于是兩種不同的生命活動。為什么是兩種不同的生命活動呢？馬克思說，動物只有一個生命的尺度，而人有兩種尺度。動物只有自己所屬的物種的一個尺度，所以它只能是本能的生命活動。人有兩個尺度，既是按照自己的目的活動，又是按照所有物種的尺度活動，這就是既“合目的”又“合規律”的活動，是把世界變成對人來說是真善美的世界的活動。所以作為一個人的存在，是一個超越性的存在，一個理想性的存在，人是一個把自己的理想不斷地變為現實的活動過程。這是一個創造的過程。

中國社會科學院的老院長胡繩，在一篇文章中講到：人類在20世紀的后五十年所創造的科學技術，超過了人類在20世紀五十年代以前的幾千年所創造的總和！

什么叫現代化？現代化首先是日常生活科學化，接著是日常消遣文化化，接著是日常交往社交化，日常生活法治化，農村生活城市化。人創造了自己的歷史，實現了生活的現代化。所以人的存在是超越性的、理想性的、創造性的存在。這才是人的存在。

大學生正處在一個人生的最有理想、最有創造性的時期，你們一定很喜歡哲學。這是對于人生的一種有系統的反思。通過這種反思，我們能夠覺解生活，更加自覺地去擁抱生活，更加自覺地去創造生活，從而把我們的世界建設成為更美好的世界，把我們的人生塑造成更美好的人生。

倫敦海格特公園的馬克思墓

人的人化，人使自己成為人

人是一個人化的產物，是一種人化的結果，是一種歷史性的存在。這是人和動物的不同。動物是一代又一代的復制自己，而人是一代又一代地發展自己。這是人和動物的不同。

法國著名哲學家薩特，有一個著名的哲學命題：“存在先于本質”。人以外的所有的存在都是本質先于存在，而人這種存在是存在先于本質。除了人之外，我們中國人有一句俗話，叫作種瓜得瓜，種豆得豆。本質先于存在，本質就規定了它的存在。

但是，人就不是這樣了。生下來的無論是男孩女孩，我們說他是人，但是長大了，未必就成為人。為什么？人是一個人化的產物，是一種人化的結果，是一種歷史性的存在。這是人和動物的不同。動物是一代又一代的復制自己，而人是一代又一代地發展自己。

用馬克思說，什么叫歷史？“歷史不過是追求自己的目的人的活動的過程而已”。人的這種活動的過程，成了人的歷史。所以，馬克思說，什么叫作社會存在？社會存在就是人們的實際的生活過程。我們的實際的生活過程，構成我們人自己的生活的歷史。人的自己的生活歷史，就是我們每個人成為人的過程。我們每個人成為人的過程，既構成了歷史的前提，又構成了歷史的結果；而人只有首先作為歷史的結果，才能夠成為歷史的前提，因為每代人總是上代人遺留的文化的產物。我們正是在歷史文化的進程中而成為今天的存在。正是在這個意義上，人是“存在先于本質”，人是人化的過程。

關于人的人化，今天我要特殊地談一個我對教育的理解。

那么，什么是教育呢？教育是一種社會遺傳的機制，它以自身為中介而實現雙向的認同：一方面，是個體向歷史社會文化的一種認同；另一方面，它同時又是歷史社會文化對個體的認可。教育就是這種“認同”與“認可”的雙向互動過程。

在這個意義上，廣義的教育實際上是哲學教育；或者說，哲學教育，就是使人作為人能夠成為人。教育首先不是使人成為某種人，而是使人作為人能夠成為人。人不僅僅是一種自然意義上的遺傳性的獲得，它還是一種文化意義上的獲得性的遺傳。所以，真實的教育，最根本的目的是提高人的素養。它是使人作為人能夠成為人。教育是使你首先能夠成為一個認同這個社會、這個時代、這個歷史的現代公民。我們只有能夠成為人，才能夠成為某種人，才能夠去掌握某種專門的知識、技能，去從事某種專門的職業，去扮演某種特殊的角色，在社會生活中實現自我。

人作為一個歷史文化的存在，自身是一個人化的過程，使自己作為人能夠成為人的過程。這種成為人的過程，最重要的就是以教育為中介的社會遺傳和文化遺傳。從十九世紀中葉以來的現代哲學，所解決的一個根本的問題就在于，它不是把人當作一個抽象的存在，而是當作一個歷史具體的文化存在。近代以來的哲學，它是一個上帝的人本化過程。上帝的自然化，上帝的物質化，上帝的精神化到整個的上帝的人本化的過程。

所以，有的同學即使不是學習哲學的可能也知道，美國出版了一套叢書叫作“導師哲學家叢書”，我推薦給不是學習哲學專業的同學。它把中世紀叫作“信仰的時代”，把文藝復興時期叫作“冒險的時代”，把十七世紀叫作“理性的時代”，把十八世紀叫作“啟蒙的時代”，把十九世紀叫作“思想體系的時代”，而把剛剛過去的二十世紀叫作“分析的時代”。

近一個時期以來，內地的哲學家們也想用五個字概括當今的時代，有的人叫它“物化的時代”，有的人叫它“體驗的時代”，有的人叫它“信息的時代”，如此等等。

總而言之，哲學，恰如哲學家黑格爾所說的，它是思想中所把握到的時代，就是思想中所把握到的人生。它是以一種理論的方式表征了人的特定的歷史的存在。

剛才說到的“導師哲學家叢書”所概括的歷史時代，特別是在座的有學哲學的，有學歷史的，你們就會很清楚，這正是一個人的人化的過程。中世紀“信仰的時代”，先上帝而后自我，先信仰而后理解。那么，從文藝復興以來就發生了一個巨大的顛倒，笛卡爾說“我思故我在”，意思是說我先有思想然后才有我的存在嗎？不是！他是說先自我而后上帝，先理解而后信仰，這才是從封建社會的自然經濟到資本主義社會的市場經濟的轉化。

什么叫作從自然經濟轉向市場經濟呢？這是一種人的存在方式的轉化，是一個人化的過程。自然經濟條件下，是一種經濟生活的禁欲主義，精神生活的蒙昧主義，政治生活的專制主義。走向市場經濟以來，在經濟生活當中反對禁欲主義而要求現實幸福，精神生活反對蒙昧主義而要求理性自由，在政治生活當中反對專制主義而要求民主法治。市場經濟實際上蘊含著三條基本原則：經濟生活的功利主義的價值取向，精神生活的工具理性的思維取向，政治生活的民主法治的政治取向。三位一體構成了馬克思所說的，市場經濟是以“物的依賴性為基礎的人的獨立性”的存在。這就是我們現代人的存在方式，這就是近代以來的人之為人的人化的過程。人是一種教養，而教養源于教育。這就是受教育的意義。所以無論是內地的同學還是臺灣的同學，你最應當珍視的就是能夠接受到高等教育，這是你作為人能夠成為現代人的一個最基本的前提。這就是人的人化。人是一個人化的過程。這就是我要跟大家講的第二個問題。

哲學家薩特

人的世界，有限世界的超越

哲學賦予人的生活以目的和意義的世界觀。哲學作為人類心靈的最深層的偉大創造，其主旨即在于使人的精神境界不斷地升華，在精神境界的升華中崇高起來。哲學的修養與創造，是人們追求崇高的過程，也是使人們自己崇高起來的過程。它要求學習哲學的人永葆理想性的追求。祝愿大家終生與哲學為伴，讓哲學引導我們對真理、正義和更美好事物的追求！謝謝大家！

馬克思在1867年8月16日看完《資本論》序言的校樣后，寫給恩格斯的信，感謝恩格斯所作的自我犧牲。

什么叫作神話的世界？神話的世界是自然世界的超越。什么叫作宗教的世界？宗教的世界是世俗世界的超越。什么叫作藝術的世界？藝術的世界是無情世界的超越。什么叫作倫理世界？倫理世界是小我世界的超越。什么叫作科學的世界？科學的世界是經驗世界的超越。什么叫作哲學的世界？哲學的世界是有限世界的超越。

人的人化過程，是一個形成人的世界、屬于人的世界的過程。世界這個概念，可以在兩個意義上去使用它:一是在自然的意義上去使用，另一個真實的意義，是在人給自己創造的世界的意義上去使用。

我在1988年曾經寫過一篇文章，正標題是“從兩極到中介”，副標題是“現代哲學的革命”。其中，談到怎么理解人的存在方式，怎么理解語言？語言既然是人的世界的積極界限，也是人的世界的消極界限，世界在人的語言中生成為有。

語言之外的世界，對于人來說，正如哲學家黑格爾所說的，是“有之非有”，“存在著的無”。語言是人的存在方式，又是我們的世界的存在的方式。我們在語言當中才構成了屬于人的世界。語言不是僅僅作為能指和所指的統一，而是作為歷史文化的水庫而存在的。它表明人是一種歷史文化的存在。人是歷史文化的結果，歷史文化的產物。人是以人類自己把握世界的方式而構成了屬于人的豐富多彩的世界。

人都以什么方式把握世界？是以常識的方式，神話的方式，宗教的方式，藝術的方式，倫理的方式，科學的方式和哲學的方式把握世界，因此對于我們來說有無限豐富的世界。

現代哲學和現代科學給了我們幾個最基本的命題，叫作觀察滲透理論，觀察負載理論，沒有中性的觀察，觀察總是被理論污染的。我們原來總認為科學始于觀察，甚至有人說，正確的科學研究和科學試驗，首先應當把我們自己的偏見像脫掉大衣一樣放到走廊里邊，用沒有偏見的頭腦進到實驗室。你只有有了相應的理論，才能夠有相應的世界。

馬克思說，人只有有了欣賞音樂的耳朵，才能夠欣賞音樂。你有什么樣的音樂修養，才能夠欣賞什么樣的音樂。想一想，沒有看羅曼?羅蘭，沒有看莎士比亞，沒有看巴爾扎克，沒有看托爾斯泰，怎么能有相應的修養去享受那樣一些相應的作品呢？正如黑格爾說的，有之非有，存在著的無！觀察負載理論，沒有中性的觀察，觀察總是被理論污染的。每個人所擁有的世界，同每個人所擁有的知識、理論、修養是密不可分的。

中國有一句古話叫作“君子坦蕩蕩，小人常戚戚”;西方人叫作“仆人眼中無英雄”。因為什么？就是因為你的背景不一樣么！知識背景，理論背景不一樣，你對生活的感受和理解也就不一樣了。

為什么君子坦蕩蕩？就因為他心中有老子、有孔子、有莊子，有孟子，養我浩然之氣，萬物皆備于我。

為什么小人常戚戚呢？因為他只知道張三李四，磯磯喳喳，爾虞我詐，蠅蠅茍茍。

為什么仆人眼中無英雄呢？因為英雄有英雄的事業，英雄有英雄的情懷。不理解英雄的事業，不懂得英雄的情懷，當然就“眼中無英雄”了。北國風光，千里冰封，萬里雪飄。這是毛澤東在《沁園春?雪》中對自然的禮贊。接著毛澤東寫歷史人物:惜秦皇漢武，略輸文采，唐宗宋祖，稍遜風騷，一代天驕，成吉思汗，只識彎弓射大雕。最后毛澤東說什么？俱往矣，數風流人物還看今朝！這就是政治家的一種博大而深邃的情懷!這也是藝術家的一種空靈而凝重的情懷！你如果不是作為政治家和藝術家的話，你就理解不了他的這種情懷。

我最強調一個年輕人必須得有兩個修養，一是文學修養，二是哲學修養。一個大學生沒有文學修養和哲學修養，肯定不會有一個完整的美好的人生，因為只有有了文學修養和哲學修養，有一種真實的審美的境界，才有這樣一種最強烈的理性之美。有了這樣兩個修養，這個世界對于你來說才是豐富多彩的。

這個屬于人的世界，它首先是一個常識的世界，同時它又是一個宗教的世界，一個藝術的世界，一個倫理的世界，一個科學的世界和一個哲學的世界。同學們需要學習，你有了哪種把握世界的方式，對你來說就有了哪種世界。因此，一個人只有在適當的年齡，受到適當的教育，他才是人。

因為，它使你獲得了那種把握世界的基本方式。什么叫作神話的世界？神話的世界是自然世界的超越。什么叫作宗教的世界？宗教的世界是世俗世界的超越。什么叫作藝術的世界？藝術的世界是無情世界的超越。什么叫作倫理世界？倫理世界是小我世界的超越。什么叫作科學的世界？科學的世界是經驗世界的超越。什么叫作哲學的世界？哲學的世界是有限世界的超越。你擁有了人類把握世界的基本方式，真正實現了人自身的超越性，才真正有了一個五彩繽紛的人的世界！

對于人來說，首先就是一個常識的世界。常識是源于經驗、適用于經驗但卻不能超越經驗的知識。常識是每個正常的健全人都普遍認同的，在經驗中所獲得的知識。人人都在生活經驗中分享常識、體驗常識、重復常識和貢獻新的常識。在常識中，人們的經驗世界得到最廣泛的相互理解，人們的思想感情得到最普遍的相互溝通，人們的行為方式得到最直接的相互協調，人們的內心世界得到最便捷的自我認同。常識既為我們構成經驗的世界圖景，又為我們構成經驗的思維方式，還為我們構成經驗的價值規范。常識是人類把握世界的最具普遍性的基本方式。沒有常識的人是不正常的，正常的人就得有常識。

常識構成經驗的世界，而人的情感、意志和思想卻總是超越經驗的常識，總是以超越常識的各種方式去構成豐富多彩的人的世界。神話就是對自然世界的超越。很多人看神話小說。其實，神話并不只是一種文學樣式，它還是人類把握世界的一種方式。人在神話世界當中，既把人的世界宇宙化了，又把宇宙的世界擬人化了。在那個被擬人化的宇宙世界當中，人找到了自身存在的意義和價值，所以人總是給自己構成一個神話的世界。金庸、梁羽生，為什么大家愿意看他們的書呢？因為從某種意義上，它使人們獲得了一個神話的世界。在神話的世界中，人們把自己的向往和追求、煩惱和憂傷對象化了。

宗教世界是世俗世界的超越。宗教使人們的生活獲得了一種神圣的意義。宗教里面，特別是西方上帝的觀念，是很值得思考的。

按照我自己的說法，什么叫作上帝？上帝就是規范人的思想和行為的根據、標準和尺度，哲學本體意義上的觀念構成心中的上帝。上帝不是一種對象性的存在，是你心中的一種觀念。

用馬克思的話說，宗教就是沒有獲得自我或者是再度喪失了自我的一種自我意識或自我感覺。因為人要超越自己所生活的世俗的世界，從一種神圣的存在來獲得生活的意義和價值。所以哲學家尼采說，上帝被殺死了，一切都是可能的。這句話是什么意思呢？它正好是說了這樣的兩層意思。一層是說，整個的哲學和科學，它的理性的求索殺死了上帝，上帝不再作為人的思想和行為的根據、標準和尺度。上帝不存在了，上帝被人本化了。一旦這個神圣的意義不再存在了，人的一切就都是可能的了。

所以，我曾經給我的學生講了一段很長的話：“在自然經濟的條件下，是在一種沒有選擇標準的生命中不堪忍受之重的本質主義的肆虐；而在市場經濟的條件下，是一種失去了標準的選擇的生命中不能承受之輕的存在主義的焦慮。”

什么叫本質主義的肆虐呢？沒有選擇的標準，給你什么標準就是什么標準，你自己沒有選擇的余地。這就是生命中不堪忍受之重的本質主義的肆虐。你們現在的生活，我把它叫作一種失去了標準的選擇的、生命中不能承受之輕的存在主義的焦慮。

現在有的人穿的短衫上寫，煩死了，別理我;或者干脆就寫一個字：煩！這不就是存在主義的焦慮么！生命中不能承受之輕。這是今天向我們提出的問題。為什么呢？馬克思曾經說過，市場經濟撕去了封建社會的田園詩般的溫情脈脈的面紗，抹去了一切職業的靈光，把一切都沉浸到金錢的冰水當中去了。這就是存在方式的變化，上帝被殺死了，上帝被人本化了，我們用什么東西使我們的生活有真實的意義呢？我們需要藝術的世界，倫理的世界，科學的世界和哲學的世界。

什么是藝術的世界？藝術的世界是對無情世界的超越，藝術是一種生命的形式。美學家蘇珊?朗格說，藝術叫作創造。為什么？舞蹈家是創造了胳膊還是創造了腿？畫家是創造了油彩還是創造了畫布？文學家是創造了語言還是創造了文字？沒有，但他們創造了意義！我非常欣賞魯迅先生在三十年代翻譯的一本書《苦悶的象征》，其中說，憤怒出詩人。

在今天這個市場經濟的條件下，最難出的就是詩人。你看看在80年代的臺灣校園歌曲里邊，你還能夠深切地感受到外婆的澎湖灣呀這樣的一些詩情畫意當中所蘊含著的一種恬淡的生活的境界。現在呢？在市場經濟的條件下，最難感受到的就是海德格爾最欣賞的荷爾德林的那句詩：人，詩意地棲居在大地上。哲學和文學呀，只不過是幫助我們大家詩意地棲居在這個大地上。藝術的真實是人生境界的升華。所以你看徐悲鴻畫的馬，它并不是草原奔馳的駿馬;齊白石畫的蝦，也不是水中游曳的蝦；但是，你看看徐悲鴻畫的馬、齊白石畫的蝦，你不感到是一種生命的躍動嗎？這不就叫作藝術么！藝術使我們體驗到了生活的深度，使我們的情感獲得了一種真實的深度。

再說倫理的世界。我把今天的社會思潮概括為兩極對立模式的消解，英雄主義時代的隱退，高層精英文化的失落，理性主義權威的弱化和人類精神家園的困惑。人類面對著許多共同的問題。前幾天聯合國教科文組織在我們這里舉辦的世界哲學節，在大會上我寫了一句話：“趨利避害，這個不言而喻的生存邏輯卻成為當代人類的最為嚴峻的行為選擇”。

人就是趨利避害的么，趨利避害這個不言而喻的生存邏輯卻構成了當代人類最為嚴峻的行為選擇了。為什么現在凸顯了環境問題呢？大家都知道，現在內地正在講科學發展觀，叫作全面、協調、可持續發展。為什么？這就是今天人類面對著的共同的問題。解決這個問題，決不僅僅是依賴技術手段，更重要的是解決社會問題，解決人之間的關系問題，解決發展的標準與選擇問題。倫理的世界呢，它是一種小我世界的超越，在我們今天的社會生活當中就具有更加重要的作用了。

馬克思說，人的本質在其現實性上，是社會關系的總和。人不是一種純自然的存在，而是一種社會性的存在，而這種社會性的存在最重要的問題就是，小我與大我的關系，離開了大我沒有小我的存在。所以這種倫理的世界是一種小我世界的超越。

人類面對著的一個共同的問題，是發展的問題。我們在自己的行為選擇當中必須深切地思考發展的問題。今天不是都講經濟全球化么，在經濟全球化的過程當中，我們必須有一種深層的時代意識，關于人類生存和發展的自我意識。

為什么20世紀80年代以來由羅爾斯的《正義論》為標志的政治哲學會成為顯學？因為公平、正義問題成為當代人類面對的重大問題。我們在座的學文史哲的、政經法的都有，無論你在文科的意義上學習哪門學科，一個共同的問題都是為當代人類的發展提供一種理論的前提。用解釋學大師伽達默爾的話說，理論是實踐的反義詞，理論就是對實踐的反駁，我們只有掌握了理論才能夠使我們作出一種比較好的選擇。

大家都在學習科學。科學同樣是人類把握世界的一種基本方式，它是經驗世界的超越。什么叫科學？科學給予我們一種普遍必然性的認識，從而對經驗世界作出規律性的解釋和預見。科學的世界是一個超驗的世界，超越了經驗的世界。

正因為是這樣，所以卡西爾在《人論》里邊說，科學在這個世界上具有無與倫比的作用，它使人類的思維達到了一種極致。“在我們現代世界中，再沒有第二種力量可以與科學思想的力量相匹敵”。科學改變了我們的世界圖景，改變了我們的思維方式，也改變了我們的價值觀念。科學改變了我們的生活。我們以科學的方式去把握這個世界，從而以科學的方式規范我們自己的思想和行為。這就是一種經驗世界的超越。

最后我們再回到哲學。人類面對千差萬別、千變萬化、無邊無際、無始無終的茫茫宇宙，又面對有生有死、有愛有恨、有聚有散、有得有失的有限人生，總會馳騁自己的探索宇宙、人生奧秘的智慧，超越自己所理解的有限的世界。哲學是對有限世界的超越。人們俯仰古今而覺時間之無限，環顧天地而覺空間之永恒，回顧自身而覺人之立于兩者間的萬千感慨！人總是試圖超越“哀吾生之須臾，羨長江之無窮”的困惑與迷惘，以自己的超越性為人生尋求“安身立命之本”。“愛智”的哲學，就是一種超越有限對永恒的無奈、實現“天人合一”的渴望。人的超越性，以哲學的方式迸發出無比瑰麗的光彩。

文藝復興時期意大利畫家拉斐爾繪的《雅典學派》，圖中站立者為柏拉圖和

亞里士多德。

第三篇：維特根斯坦 哲學演講(英文)

維特根斯坦 哲學演講（英文）

2006年6月27日

來源:論壇主題I am going to exclude from our discussion questions which are answered by experience.Philosophical problems are not solved by experience, for what we talk about in philosophy are not facts but things for which facts are useful.Philosophical trouble arises through seeing a system of rules and seeing that things do not fit it.It is like advancing and retreating from a tree stump and seeing different things.We go nearer, remember the rules, and feel satisfied, then retreat and feel dissatisfied.2 Words and chess pieces are analogous;knowing how to use a word is like knowing how to move a chess piece.Now how do the rules enter into playing the game? What is the difference between playing the game and aimlessly moving the pieces? I do not deny there is a difference, but I want to say that knowing how a piece is to be used is not a particular state of mind which goes on while the game goes on.The meaning of a word is to be defined by the rules for its use, not by the feeling that attaches to the words.“How is the word used?” and “What is the grammar of the word?” I shall take as being the same question.The phrase, “bearer of the word”, standing for what one points to in giving an ostensive definition, and “meaning of the word” have entirely different grammars;the two are not synonymous.To explain a word such as “red” by pointing to something gives but one rule for its use, and in cases where one cannot point, rules of a different sort are given.All the rules together give the meaning, and these are not fixed by giving an ostensive definition.The rules of grammar are entirely independent of one another.Two words have the same meaning if they have the same rules for their use.Are the rules, for example, ~ ~ p = p for negation, responsible to the meaning of a word? No.The rules constitute the meaning, and are not responsible to it.The meaning changes when one of its rules changes.If, for example, the game of chess is defined in terms of its rules, one cannot say the game changes if a rule for moving a piece were changed.Only when we are speaking of the history of the game can we talk of change.Rules are arbitrary in the sense that they are not responsible to some sort of reality-they are not similar to natural laws;nor are they responsible to some meaning the word already has.If someone says the rules of negation are not arbitrary because negation could not be such that ~~p =~p, all that could be meant is that the latter rule would not correspond to the English word “negation”.The objection that the rules are not arbitrary comes from the feeling that they are responsible to the meaning.But how is the meaning of “negation” defined, if not by the rules? ~ ~p =p does not follow from the meaning of “not” but constitutes it.Similarly, p.p ?q.?.q does not depend on the meanings of “and” and “implies”;it constitutes their meaning.If it is said that the rules of negation are not arbitrary inasmuch as they must not contradict each other, the reply is that if there were a contradiction among them we should simply no longer call certain of them rules.“It is part of the grammar of the word 'rule' that if 'p' is a rule, 'p.~p' is not a rule.” 3 Logic proceeds from premises just as physics does.But the primitive propositions of physics are results of very general experience, while those of logic are not.To distinguish between the propositions of physics and those of logic, more must be done than to produce predicates such as experiential and self-evident.It must be shown that a grammatical rule holds for one and not for the other.4 In what sense are laws of inference laws of thought? Can a reason be given for thinking as we do? Will this require an answer outside the game of reasoning? There are two senses of “reason”: reason for, and cause.These are two different orders of things.One needs to decide on a criterion for something's being a reason before reason and cause can be distinguished.Reasoning is the calculation actually done, and a reason goes back one step in the calculus.A reason is a reason only inside the game.To give a reason is to go through a process of calculation, and to ask for a reason is to ask how one arrived at the result.The chain of reasons comes to an end, that is, one cannot always give a reason for a reason.But this does not make the reasoning less valid.The answer to the question, Why are you frightened?, involves a hypothesis if a cause is given.But there is no hypothetical element in a calculation.To do a thing for a certain reason may mean several things.When a person gives as his reason for entering a room that there is a lecture, how does one know that is his reason? The reason may be nothing more than just the one he gives when asked.Again, a reason may be the way one arrives at a conclusion, e.g., when one multiplies 13 x 25.It is a calculation, and is the justification for the result 325.The reason for fixing a date might consist in a man's going through a game of checking his diary and finding a free time.The reason here might be said to be included in the act he performs.A cause could not be included in this sense.We are talking here of the grammar of the words “reason” and “cause”: in what cases do we say we have given a reason for doing a certain thing, and in what cases, a cause? If one answers the question “Why did you move your arm?” by giving a behaviouristic explanation, one has specified a cause.Causes may be discovered by experiments, but experiments do not produce reasons.The word “reason” is not used in connection with experimentation.It is senseless to say a reason is found by experiment.The alternative, “mathematical argument or experiential evidence?” corresponds to “reason or cause?” 5 Where the class defined by f can be given by an enumeration, i.e., by a list,(x)fx is simply a logical product and(?x)fx a logical sum.E.g.,(x)fx.=.fa.fb.fc, and(?x)fx.=.fa v fb v fc.Examples are the class of primary colours and the class of tones of the octave.In such cases it is not necessary to add “and a, b, c,...are the only f's” The statement, “In this picture I see all the primary colours”, means “I see red and green and blue...”, and to add “and these are all the primary colours” says neither more nor less than “I see all...”;whereas to add to “a, b, c are people in the room” that a, b, c are all the people in the room says more than “(x)x is a person in the room”, and to omit it is to say less.If it is correct to say the general proposition is a shorthand for a logical product or sum, as it is in some cases, then the class of things named in the product or sum is defined in the grammar, not by properties.For example, being a tone of the octave is not a quality of a note.The tones of an octave are a list.Were the world composed of “individuals” which were given the names “a”, “b”, “c”, etc., then, as in the case of the tones, there would be no proposition “and these are all the individuals”.Where a general proposition is a shorthand for a product, deduction of the special proposition fa from(x)fx is straightforward.But where it is not, how does fa follow? “Following” is of a special sort, just as the logical product is of a special sort.And although(?x)fx.fa.=.fa is analogous to p v q.p.=.p, fa “follows” in a different way in the two cases where(?x)fx is a shorthand for a logical sum and where it is not.We have a different calculus where(?x)fx is not a logical sum fa is not deduced asp is deduced in the calculus of T's and F's from p v q.p.I once made a calculus in which following was the same in all cases.But this was a mistake.Note that the dots in the disjunctions v fb v fc v...have different grammars:(1)“and so on” indicates laziness when the disjunction is a shorthand for a logical sum, the class involved being given by an enumeration,(2)“and so on” is an entirely different sign with new rules when it does not correspond to any enumeration, e.g., “2 is even v 4 is even v 6 is even...”,(3)“and so on” refers to positions in visual space, as contrasted with positions correlated with the numbers of the mathematical continuum.As an example of(3)consider “There is a circle in the square”.Here it might appear that we have a logical sum whose terms could be determined by observation, that there is a number of positions a circle could occupy in visual space, and that their number could be determined by an experiment, say, by coordinating them with turns of a micrometer.But there is no number of positions in visual space, any more than there is a number of drops of rain which you see.The proper answer to the question, “How many drops did you see?”, is many, not that there was a number but you don't know how many.Although there are twenty circles in the square, and the micrometer would give the number of positions coordinated with them, visually you may not see twenty.6 I have pointed out two kinds of cases(I)those like “In this melody the composer used all the notes of the octave”, all the notes being enumerable,(2)those like “All circles in the square have crosses”.Russell's notation assumes that for every general proposition there are names which can be given in answer to the question “Which ones?”(in contrast to, “What sort?”).Consider(?x)fx, the notation for “There are men on the island” and for “There is a circle in the square”.Now in the case of human beings, where we use names, the question “Which men?” has meaning.But to say there is a circle in the square may not allow the question “Which?” since we have no names “a”, “b”, etc.for circles.In some cases it is senseless to ask “Which circle?”, though “What sort of circle is in the square-a red one?, a large one?” may make sense.The questions “which?” and “What sort?” are muddled together [so that we think both always make sense].Consider the reading Russell would give of his notation for “There is a circle in the square”: “There is a thing which is a circle in the square”.What is the thing? Some people might answer: the patch I am pointing to.But then how should we write “There are three patches”? What is the substrate for the property of being a patch? What does it mean to say “All things are circles in the square”, or “There is not a thing that is a circle in the square” or “All patches are on the wall”? What are the things? These sentences have no meaning.To the question whether a meaning mightn't be given to “There is a thing which is a circle in the square” I would reply that one might mean by it that one out of a lot of shapes in the square was a circle.And “All patches are on the wall” might mean something if a contrast was being made with the statement that some patches were elsewhere.7 What is it to look for a hidden contradiction, or for the proof that there is no contradiction? “To look for” has two different meanings in the phrases “to look for something at the North Pole”, “to look for a solution to a problem”.One difference between an expedition of discovery to the North Pole and an attempt to find a mathematical solution is that with the former it is possible to describe beforehand what is looked for, whereas in mathematics when you describe the solution you have made the expedition and have found what you looked for.The description of the proof is the proof itself, whereas to find the thing at the North Pole it is not enough to describe it.You must make the expedition.There is no meaning to saying you can describe beforehand what a solution will be like in mathematics except in the cases where there is a known method of solution.Equations, for example, belong to entirely different games according to the method of solving them.To ask whether there is a hidden contradiction is to ask an ambiguous question.Its meaning will vary according as there is, or is not, a method of answering it.If we have no way of looking for it, then “contradiction” is not defined.In what sense could we describe it? We might seem to have fixed it by giving the result, a not= a.But it is a result only if it is in organic connection with the construction.To find a contradiction is to construct it.If we have no means of hunting for a contradiction, then to say there might be one has no sense.We must not confuse what we can do with what the calculus can do.8 Suppose the problem is to find the construction of a pentagon.The teacher gives the pupil the general idea of a pentagon by laying off lengths with a compass, and also shows the construction of triangles, squares, and hexagons.These figures are coordinated with the cardinal numbers.The pupil has the cardinal number 5, the idea of construction by ruler and compasses, and examples of constructions of regular figures, but not the law.Compare this with being taught to multiply.Were we taught all the results, or weren't we? We may not have been taught to do 61 x 175, but we do it according to the rule which we have been taught.Once the rule is known, a new instance is worked out easily.We are not given all the multiplications in the enumerative sense, but we are given all in one sense: any multiplication can be carried out according to rule.Given the law for multiplying, any multiplication can be done.Now in telling the pupil what a pentagon is and showing what constructions with ruler and compasses are, the teacher gives the appearance of having defined the problem entirely.But he has not, for the series of regular figures is a law, but not a law within which one can find the construction of the pentagon.When one does not know how to construct a pentagon one usually feels that the result is clear but the method of getting to it is not.But the result is not clear.The constructed pentagon is a new idea.It is something we have not had before.What misleads us is the similarity of the pentagon constructed to a measured pentagon.We call our construction the construction of the pentagon because of its similarity to a perceptually regular five-sided figure.The pentagon is analogous to other regular figures;but to tell a person to find a construction analogous to the constructions given him is not to give him any idea of the construction of a pentagon.Before the actual construction he does not have the idea of the construction.When someone says there must be a law for the distribution of primes despite the fact that neither the law nor how to go about finding it is known, we feel that the person is right.It appeals to something in us.We take our idea of the distribution of primes from their distribution in a finite interval.Yet we have no clear idea of the distribution of primes.In the case of the distribution of even numbers we can show it thus: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6,..., and also by mentioning a law which we could write out algebraically.In the case of the distribution of primes we can only show: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7,...Finding a law would give a new idea of distribution just as a new idea about the trisection of an angle is given when it is proved that it is not possible by straight edge and compasses.Finding a new method in mathematics changes the game.If one is given an idea of proof by being given a series of proofs, then to be asked for a new proof is to be asked for a new idea of proof.Suppose someone laid off the points on a circle in order to show, as he imagined, the trisection of an angle.We would not be satisfied, which means that he did not have our idea of trisection.In order to lead him to admit that what he had was not trisection we should have to lead him to something new.Suppose we had a geometry allowing only the operation of bisection.The impossibility of trisection in this geometry is exactly like the impossibility of trisecting an angle in Euclidean geometry.And this geometry is not an incomplete Euclidean geometry.9 Problems in mathematics are not comparable in difficulty;they are entirely different problems.Suppose one was told to prove that a set of axioms is free from contradiction but was supplied with no method of doing it.Or suppose it was said that someone had done it, or that he had found seven 7's in the development of pi.Would this be understood? What would it mean to say that there is a proof that there are seven 7's but that there is no way of specifying where they are? Without a means of finding them the concept of pi is the concept of a construction which has no connection with the idea of seven 7's.Now it does make sense to say “There are seven 7's in the first 100 places”, and although “There are seven 7's in the development” does not mean the same as the italicised sentence, one might maintain that it nevertheless makes sense since it follows from something which does make sense.Even though you accepted this as a rule, it is only one rule.I want to say that if you have a proof of the existence of seven 7's which does not tell you where they are, the sentence for the existence theorem has an entirely different meaning than one for which a means for finding them is given.To say that a contradiction is hidden, where there is nevertheless a way of finding it, makes sense, but what is the sense in saying there is a hidden contradiction when there is no way? Again, compare a proof that an algebraic equation of nth degree has n roots, in connection with which there is a method of approximation, with a proof for which no such method exists.Why call the latter a proof of existence? Some existence proofs consist in exhibiting a particular mathematical structure, i.e., in “constructing an entity”.If a proof does not do this, “existence proof” and “existence theorem” are being used in another sense.Each new proof in mathematics widens the meaning of “proof”.With Fermat's theorem, for example, we do not know what it would be like for it to be proved.What “existence” means is determined by the proof.The end-result of a proof is not isolated from the proof but is like the end surface of a solid.It is organically connected with the proof which is its body.In a construction as in a proof we seem first to give the result and then find the construction or proof.But one cannot point out the result of a construction without giving the construction.The construction is the end of one's efforts rather than a means to the result.The result, say a regular pentagon, only matters insofar as it is an incitement to make certain manipulations.It would not be useless.For example, a teacher who told someone to find a colour beyond the rainbow would be expressing himself incorrectly, but what he said would have provided a useful incitement to the person who found ultra-violet.10 If an atomic proposition is one which does not contain and, or, or apparent variables, then it might be said that it is not possible to distinguish atomic from molecular propositions.For p may be written as p.p or ~ ~p, and fa as fa v fa or as(?x)fx.x = a.But “and”, “or”, and the apparent variables are so used that they can be eliminated from these expressions by the rules.So we can disregard these purportedly molecular expressions.The word “and”, for example, is differently used in cases where it can be eliminated from those in which it cannot.Whether a proposition is atomic, i.e., whether it is not a truth-function of other propositions, is to be decided by applying certain methods of analysis laid down strictly.But when we have no method, it makes no sense to say there may be a hidden logical constant.The question whether such a seemingly atomic proposition as “It rains” is molecular, that it is, say, a logical product, is like asking whether there is a hidden contradiction when there is no method of answering the question.Our method might consist in looking up definitions.We might find that “It's rotten weather”, for example, means “It is cold and damp”.Having a means of analysing a proposition is like having a method for finding out whether there is a 6 in the product 25 x 25, or like having a rule which allows one to see whether a proposition is tautologous.Russell and I both expected to find the first elements, or “individuals”, and thus the possible atomic propositions, by logical analysis.Russell thought that subject-predicate propositions, and 2-term relations, for example, would be the result of a final analysis.This exhibits a wrong idea of logical analysis: logical analysis is taken as being like chemical analysis.And we were at fault for giving no examples of atomic propositions or of individuals.We both in different ways pushed the question of examples aside.We should not have said “We can't give them because analysis has not gone far enough, but we'll get there in time”.Atomic propositions are not the result of an analysis which has yet to be made.We can talk of atomic propositions if we mean those which on their face do not contain “and”, “or”, etc., or those which in accordance with methods of analysis laid down do not contain these.There are no hidden atomic propositions.11 In teaching a child language by pointing to things and pronouncing the words for them, where does the use of a proposition start? If you teach him to touch certain colours when you say the word “red”, you have evidently not taught him sentences.There is an ambiguity in the use of the word “proposition” which can be removed by making certain distinctions.I suggest defining it arbitrarily rather than trying to portray usage.What is called understanding a sentence is not very different from what a child does when he points to colours on hearing colour words.Now there are all sorts of language-games suggested by the one in which colour words are taught: games of orders and commands, of question and answer, of questions and “Yes” and “No.” We might think that in teaching a child such language games we are not teaching him a language but are only preparing him for it.But these games are complete;nothing is lacking.It might be said that a child who brought me a book when I said “The book, please” would not understand this to mean “Bring me a book”, as would an adult.But this full sentence is no more complete than “book”.Of course “book” is not what we call a sentence.A sentence in a language has a particular sort of jingle.But it is misleading to suppose that “book” is a shorthand for something longer which might be in a person's mind when it is understood.The word “book” might not lack anything, except to a person who had never heard elliptic sentences, in which case he would need a table with the ellipses on one side and sentences on the other.Now what role do truth and falsity play in such language-games? In the game where the child responds by pointing to colours, truth and falsity do not come in.If the game consists in question and answer and the child responds, say, to the question “How many chairs?”, by giving the number, again truth and falsity may not come in, though it might if the child were taught to reply “Six chairs agrees with reality”.If he had been taught the use of “true” and “false” instead of “Yes” and “No”, they would of course come in.Compare how differently the word “false” comes into the game where the child is taught to shout “red” when red appears and the game where he is to guess the weather, supposing now that we use the word “false” in the following circumstances: when he shouts “green” when something red appears, and when he makes a wrong guess about the weather.In the first case the child has not got hold of the game, he has offended against the rules;in the second he has made a mistake.The two are like playing chess in violation of the rules, and playing it and losing.In a game where a child is taught to bring colours when you say “red”, etc., you might say that “Bring me red” and “I wish you to bring me red” are equivalent to “red”;in fact that until the child understands “red” as information about the state of mind of the person ordering the colour he does not understand it at all.But “I wish you to bring me red” adds nothing to this game.The order “red” cannot be said to describe a state of mind, e.g., a wish, unless it is part of a game containing descriptions of states of mind.“I wish...” is part of a larger game if there are two people who express wishes.The word “I” is then not replaceable by “John”.A new multiplicity means having another game.I have wanted to show by means of language-games the vague way in which we use “language”, “proposition”, “sentence”.There are many things, such as orders, which we may or may not call propositions;and not only one game can be called language.Language-games are a clue to the understanding of logic.Since what we call a proposition is more or less arbitrary, what we call logic plays a different role from that which Russell and Frege supposed.We mean all sorts of things by “proposition”, and it is wrong to start with a definition of a proposition and build up logic from that.If “proposition” is defined by reference to the notion of a truth-function, then arithmetic equations are also propositions-which does not make them the same as such a proposition as “He ran out of the building”.When Frege tried to develop mathematics from logic he thought the calculus of logic was the calculus, so that what followed from it would be correct mathematics.Another idea on a par with this is that all mathematics could be derived from cardinal arithmetic.Mathematics and logic were one building, with logic the foundation.This I deny;Russell's calculus is one calculus among others.It is a bit of mathematics.12 It was Frege's notion that certain words are unique, on a different level from others, e.g., “word”, “proposition”, “world”.And I once thought that certain words could be distinguished according to their philosophical importance: “grammar”, “logic”, “mathematics”.I should like to destroy this appearance of importance.How is it then that in my investigations certain words come up again and again? It is because I am concerned with language, with troubles arising from a particular use of language.The characteristic trouble we are dealing with is due to our using language automatically, without thinking about the rules of grammar.In general the sentences we are tempted to utter occur in practical situations.But then there is a different way we are tempted to utter sentences.This is when we look at language, consciously direct our attention on it.And then we make up sentences of which we say that they also ought to make sense.A sentence of this sort might not have any particular use, but because it sounds English we consider it sensible.Thus, for example, we talk of the flow of time and consider it sensible to talk of its flow, after the analogy of rivers.13 If we look at a river in which numbered logs are floating, we can describe events on land with reference to these, e.g., “When the 105th log passed, I ate dinner”.Suppose the log makes a bang on passing me.We can say these bangs are separated by equal, or unequal, intervals.We could also say one set of bangs was twice as fast as another set.But the equality or inequality of intervals so measured is entirely different from that measured by a clock.The phrase “length of interval” has its sense in virtue of the way we determine it, and differs according to the method of measurement.Hence the criteria for equality of intervals between passing logs and for equality of intervals measured by a clock are different.We cannot say that two bangs two seconds apart differ only in degree from those an hour apart, for we have no feeling of rhythm if the interval is an hour long.And to say that one rhythm of bangs is faster than another is different from saying that the interval between these two bangs passed much more slowly than the interval between another pair.Suppose that the passing logs seem to be equal distances apart.We have an experience of what might be called the velocity of these(though not what is measured by a clock).Let us say the river moves uniformly in this sense.But if we say time passed more quickly between logs 1 and 100 than between logs 100 and 200, this is only an analogy;really nothing has passed more quickly.To say time passes more quickly, or that time flows, is to imagine something flowing.We then extend the simile and talk about the direction of time.When people talk of the direction of time, precisely the analogy of a river is before them.Of course a river can change its direction of flow, but one has a feeling of giddiness when one talks of time being reversed.The reason is that the notion of flowing, of something, and of the direction of the flow is embodied in our language.Suppose that at certain intervals situations repeated themselves, and that someone said time was circular.Would this be right or wrong? Neither.It would only be another way of expression, and we could just as well talk of a circular time.However, the picture of time as flowing, as having a direction, is one that suggests itself very vigorously.Suppose someone said that the river on which the logs float had a beginning and will have an end, that there will be 100 more logs and that will be the end.It might be said that there is an experience which would verify these statements.Compare this with saying that time ceases.What is the criterion for its ceasing or for its going on? You might say that time ceases when “Time River” ceases.Suppose we had no substantive “time”, that we talked only of the passing of logs.Then we could have a measurement of time without any substantive “time”.Or we could talk of time coming to an end, meaning that the logs came to an end.We could in this sense talk of time coming to an end.Can time go on apart from events? What is the criterion for time involved in “Events began 100 years ago and time began 200 years ago”? Has time been created, or was the world created in time? These questions are asked after the analogy of “Has this chair been made?”, and are like asking whether order has been created(a “before” and “after”).“Time” as a substantive is terribly misleading.We have got to make the rules of the game before we play it.Discussion of “the flow of time” shows how philosophical problems arise.Philosophical troubles are caused by not using language practically but by extending it on looking at it.We form sentences and then wonder what they can mean.Once conscious of “time” as a substantive, we ask then about the creation of time.14 If I asked for a description of yesterday's doings and you gave me an account, this account could be verified.Suppose what you gave as an account of yesterday happened tomorrow.This is a possible state of affairs.Would you say you remembered the future? Or would you say instead that you remembered the past? Or are both statements senseless? We have here two independent orders of events(1)the order of events in our memory.Call this memory time.(2)the order in which information is got by asking different people, 53 o'clock.Call this information time.In information time there will be past and future with respect to a particular day.And in memory time, with respect to an event, there will also be past and future.Now if you want to say that the order of information is memory time, you can.And if you are going to talk about both information and memory time, then you can say that you remember the past.If you remember that which in information time is future, you can say “I remember the future”.15 It is not a priori that the world becomes more and more disorganised with time.It is a matter of experience that disorganisation comes at a later rather than an earlier time.It is imaginable, for example, that by stirring nuts and raisins in a tank of chocolate they become unshuffled.But it is not a matter of experience that equal distributions of nuts and raisins must occur when they are swished about.There is no experience of something necessarily happening.To say that if equal distribution does not occur there must be a difference in weight of the nuts and raisins, even though these have not been weighed, is to assume some other force to explain the unshuffling.We tend to say that there must be some explanation if equal distribution does not occur.Similarly, we say of a planet's observed eccentric behaviour that there must be some planet attracting it.This is analogous to saying that if two apples were added to two apples and we found three, one must have vanished.Or like saying that a die must fall on one of six sides.When the possibility of a die's falling on edge is excluded, and not because it is a matter of experience that it falls only on its sides, we have a statement which no experience will refute-a statement of grammar.Whenever we say that something must be the case we are using a norm of expression.Hertz said that wherever something did not obey his laws there must be invisible masses to account for it.This statement is not right or wrong, but may be practical or impractical.Hypotheses such as “invisible masses”, “unconscious mental events” are norms of expression.They enter into language to enable us to say there must be causes.(They are like the hypothesis that the cause is proportional to the effect.If an explosion occurs when a ball is dropped, we say that some phenomenon must have occurred to make the cause proportional to the effect.On hunting for the phenomenon and not finding it, we say that it has merely not yet been found.)We believe we are dealing with a natural law a priori, whereas we are dealing with a norm of expression that we ourselves have fixed.Whenever we say that something must be the case we have given an indication of a rule for the regulation of our expression, as if one were to say “Everybody is really going to Paris.True, some don't get there, but all their movements are preliminary”.The statement that there must be a cause shows that we have got a rule of language.Whether all velocities can be accounted for by the assumption of invisible masses is a question of mathematics, or grammar, and is not to be settled by experience.It is settled beforehand.It is a question of the adopted norm of explanation.In a system of mechanics, for example, there is a system of causes, although there may be no causes in another system.A system could be made up in which we would use the expression “My breakdown had no causes”.If we weighed a body on a balance and took the different readings several times over, we could either say that there is no such thing as absolutely accurate weighing or that each weighing is accurate but that the weight changes in an unaccountable manner.If we say we are not going to account for the changes, then we would have a system in which there are no causes.We ought not say that there are no causes in nature, but only that we have a system in which there are no causes.Determinism and indeterminism are properties of a system which are fixed arbitrarily.16 We begin with the question whether the toothache someone else has is the same as the toothache I have.Is his toothache merely outward behaviour? Or is it that he has the same as I am having now but that I don't know it since I can only say of another person that he is manifesting certain behaviour? A series of questions arises about personal experience.Isn't it thinkable that I have a toothache in someone else's tooth? It might be argued that my having toothache requires my mouth.But the experience of my having toothache is the same wherever the tooth is that is aching, and whoever's mouth it is in.The locality of pain is not given by naming a possessor.Further, isn't it imaginable that I live all my life looking in a mirror, where I saw faces and did not know which was my face, nor how my mouth was distinguished from anyone else's? If this were in fact the case, would I say I had toothache in my mouth? In a mirror I could speak with someone else's mouth, in which case what would we call me? Isn't it thinkable that I change my body and that I would have a feeling correlated with someone's else's raising his arm? The grammar of “having toothache” is very different from that of “having a piece of chalk”, as is also the grammar of “I have toothache” from “Moore has toothache”.The sense of “Moore has toothache” is given by the criterion for its truth.For a statement gets its sense from its verification.The use of the word “toothache” when I have toothache and when someone else has it belongs to different games.(To find out with what meaning a word is used, make several investigations.For example, the words “before” and “after” mean something different according as one depends on memory or on documents to establish the time of an event.)Since the criteria for “He has toothache” and “I have toothache” are so different, that is, since their verifications are of different sorts, I might seem to be denying that he has toothache.But I am not saying he really hasn't got it.Of course he has it: it isn't that he behaves as if he had it but really doesn't.For we have criteria for his really having it as against his simulating it.Nevertheless, it is felt that I should say that I do not know he has it.Suppose I say that when he has toothache he has what I have, except that I know it indirectly in his case and directly in mine.This is wrong.Judging that he has toothache is not like judging that he has money but I just can't see his billfold.Suppose it is held that I must judge indirectly since I can't feel his ache.Now what sense is there to this? And what sense is there to “I can feel my ache”? It makes sense to say “His ache is worse than mine”, but not to say “I feel my toothache” and “Two people can't have the same pain”.Consider the statement that no two people can ever see the same sense datum.If being in the same position as another person were taken as the criterion for someone's seeing the same sense datum as he does, then one could imagine a person seeing the same datum, say, by seeing through someone's head.But if there is no criterion for seeing the same datum, then “I can't know that he sees what I see” does not make sense.We are likely to muddle statements of fact which are undisputed with grammatical statements.Statements of fact and grammatical statements are not to be confused.The question whether someone else has what I have when I have toothache may be meaningless, though in an ordinary situation it might be a question of fact, and the answer, “He has not”, a statement of fact.But the philosopher who says of someone else, “He has not got what I have”, is not stating a fact.He is not saying that in fact someone else has not got toothache.It might be the case that someone else has it.And the statement that he has it has the meaning given it, that is, whatever sense is given by the criterion.The difficulty lies in the grammar of “having toothache”.Nonsense is produced by trying to express in a proposition something which belongs to the grammar of our language.By “I can't feel his toothache” is meant that I can't try.It is the character of the logical cannot that one can't try.Of course this doesn't get you far, as you can ask whether you can try to try.In the arguments of idealists and realists somewhere there always occur the words “can”, “cannot”, “must”.No attempt is made to prove their doctrines by experience.The words “possibility” and “necessity” express part of grammar, although patterned after their analogy to “physical possibility” and “physical necessity”.Another way in which the grammars of “I have toothache” and “He has toothache” differ is that it does not make sense to say “I seem to have toothache”, whereas it is sensible to say “He seems to have toothache”.The statements “I have toothache” and “He has toothache” have different verifications;but “verification” does not have the same meaning in the two cases.The verification of my having toothache is having it.It makes no sense for me to answer the question, “How do you know you have toothache?”, by “I know it because I feel it”.In fact there is something wrong with the question;and the answer is absurd.Likewise the answer, “I know it by inspection”.The process of inspection is looking, not seeing.The statement, “I know it by looking”, could be sensible, e.g., concentrating attention on one finger among several for a pain.But as we use the word “ache” it makes no sense to say that I look for it: I do not say I will find out whether I have toothache by tapping my teeth.Of “He has toothache” it is sensible to ask “How do you know?”, and criteria can be given which cannot be given in one's own case.In one's own case it makes no sense to ask “How do I know?” It might be thought that since my saying “He seems to have toothache” is sensible but not my saying a similar thing of myself, I could then go on to say “This is so for him but not for me”.Is there then a private language I am referring to, which he cannot understand, and thus that he cannot understand my statement that I have toothache? If this is so, it is not a matter of experience that he cannot.He is prevented from understanding, not because of a mental shortcoming but by a fact of grammar.If a thing is a priori impossible, it is excluded from language.Sometimes we introduce a sentence into our language without realising that we have to show rules for its use.(By introducing a third king into a chess game we have done nothing until we have given rules for it.)How am I to persuade someone that “I feel my pain” does not make sense? If he insists that it does he would probably say “I make it a rule that it makes sense”.This is like introducing a third king, and I then would raise many questions, for example, “Does it make sense to say I have toothache but don't feel it?” Suppose the reply was that it did.Then I could ask how one knows that one has it but does not feel it.Could one find this out by looking into a mirror and on finding a bad tooth know that one has a toothache? To show what sense a statement makes requires saying how it can be verified and what can be done with it.Just because a sentence is constructed after a model does not make it part of a game.We must provide a system of applications.The question, “What is its verification?”, is a good translation of “How can one know it?”.Some people say that the question, “How can one know such a thing?”, is irrelevant to the question, “What is the meaning?” But an answer gives the meaning by showing the relation of the proposition to other propositions.That is, it shows what it follows from and what follows from it.It gives the grammar of the proposition, which is what the question, “What would it be like for it to be true?”, asks for.In physics, for example, we ask for the meaning of a statement in terms of its verification.I have remarked that it makes no sense to say “I seem to have toothache”, which presupposes that it makes sense to say I can or cannot, doubt it.The use of the word “cannot” here is not at all like its use in “I cannot lift the scuttle”.This brings us to the question: What is the criterion for a sentence making sense? Consider the answer, “It makes sense if it is constructed according to the rules of grammar”.Then does this question mean anything: What must the rules be like to give it sense? If the rules of grammar are arbitrary, why not let the sentence make sense by altering the rules of grammar? Why not simply say “I make it a rule that this sentence makes sense”? 17 To say what rules of grammar make up a propositional game would require giving the characteristics of propositions, their grammar.We are thus led to the question, What is a proposition? I shall not try to give a general definition of “proposition”, as it is impossible to do so.This is no more possible than it is to give a definition of the word “game”.For any line we might draw would be arbitrary.Our way of talking about propositions is always in terms of specific examples, for we cannot talk about these more generally than about specific games.We could begin by giving examples such as the proposition “There is a circle on the blackboard 2 inches from the top and 5 inches from the side”.Let us represent this as “(2,5)”.Now let us construct something that would be said to make no sense: “(2,5,7)”.This would have to be explained(and you could give it sense), or else you could say it is a mistake or a joke.But if you say it makes no sense, you can explain why by explaining the game in which it has no use.Nonsense can look less and less like a sentence, less and less like a part of language.“Goodness is red” and “Mr.S came to today's redness” would be called nonsense, whereas we would never say a whistle was nonsense.An arrangement of chairs could be taken as a language, so that certain arrangements would be nonsense.Theoretically you could always say of a symbol that it makes sense, but if you did so you would be called upon to explain its sense, that is, to show the use you give it, how you operate with it.The words “nonsense' and ”sense“ get their meaning only in particular cases and may vary from case to case.We can still talk of sense without giving a clear meaning to ”sense“, just as we talk of winning or losing without the meaning of our terms being absolutely clear.In philosophy we give rules of grammar wherever we encounter a difficulty.To show what we do in philosophy I compare playing a game by rules and just playing about.We might feel that a complete logical analysis would give the complete grammar of a word.But there is no such thing as a completed grammar.However, giving a rule has a use if someone makes an opposite rule which we do not wish to follow.When we discover rules for the use of a known term we do not thereby complete our knowledge of its use, and we do not tell people how to use the term, as if they did not know how.Logical analysis is an antidote.Its importance is to stop the muddle someone makes on reflecting on words.18 To return to the differing grammars of ”I have toothache“ and ”He has toothache“, which show up in the fact that the statements have different verifications and also in the fact that it is sensible to ask, in the latter case, ”How do I know this?“, but not in the former.The solipsist is right in implying that these two are on different levels.I have said that we confuse ”I have a piece of chalk“ and ”He has a piece of chalk“ with ”I have an ache“ and ”He has an ache“.In the case of the first pair the verifications are analogous, although not in the case of the second pair.The function ”x has toothache“ has various values, Smith, Jones, etc.But not I.I is in a class by itself.The word ”I“ does not refer to a possessor in sentences about having an experience, unlike its use in ”I have a cigar“.We could have a language from which ”I“ is omitted from sentences describing a personal experience.{Instead of saying ”I think“ or ”I have an ache“ one might say ”It thinks“(like ”It rains“), and in place of ”I have an ache“, ”There is an ache here“.Under certain circumstances one might be strongly tempted to do away with the simple use of ”I“.We constantly judge a language from the standpoint of the language we are accustomed to, and hence we think we describe phenomena incompletely if we leave out personal pronouns.It is as though we had omitted pointing to something, since the word ”I“ seems to point to a person.But we can leave out the word ”I“ and still describe the phenomenon formerly described.It is not the case that certain changes in our symbolism are really omissions.One symbolism is in fact as good as the next;no one symbolism is necessary.The solipsist who says ”Only my experiences are real“ is saying that it is inconceivable that experiences other than his own are real.This is absurd if taken to be a statement of fact.Now if it is logically impossible for another person to have toothache, it is equally so for me to have toothache.To the person who says ”Only I have real toothache“ the reply should be: ”If only you can have real toothache, there is no sense in saying 'Only I have real toothache'.Either you don't need 'I' or you don't need 'real'...'I' is no longer opposed to anything.You had much better say 'There is toothache'.“ The statement, ”Only I have real toothache,“ either has a commonsense meaning, or, if it is a grammatical proposition, it is meant to be a statement of a rule.The solipsist wishes to say, ”I should like to put, instead of the notation 'I have real toothache' 'There is toothache' “.What the solipsist wants is not a notation in which the ego has a monopoly, but one in which the ego vanishes.Were the solipsist to embody in his notation the restriction of the epithet ”real“ to what we should call his experiences and exclude ”A has real toothache“(where A is not he), this would come to using ”There is real toothache“ instead of ”Smith(the solipsist)has toothache“.Getting into the solipsistic mood means not using the word ”I “ in describing a personal experience.Acceptance of such a change is tempting] because the description of a sensation does not contain a reference to either a person or a sense organ.Ask yourself, How do I, the person, come in? How, for example, does a person enter into the description of a visual sensation? If we describe the visual field, no person necessarily comes into it.We can say the visual field has certain internal properties, but its being mine is not essential to its description.That is, it is not an intrinsic property of a visual sensation, or a pain, to belong to someone.There will be no such thing as my image or someone else's.The locality of a pain has nothing to do with the person who has it: it is not given by naming a possessor.Nor is a body or an organ of sight necessary to the description of the visual field.The same applies to the description of an auditory sensation.The truth of the proposition, ”The noise is approaching my right ear“, does not require the existence of a physical ear;it is a description of an auditory experience, the experience being logically independent of the existence of my ears.The audible phenomenon is in an auditory space, and the subject who hears has nothing to do with the human body.Similarly, we can talk of a toothache without there being any teeth, or of thinking without there being a head involved.Pains have a space to move in, as do auditory experiences and visual data.The idea that a visual field belongs essentially to an organ of sight or to a human body having this organ is not based on what is seen.It is based on such facts of experience as that closing one's lids is accompanied by an event in one's visual field, or the experience of raising one's arm towards one's eye.It is an experiential proposition that an eye sees.We can establish connections between a human body and a visual field which are very different from those we are accustomed to.It is imaginable that I should see with my body rather than with my eyes, or that I could see with someone else's eyes and have toothache in his tooth.If we had a tube to our eyes and looked into a mirror, the idea of a perceiving organ could be dispensed with.Were all human bodies seen in a mirror, with a loudspeaker making the sounds when mouths moved, the idea of an ego speaking and seeing would become very different.20 The solipsist does not go through with a notation from which either ”I“ or ”real“ is deleted.He says ”Only my experiences are real“, or ”Only I have real toothache“, or ”The only pain that is real is what I feel“.This provokes someone to object that surely his pain is real.And this would not really refute the solipsist, any more than the realist refutes the idealist.The realist who kicks the stone is correct in saying it is real if he is using the word ”real“ as opposed to ”not real“.His rejoinder answers the question, ”Is it real or hallucinatory?“, but he does not refute the idealist who is not deterred by his objection.They still seem to disagree.Although the solipsist is right in treating ”I have toothache“ as being on a different level from ”He has toothache“, his statement that he has something that no one else has, and that of the person who denies it, are equally absurd.”Only my experiences are real“ and ”Everyone's experiences are real“ are equally nonsensical.21 Let us turn to a different task.What is the criterion for ”This is my body“? There is a criterion for ”This is my nose“: the nose would be possessed by the body to which it is attached.There is a temptation to say there is a soul to which the body belongs and that my body is the body that belongs to me.Suppose that all bodies were seen in a mirror, so that all were on the same level.I could talk of A's nose and Any nose in the same way.But if I singled out a body as mine, the grammar changes.Pointing to a mirror body and saying ”This is my body“ does not assert the same relation of possession between me and my body as is asserted by ”This is A's nose“ between A's body and A's nose.What is the criterion for one of the bodies being mine? It might be said that the body which moved when I had a certain feeling will be mine.(Recall that the ”I“ in ”I have a feeling“ does not denote a possessor.)Compare ”Which of these is my body?“ with ”Which of these is A's body?“, in which ”my“ is replaced by ”A's“.What is the criterion for the truth of the answer to the latter? There is a criterion for this, which in the case of the answer to ”Which is mine?“ there is not.If all bodies are seen in a mirror and the bodies themselves become transparent but the mirror images remain, my body will be where the mirror image is.And the criterion for something being my nose will be very different from its belonging to the body to which it is attached.In the mirror world, will deciding which body is mine be like deciding which body is A's? If the latter is decided by referring to a voice called ”A“ which is correlated to the body, then if I answer ”Which is my body?“ by referring to a voice called Wittgenstein, it will make no sense to ask which is my voice.There are two kinds of use of the word ”I“ when it occurs in answer to the question ”Who has toothache?“.For the most part the answer ”I“ is a sign coming from a certain body.If when people spoke, the sounds always came from a loudspeaker and the voices were alike, the word ”I“ would have no use at all: it would be absurd to say ”I have toothache“.The speakers could not be recognised by it.)Although there is a sense in which answering ”I“ to the question, ”Who has toothache?“, makes a reference to a body, even to this body of mine, my answer to the question whether I have toothache is not made by reference to any body.I have no need of a criterion.My body and the toothache are independent.Thus one answer to the question ”Who?“ is made by reference to a body, and another seems not to be, and to be of a different kind.22 Let us turn to the view, which is connected with ”All that is real is my experience“, namely, solipsism of the present moment: ”All that is real is the experience of the present moment“.(Cf.Wm.James' remark ”The present thought is the only thinker“, which makes the subject of thinking equivalent to the experience.)We may be inclined to make our language such that we will call only the present experience ”experience“.This will be a solipsistic language, but of course we must not make a solipsistic language without saying exactly what we mean by the word which in our old language meant ”present“.Russell said that remembering cannot prove that what is remembered actually occurred, because the world might have sprung into existence five minutes ago, with acts of remembering intact.We could go on to say that it might have been created one minute ago, and finally, that it might have been created in the present moment.Were this latter the situation we should have the equivalent of ”All that is real is the present moment“.Now if it is possible to say the world was created five minutes ago, could it be said that the world perished five minutes ago? This would amount to saying that the only reality was five minutes ago.Why does one feel tempted to say ”The only reality is the present“? The temptation to say this is as strong as that of saying that only my experience is real.The person who says only the present is real because past and future are not here has before his mind the image of something moving.past < present < future.This image is mispast present future leading, just as the blurred image we would draw of our visual field is misleading inasmuch as the field has no boundary.That the statement ”Only the present experience is real“ seems to mean something is due to familiar images we associate with it, images of things passing us in space.When in philosophy we talk of the present, we seem to be referring to a sort of Euclidean point.Yet when we talk of present experience it is impossible to identify the present with such a point.The difficulty is with the word ”present“.There is a grammatical confusion here.A person who says the present experience alone is real is not stating an empirical fact, comparable to the fact that Mr.S.always wears a brown suit.And the person who objects to the assertion that the present alone is real with ”Surely the past and future are just as real“ somehow does not meet the point.Both statements mean nothing.By examining Russell's hypothesis that the world was created five minutes ago I shall try to explain what I mean in saying that it is meaningless.Russell's hypothesis was so arranged that nothing could bear it out or refute it.Whatever our experience might be, it would be in agreement with it.The point of saying that something has happened derives from there being a criterion for its truth.To lay down the evidence for what happened five minutes ago is like laying down rules for making measurements.The question as to what evidence there can be is a grammatical one.It concerns the sorts of actions and propositions which would verify the statement.It is a simple matter to make up a statement which will agree with experience because it is such that no proposition can refute it, e.g., ”There is a white rabbit between two chairs whenever no observations or verifications are being carried out.“ Some people would say that this statement says more than ”There is no white rabbit between the chairs“, just as some would say it means something to say the world was created five minutes ago.When such statements are made they are somehow connected with a picture, say, a picture of creation.Hence it is that such sentences seem to mean something.But they are otiose, like wheels in a watch which have no function although they do not look to be useless.I shall try to explain further what I mean by these sentences being meaningless by describing figures on two planes, one on plane I, which is to be projected, and the other, on plane II, the projection: Now suppose the mode of projecting a circle on plane I was not orthogonal.In consequence, to say ”There is a circle in plane II“ would not be quite the same as saying that there is a circle in plane I.For a range of angles through which the circle is projected, the figures on plane II are all more or less circular.But now suppose the rays of light effecting the projection were allowed to vary through any range of angles.Then what meaning has it to say there are circles in plane II? When we give the method of projection such freedom, assertions about the projection become meaningless, though we still keep the picture of a circle in mind.Russell's assertion about the creation of the world is like this.The fact that there is a picture on plane I does not make a verifiable projection on plane II.We are accustomed to certain pictures being projected in a given way.But as soon as we leave this mode of projection, statements do not have their usual significance.When I say ”That means nothing“ I mean that you have altered your mode of projection.That it seems to mean something is due to an image of well-known things.23 The words ”thinkable“ and ”imaginable“ have been used in comparable ways, what is imaginable being a special case of what is thinkable, e.g., a proposition and a picture.Now we can replace a visual image by a painted picture, and the picture can be described in words.Pictures and words are intertranslatable, for example, as A(5,7), B(2,3).A proposition is like, or something like, a picture.Let us limit ourselves to propositions describing the distribution of objects in a room.The distribution could be pictured in a painting.It would be sensible to say that a certain system of propositions corresponds to those painted and that other propositions do not correspond to pictures, for example，that someone whistles.Suppose we call the imaginable what can be painted, and the thinkable only what is imaginable.This would limit the word ”thinkable“ to the paintable.Now of course one can extend the way of picturing, for example, to someone whistling:

This is a new way of picturing, for a ”rising“ note is different from a vertical rise in space.With this new way we can imagine more, i.e., think more.People who make metaphysical assertions such as ”Only the present is real“ pretend to make a picture, as opposed to some other picture.I deny that they have done this.But how can I prove it? I cannot say ”This is not a picture of anything, it is unthinkable“ unless I assume that they and I have the same limitations on picturing.If I indicate a picture which the words suggest and they agree, then I can tell them they are misled, that the imagery in which they move does not lead them to such expressions.It cannot be denied that they have made a picture, but we can say they have been misled.We can say ”It makes no sense in this system, and I believe this is the system you are using'?.If they reply by introducing a new system, then I have to acquiesce.My method throughout is to point out mistakes in language.I am going to use the word “philosophy” for the activity of pointing out such mistakes.Why do I wish to call our present activity philosophy, when we also call Plato's activity philosophy? Perhaps because of a certain analogy between them, or perhaps because of the continuous development of the subject.Or the new activity may take the place of the old because it removes mental discomforts the old was supposed to.24 With regard to a proposition about the external world or to a proposition of mathematics it is frequently asked “How do you know it?” There is an ambiguity here between reasons and causes.The interpretation we do not want is “How, causally, did you reach the result?” It does not matter what caused you to get the result;this is irrelevant.The important thing is to determine what you know when you are knowing it.To illustrate the distinction between reason and cause, let us take the question, How does one know the molecules of a gas are in motion? The answer might be psychological, for example, that you will see them if you have had enough to eat.If the kinetic theory were wrong, then no experience at all need correspond to it;but at the same time there would be a criterion for movement of molecules in a gas.The inventor of the theory would say “I am going to take such-and-such as a criterion”.What is taken as a reason for belief in a theory is thus not a matter of experience but a matter of convention.If I believe the theory after taking clear soup, this is a cause of my belief, not a reason.When I am asked for a reason for the belief, what is expected, as part of the answer, is what I believe.The different ways of verifying “It rained yesterday” help to determine the meaning.Now a distinction should be made between “being the meaning of” and “determining the meaning of”.That I remember its raining yesterday helps determine the meaning of “It rained yesterday”, but it is not true that “It rained yesterday” means “I remember that...” We can distinguish between primary and secondary criteria of its raining.If someone asks “What is rain?”, you can point to rain falling, or pour some water from a watering can.These constitute primary criteria.Wet pavements constitute a secondary criterion and determine the meaning of “rain” in a less important way.Two questions have been raised, which need to be answered now.(I)How could the meaning of a sentence about the past be given by a sentence about the present?(2)The verification of a proposition about the past is a set of propositions involving present and future tenses.If the verification gives the meaning, is part of the meaning left out? My reply is to deny that the verification gives the meaning.It merely determines the meaning, i.e., determines its use, or grammar.25 When we understand a statement we often have certain characteristic experiences connected with it and with the words it contains.But the meaning of a symbol in our language is not the feelings it arouses nor the momentary impression it makes on us.The sense of a sentence is neither a succession of feelings nor one definite feeling.If you want to know the meaning of a sentence, ask for its verification.I stress the point that the meaning of a symbol is its place in the calculus, the way it is used.Of course if the symbol were used differently there might be a different feeling, but the feeling is not what concerns us.To know the meaning of a symbol is to know its use.We can regard understanding a symbol, when we take its meaning in at a glance, as intuitive.Or understanding it may be discursive: knowing its meaning by knowing its use.Knowing the use of a sign is not a certain state lasting a certain time.(If we say knowing how to play chess is a certain state of mind, we have to say it is a hypothetical state.)Attending to the way the meaning of a sentence is explained makes clear the connection between meaning and verification.Reading that Cambridge won the boat race, which verifies “Cambridge won”, is obviously not the meaning, but it is connected with it.“Cambridge won” is not a disjunction, “I saw the race or I read the result or...” It is more complicated.Yet if we ruled out any one of the means of verifying the statement we would alter its meaning.It would upset our grammar if we excluded as a verification something that always accompanied winning.And if we did away with all means of verifying it we would destroy the meaning.It is clear that not every sort of verification is actually used to verify “Cambridge won”, nor would just any verification give the meaning.The different verifications of the boat race being won have different places in the grammar of “boat race being won”.There is a mistaken conception of my view concerning the connection between meaning and verification which turns the view into idealism.This is that a boat race = the idea of a boat race.The mistake here is in trying to explain something in terms of something else.It lies back of Russell's definition of number, which we expect to tell us what a number is.The difficulty with these explanations in terms of something else is that the something else may have an entirely different grammar.Consider the word “chair”.If there could be no visual picture of a chair, the word would have a different meaning.That one can see a chair is essential to the meaning of the word.But a visual picture of a chair is not a chair.What would it mean to sit on the visual picture of a chair? Of course we can explain what a chair is by showing pictures of it.But that does not mean that a chair is a complex of views.The tendency is to ask “What is a chair?”;but I ask how the word “chair” is used.An intimately connected consideration concerns the words “time” and “length”.People have felt that time is independent of the way it is measured.This is to forget what one would have to do to explain the word.Time is what is measured by a clock.To verify “The concert lasted an hour” you must tell how you measured time.It is a misunderstanding about both time and length that they are independent of measurement.If we have many ways of measuring which do not contradict, we do not assume any one way of measuring in explaining these words.The measuring which is connected with the meaning of a term is not exact, though in physics we do sometimes specify the temperature of the measuring rod.If, for example, we try to make the notion of a “precise time” more exact, we do not push it back far, for the striking of a clock at “precisely 4:30” takes time.And “to be here at precisely 4:30” is also not precise: should one be opening the door or be inside? Likewise with “having the same colour”.The verification of “These have the same colour” may be that one can't see a colour transition when they are put side by side, or that one can't tell the difference when they are apart, or that one can't tell one from the other when one is substituted for the other.These ways of testing give different meanings for “having the same colour”.26 If the meaning of a word is determined by the rules for its use, does this mean that its meaning is the list of rules? No.Nor is the meaning, as is sometimes the case with the bearer, something one can point to.The use of money and the use of words are analogous.Money is not always used to buy things which can be pointed to, e.g., when it buys permission to sit in a theatre, or a title, or one's life.The ideas of meaning and sense are obsolete.Unless “sense” is used in such sentences as “This has no sense” or “This has the same sense as that”, we are not concerned with sense.In some cases it is not clear whether a statement is experiential or grammatical.How far is giving the verification of a proposition a grammatical statement about it? So far as it is, it can explain the meaning of its terms.Insofar as it is a matter of experience, as when one names a symptom, the meaning is not explained.27 There is a problem connected with our talk of meaning: Does such talk indicate that I think meaning to be the subject matter of philosophy? Are we talking about something of more general importance than chairs, etc., so that we can take it that questions of meaning are the central questions of philosophy? Is meaning a metalogical idea? No.For there are problems in philosophy that are not concerned with the meaning of “meaning”, though perhaps with the meaning of other words, e.g., “time”.The word “meaning” has no higher place than these.What gives it a different place is that our investigations are about language and about puzzles arising from the use of language.“Grammar”, “proposition”, “meaning” thus figure more often than other words, though investigation concerning the word “meaning” is on the same level as a grammatical investigation of the word “time”.Of course there isn't a philosophical grammar and ordinary English grammar, the former being more complete since it includes ostensive definitions such as the correlation of “white” with several of its applications, Russell's theory of descriptions, etc.These are not to be found in ordinary grammar books;but this is not the important difference.The important difference is in the aims for which the study of grammar are pursued by the linguist and the philosopher.One obvious difference is that the linguist is concerned with history, and with literary qualities, neither of which is of concern to us.Moreover, we construct languages of our own so as to solve certain puzzles which the grammarian is not interested in, e.g., puzzles arising from the expression “Time flows”.We shall have to justify calling our comments on such a sentence grammar.If we say time flows in a different sense than water does, explaining this by an ostensive definition, we have indicated a way of explaining the word.And we have left the realm of what is generally called grammar.Our object is to get rid of certain puzzles.The grammarian has no interest in these;his aims and the philosopher's are different.We are pulling ordinary grammar to bits.28 Let us look at the grammar of ethical terms, and such terms as “God”, “soul”, “mind”, “concrete”, “abstract”.One of the chief troubles is that we take a substantive to correspond to a thing.Ordinary grammar does not forbid our using a substantive as though it stood for a physical body.The words “soul” and “mind” have been used as though they stood for a thing, a gaseous thing.'what is the soul?“ is a misleading question, as are questions about the words ”concrete“ and ”abstract“, which suggest an analogy with solid and gaseous instead of with a chair and the permission to sit on a chair.Another muddle consists in using the phrase ”another kind“ after the analogy of ”a different kind of chair“, e.g., that transfinite numbers are another kind of number than rationals, or unconscious thoughts a different kind of thought from conscious ones.The difference in the case of the latter pair is not analogous to that between a chair we see and a chair we don't see.The word ”thought“ is used differently when prefaced by these adjectives.What happens with the words ”God“ and ”soul“ is what happens with the word ”number“.Even though we give up explaining these words ostensively, by pointing, we don't give up explaining them in substantival terms.The reason people say that a number is a scratch on the blackboard is the desire to point to something.No sort of process of pointing is connected with explaining ”number“, any more than it is with explaining ”permission to sit in a seat at the theatre“.Luther said that theology is the grammar of the word ”God“.I interpret this to mean that an investigation of the word would be a grammatical one.For example, people might dispute about how many arms God had, and someone might enter the dispute by denying that one could talk about arms of God.This would throw light on the use of the word.What is ridiculous or blasphemous also shows the grammar of the word.29 Changing the meaning of a word, e.g., ”Moses“, when one is forced to give a different explication, does not indicate that it had no meaning before.The similarity between new and old uses of a word is like that between an exact and a blurred boundary.Our use of language is like playing a game according to the rules.Sometimes it is used automatically, sometimes one looks up the rules.Now we get into difficulties when we believe ourselves to be following a rule.We must examine to see whether we are.Do we use the word ”game“ to mean what all games have in common? It does not follow that we do, even though we were to find something they have in common.Nor is it true that there are discrete groups of things called ”games“.What is the reason for using the word ”good“? Asking this is like asking why one calls a given proposition a solution to a problem.It can be the case that one trouble gives way to another trouble, and that the resolution of the second difficulty is only connected with the first.For example, a person who tries to trisect an angle is led to another difficulty, posed by the question ”Can it be done?“ Proof of the impossibility of a trisection takes the place of the first investigation;the investigation has changed.When there is an argument about whether a thing is good, the discussion shows what we are talking about.In the course of the argument the word may begin to get a new grammar.In view of the way we have learned the word ”good“ it would be astonishing if it had a general meaning covering all of its applications.I am not saying it has four or five different meanings.It is used in different contexts because there is a transition between similar things called ”good“, a transition which continues, it may be, to things which bear no similarity to earlier members of the series.We cannot say ”If we want to find out the meaning of 'good' let's find what all cases of good have in common“.They may not have anything in common.The reason for using the word ”good“ is that there is a continuous transition from one group of things called good to another.30 There is one type of explanation which I wish to criticise, arising from the tendency to explain a phenomenon by one cause, and then to try to show the phenomenon to be ”really“ another.This tendency is enormously strong.It is what is responsible for people saying that punishment must be one of three things, revenge, a deterrent, or improvement.This way of looking at things comes out in such questions as, Why do people hunt?, Why do they build high buildings? Other examples of it are the explanation of striking a table in a rage as a remnant of a time when people struck to kill, or of the burning of an effigy because of its likeness to human beings, who were once burnt.Frazer concludes that since people at one time were burnt, dressing up an effigy for burning is what remains of that practice.This may be so;but it need not be, for this reason.The idea which underlies this sort of method is that every time what is sought is the motive.People at one time thought it useful to kill a man, sacrifice him to the god of fertility, in order to produce good crops.But it is not true that something is always done because it is useful.At least this is not the sole reason.Destruction of an effigy may have its own complex of feelings without being connected with an ancient practice, or with usefulness.Similarly, striking an object may merely be a natural reaction in rage.A tendency which has come into vogue with the modern sciences is to explain certain things by evolution.Darwin seemed to think that-an emotion got its importance from one thing only, utility.A baby bares its teeth when angry because its ancestors did so to bite.Your hair stands on end when you are frightened because hair standing on end served some purpose for animals.The charm of this outlook is that it reduces importance to utility.31 Let us change the topic to a discussion of good.One of the ways of looking at questions in ethics about good is to think that all things said to be good have something in common, just as there is a tendency to think that all things we call games have something in common.Plato's talk of looking for the essence of things was very like talk of looking for the ingredients in a mixture, as though qualities were ingredients of things.But to speak of a mixture, say of red and green colours, is not like speaking of a mixture of a paint which has red and green paints as ingredients.Suppose you say ”Good is a quality of human actions and events“.This is apparently an intelligible sentence.If I ask ”How does one know an action has this quality?“, you might tell me to examine it and I would find out.Now am I to investigate the movements making up the action, or are they only symptoms of goodness? If they are a symptom, then there must be some independent verification, otherwise the word ”symptom“ is meaningless.Now there is an important question which arises about goodness: Can one know an action in all its details and yet not know whether it is good? A similar question arises about beauty.Consider the beauty of a face.If all its shapes and colours are determined, is its beauty determined also? Or are these merely symptoms of beauty, which is to be determined otherwise? You may say that beauty is an indefinable quality, and that to say a particular face is beautiful comes to saying it has the indefinable quality.Is our scrutiny intended to find out whether a face has this indefinable quality, or merely to find out what the face is like? If the former, then the indefinable quality can be attributed to a particular arrangement of colours.But it need not be, and we must have some independent verification.If no separate investigation is required, then we only mean by a beautiful face a certain arrangement of colours and shapes.32 The attribute beauty has been analysed as what all beautiful things have in common.Consider one such property, agreeableness.I call attention to the fact that in studying the laws of harmony in a harmony text there is no mention of ”agreeableness“;psychology drops out.To say Lear is agreeable is to say something nondescriptive.And to many things this adjective is wholly inapplicable.Hence there is no basis for building up a calculus.The phrase ”beautiful colour“, for example, can have a hundred meanings, depending on the occasion on which we use it.Very often the adjectives we use are those applicable to the face of a person.This is the case with ”beautiful“ and ”ugly“.Consider how we learn such words.We do not as children discover the quality of beauty or ugliness in a face and find that these are qualities a tree has in common with it.The words ”beautiful“ and ”ugly“ are bound up with the words they modify, and when applied to a face are not the same as when applied to flowers and trees.We have in the latter a similar ”game“.For example, the adjective ”stupid“ is inapplicable to coals, except as you see a face in them.By a face being stupid we may mean it is the sort of face that really belongs to a stupid person;but usually not.Instead, it is a character of the particular expression of a face.This is not to say it is a character of the distribution of lines and colours.If it were, then one might ask how to find out whether the distribution is stupid.Is stupidity part of the distribution? The word ”stupid“ as applied to hands is still another game.The same is the case with ”beautiful“.It is bound up with a particular game.And similarly in ethics: the meaning of the word ”good“ is bound up with the act it modifies.How can one know whether an action or event has the quality of goodness? And can one know the action in all of its details and not know whether it is good? That is, is its being good something that is independently experienced? Or does its being good follow from the thing's properties? If I want to know whether a rod is elastic I can find out by looking through a microscope to see the arrangement of its particles, the nature of their arrangement being a symptom of its elasticity, or inelasticity.Or I can test the rod empirically, e.g., see how far it can be pulled out.The question in ethics, about the goodness of an action, and in aesthetics, about the beauty of a face, is whether the characteristics of the action, the lines and colours of the face, are like the arrangement of particles: a symptom of goodness, or of beauty.Or do they constitute them? a cannot be a symptom of b unless there is a possible independent investigation of b.If no separate investigation is possible, then we mean by ”beauty of face“ a certain arrangement of colours and spaces.Now no arrangement is beautiful in itself.The word ”beauty“ is used for a thousand different things.Beauty of face is different from that of flowers and animals.That one is playing utterly different games is evident from the difference that emerges in the discussion of each.We can only ascertain the meaning of the word ”beauty“ by seeing how we use it.33 What has been said of ”beautiful“ will apply to ”good“ in only a slightly different way.Questions which arise about the latter are analogous to those raised about beauty: whether beauty is inherent in an arrangement of colours and shapes, i.e., such that on describing the arrangement one would know it is beautiful, or not;or whether this arrangement is a symptom of beauty from which the thing's being beautiful is concluded.In an actual aesthetic controversy or inquiry several questions arise:(1)How do we use such words as ”beautiful“?(2)Are these inquiries psychological? Why are they so different, and what is their relation to psychology?(3)What features makes us say of a thing that it is the ideal, e.g., the ideal Greek profile? Note that in an aesthetic controversy the word ”beautiful“ is scarcely ever used.A different sort of word crops up: ”correct“, ”incorrect“, ”right“, ”wrong“.We never say ”This is beautiful enough“.We only use it to say, ”Look, how beautiful“, that is, to call attention to something.The same thing holds for the word ”good“.34 Why do we say certain changes bring a thing nearer to an ideal, e.g., making a door lower, or the bass in music quieter.It is not that we want in different cases to produce the same effect, namely, an agreeable feeling.What made the ideal Greek profile into an ideal, what quality? Actually what made us say it is the ideal is a certain very complicated role it played in the life of people.For example, the greatest sculptors used this form, people were taught it, Aristotle wrote on it.Suppose one said the ideal profile is the one occurring at the height of Greek art.What would this mean? The word ”height“ is ambiguous.To ask what ”ideal“ means is the same as asking what ”height“ and ”decadence“ mean.You would need to describe the instances of the ideal in a sort of serial grouping.And the word is always used in connection with one particular thing, for there is nothing in common between roast beef, Greek art, and German music.The word ”decadence“ cannot be explained without specific examples, and will have different meanings in the case of poetry, music, and sculpture.To explain what decadence in music means you would need to discuss music in detail.The various arts have some analogy to each other, and it might be said that the element common to them is the ideal.But this is not the meaning of ”the ideal“.The ideal is got from a specific game, and can only be explained in some specific connection, e.g., Greek sculpture.There is no way of saying what all have in common, though of course one may be able to say what is common to two sculptures by studying them.In the statement that their beauty is what approaches the ideal, the word ”ideal“ is not used as is the word ”water“, which stands for something that can be pointed to.And no aesthetic investigation will supply you with a meaning of the word ”ideal“ which you did not have before.When one describes changes made in a musical arrangement as being directed to bringing the arrangement of parts nearer to an ideal, the ideal is not before us like a straight line which is set before us when we try to draw it.(When questioned about what we are doing we might cite another tune which we thought not to be as near the ideal.)Some people say we have an ideal before our minds in the same way we have a memory image when we recognise a colour.It may happen that you have a picture in mind with which the colour recognised is compared, but this is rare.To see how the ideal comes in, say in making the bass quieter, look at what is being done and at one's being dissatisfied with the music as it is.Can one call this ”action“ of making the bass quieter an investigation? No, not in the sense of scientific investigation.No truth is found, except the psychological fact that I am satisfied with the result.In what sense is aesthetic investigation a matter of psychology? The first thing we might say of a beautiful arrangement of colours-a flower, a meadow, or a face-is that it gives us pleasure.In saying these all give pleasure we speak as if the pleasure differed in degree rather than that the pleasures were of a different sort.Pain and pleasure do not belong on one scale, any more than the scale from boiling hot to ice cold is one of degree.They differ in kind.When a man jumps out of the window rather than meet the police he is not choosing the ”more agreeable“.Of course there are cases where we do weigh pleasures, as in choosing between cinemas.But this is not always the case.And it happens only sometimes that when we do not choose the lesser pain or the greater pleasure we choose what will produce these in the long run.One might think that it is entirely a matter of psychology whether something is good or beautiful, that in comparing musical arrangements, for example, one is making a psychological experiment to determine which produces the more pleasing effect.If this were true then the statement that beauty is what gives pleasure is an experiential one.But what people who say this wish to say is that it is not a matter of experience that beauty is what gives pleasure.Their statement is really a sort of tautology.In aesthetic investigation the thing we are not interested in is causal connections, whereas in psychology we are.This is the main point of difference.To the question ”Why is this beautiful?“ we are accustomed to being satisfied with answers which cite causes instead of reasons.To name causal connections is to give an hypothesis.Giving a cause does not remove the aesthetic puzzle one feels when asked what makes a thing beautiful.It is useful to remind yourself of the answers given to the opposite question, ”What is wrong with this poem or melody?“, for the answer to the first question is of the same kind.The answer to ”What is wrong with this melody?“ is like the statement, ”This is too loud“, not like the statement that it produces sulphur in the blood.The sort of experiment we carry on to discover people's likes and dislikes is not aesthetics.If it were, then you could say aesthetics is a matter of taste.In aesthetics the question is not ”Do you like it?“ but ”Why do you like it?“ Whenever we get to the point where the question is one of taste, it is no longer aesthetics.In aesthetic discussion what we are doing is more like solving a mathematical problem.It is not a psychological one.Aesthetic discussion is something that goes on inside the range of likes and dislikes.It goes on before any question of taste arises.A statement about a visual or auditory impression, as against what causes it, need not be psychological.That a sorrowful face becomes more sorrowful as the mouth turns downward is not a statement of psychology.In aesthetics we are not interested in causal connections but in description of a thing.35 What is the justification for a feature in a work of art? I disagree with the answer ”Something else would produce the wrong effect“.Is it that you are satisfied, once something is found which removes the difficulty? What reasons can one give for being satisfied? The reasons are further descriptions.Aesthetics is descriptive.What it does is to draw one's attention to certain features, to place things side by side so as to exhibit these features.To tell a person ”This is the climax“ is like saying ”This is the man in the puzzle picture“.Our attention is drawn to a certain feature, and from that point forward we see that feature.The reasons one gives for feeling satisfied have nothing to do with psychology.These, the aesthetic reasons, are given by placing things side by side, as in a court of law.If one gave psychological reasons for choosing a simile, those would not be reasons in aesthetics.They would be causes, not reasons.Stating a cause would be offering a hypothesis.Insofar as the remedy for the disagreeable feeling of top-heaviness of a door is like a remedy for a headache, a question concerning what remedy to prescribe is not a question of aesthetics.The aesthetic reason for feeling dissatisfied, as opposed to its cause, is not a proposition of psychology.A good example of a cause for dissatisfaction which I might have, say, with the way someone is playing a waltz, is that I have seen the waltz danced and know how it should be played.This does not give a reason for my dissatisfaction.The person who plays it, and I, have a different ideal of the waltz, and to give the reason for my dissatisfaction demands a description.Similarly, if a composition is felt to have a wrong ending.36 I wish to remark on a certain sort of connection which Freud cites, between the foetal position and sleep, which looks to be a causal one but which is not, inasmuch as a psychological experiment cannot be made.His explanation does what aesthetics does: puts two factors together.Another matter which Freud treats psychologically but whose investigation has the character of an aesthetic one is the nature of jokes.The question, ”What is the nature of a joke?“, is like the question, ”What is the nature of a lyric poem?“ I wish to examine in what way Freud's theory is a hypothesis and in what way not.The hypothetical part of his theory, the subconscious, is the part which is not satisfactory.Freud thinks it is part of the essential mechanism of a joke to conceal something, say, a desire to slander someone, and thereby to make it possible for the subconscious to express itself.He says that people who deny the subconscious really cannot cope with post-hypnotic suggestion, or with waking up at an unusual hour of one's own accord.When we laugh without knowing why, Freud claims that by psychoanalysis we can find out.I see a muddle here between a cause and a reason.Being clear why you laugh is not being clear about a cause.If it were, then agreement to the analysis given of the joke as explaining why you laugh would not be a means of detecting it.The success of the analysis is supposed to be shown by the person's agreement.There is nothing corresponding to this in physics.Of course we can give causes for our laughter, but whether those are in fact the causes is not shown by the person's agreeing that they are.A cause is found experimentally.The psychoanalytic way of finding why a person laughs is analogous to an aesthetic investigation.For the correctness of an aesthetic analysis must be agreement of the person to whom the analysis is given.The difference between a reason and a cause is brought out as follows: the investigation of a reason entails as an essential part one's agreement with it, whereas the investigation of a cause is carried out experimentally.”What the patient agrees to can't be a hypothesis as to the cause of his laughter, but only that so and-so was the reason why he laughed." Of course the person who agrees to the reason was not conscious at the time of its being his reason.But it is a way of speaking to say the reason was subconscious.It may be expedient to speak in this way, but the subconscious is a hypothetical entity which gets its meaning from the verifications these propositions have.What Freud says about the subconscious sounds like science, but in fact it is just a means of representation New regions of the soul have not been discovered, as his writings suggest.The display of elements of a dream, for example, a hat(which may mean practically anything)is a display of similes.As in aesthetics, things are placed side by side so as to exhibit certain features.These throw light on our way of looking at a dream;they are reasons for the dream.But his method of analysing dreams is not analogous to a method for finding the causes of stomach-ache.It is a confusion to say that a reason is a cause seen from the inside.A cause is not seen from within or from without.It is found by experiment.In enabling one to discover the reasons for laughter psychoanalysis provides merely a representation of processes.

第四篇：在哲學課上的一次演講

在哲學課上的一次演講

各位老師，各位同學下午好： 今天很高興也很榮幸能站在這個講臺上和大家一起共同探討對一些問題的看法。我知道接下來我講的內容可能并不是十分的精彩，甚至還有什么不妥的地方，還請各位老師和同學多多包涵。在這我只是起一個拋磚引玉的作用，因為我相信接下來會有很多更優秀的同學帶來更精彩的發言。直奔主題，今天我想和大家一起探討的是關于“開放民間信貸”的問題。通俗點說就是“高利貸”。可以這么說，自古以來，高利貸都是躲在陽光背后的東西，它不被社會和政府認可，原因是高利貸的確存在著某些負面影響。可唯物辯證法也告訴我們，萬事萬物都是變化發展的，我們一定要用發展的眼光看問題。絕不能以現在的標準去否定過去，當然，也不能以過去的觀點評定現在。你不能因為某個人在過去犯了錯誤就將他一棍子打死。所有這些靜止的觀點都是形而上學，都應該是我們所反對的。同樣，對于高利貸，對于民間信貸，我們也需要用發展的眼光重新審視。為什么這么說呢？ 中國改革開放30年來，經濟發展突飛猛進，中小企業的發展也不可謂不迅速，他們在發展中對資金的需求也越來越大。可遺憾的是，中國的銀行信貸卻跟不上時代的步伐，他們對中小企業和個體工商戶的金融服務少之又少，導致中小企業融資困難重重，有的甚至因為缺乏資金而不得不關門大吉，這不能不算是中國資本社會的一大悲哀。所以，在新形勢下，是政府該開放民間信貸，讓高利貸，地下錢莊從黑暗走向光明，從地下走到地上的時候了。雖然高利貸一直都沒有實現合法化，可中國的地下金融交易卻一直非常之繁榮。有調查結果顯示，以存貸款總額作為衡量指標，2005年中國的民間金融，地下金融和非法金融總量約為2.9萬億元左右。由此可見，民間信貸市場之大，前景之廣闊是不言而喻的。所以開發民間信貸，不僅可以打破現在銀行金融機構的信貸壟斷地位，加快中國金融體制改革的步伐。還可以充分利用民間閑散資金，活躍產品和資本市場，拉動經濟增長。所以，政府開放民間信貸將是順應歷史潮流的偉大選擇，是大勢所趨，也是刻不容緩的。我們知道，美國從二戰以來就建立了以美元為中心的資本主義貨幣體系，成為當今世界上唯一的超級大國，所以就時不時的喜歡干涉這個，指責那個，到處插手別國內政，把別國都看作它的“小弟”。我們想想，美國為什么能夠這樣霸道呢？有人可能會說因為它有強大的軍事實力和先進的科技，可我認為這些都還不是主要的。主要的是什么？是因為它擁有強大的資本市場。你們知道嗎？美國以華爾街為中心編織了一張龐大的資本之網，這張網遍布了世界的各個角落，牽動著全球的經濟動向，2008年由美國的次貸危機而引起的全球金融危機就是最好的證明。所以說，中國想要有一天超越美國，成為世界的主宰，就必須大力發展資本市場，加快金融體制創新，要讓中國的上海超越美國的紐約，要讓中國擁有自己的“華爾街”，也只有這樣中國才能實現彎道超越！現在流傳這樣一個說法，未來的戰爭是貨幣的戰爭，誰掌握的貨幣誰就統治世界！但這歸根到底還是要有完善和健全的資本市場。所以，加快中國的金融體制創新是中國領先世界的必經之路。當然，我們也都很清楚，中國要實現發展，實現超越并不是一兩句話那么簡單的事情，他需要我們中國一代又一代人的共同努力和奮斗，需要我們為了一個信念而堅持，所以我希望在中國復興的道路上也能夠留下在座的每一位同學的足跡和身影！我相信，有我們的共同努力，中國的復興之路不會遙遠，中國的復興之夢也將不再是夢！謝謝！

2011-11-8

第五篇：哲學讀后感（共3篇）

篇1：哲學讀后感

哲學讀后感

對于中國哲學簡史以及其他部分哲學書表面處理之后得到的讀后感：

全部--部分--相對立面

死亡----生存:相對的解釋.沒有死亡的感覺體會不到你還在生存.死亡可以給你存在的相對感覺.如一切明天都沒有了,你會珍惜今天的所有一切.大多數時間死亡不在我們考慮范圍之內,或者是我們不可能清晰的體驗到死亡的感覺.所以我們一直認為我們還有明天.實際上有太多的意外不在我們掌控中.grey里面的,t如果愛就說吧,也許明天一切都沒有了.任何一個感覺和詞語,都是要一個反襯才能體現出它的價值.如果世界尚沒有悲傷,那也不會有快樂了.如果某一種感覺全部的占據了你的內心,那么你要留意去尋找相對的感覺,因為那個全部的感覺一定不是真實的也根本沒有價值.

日常--->慣性動作可以讓人產生惰性.就是上面的全部感覺,你必須要找到如何突破惰性,找到那種相對立的感覺去突破自己.

靈魂的電流--->應該是部分感性的存在.回憶對人是重要的.是人最寶貴的財富,在一生中不停的做著計劃和回憶的互動動作.雖然很多理論讓你把握當前,其實,這很難.至少從以上的文字可以看出.多數是在幻想未來,和回味過去.只是今天也會成為回憶,未來也會成為今天.把握當前的心態就是要突破惰性,要在一種全部的感覺中找到那種相對立的感覺.比如你有一個鉆石,你會永遠擁有它.它放在你的倉庫里面.永遠不去提取.你偶爾會想想它的光芒,但實際生活中你不會天天帶著它.但是有一天你的倉庫失竊,鉆石沒有了.你就會經常想起那個鉆石,想如果天天帶著它的話也許倉庫失竊的時候就不會丟了.但是你不知道哪天你的倉庫會失竊.失竊前,你也會經常忘記你擁有這個鉆石,這個就是計劃之內的東西,也是在你回憶里面的東西,其實不屬于你的'現在.

我覺得,改變,或者是體驗到存在感,或者價值等方法就是一定要知道相對立的體驗感覺.事物矛盾的對立面是促進事物發展的原始動力。靈魂的電流基本是一種情感發揮到一定程度所體現出來的物理現象.

存在主義哲學家卡爾.雅斯貝爾斯（karljaspers的觀點:他把我們體驗到存在邊緣的狀態定義為“邊緣狀態”。通常，我們如此地執迷于和熟悉日常的生活，以至于我們不能夠看破世俗--我們用自己的觀點造了一個藩籬。只有當我們處于邊緣狀態，如疾病、痛苦、煩惱或者破產使我們遠離正常的生活，把我們放置在一個新的位置時，我們才會像一個旁觀者一樣去看待和重新審視我們的生活.我們可以說生命和死亡就像在鏡子里互相觀望一樣，當我們說已經為死亡做好了準備的時候，也就意味著我們活得沒有任何遺憾；而當我們說自己生活得很幸福的時候，就意味著我們已經為死亡做好了準備。

其實內心中,生活應該正在朝著這么一個軌跡發展吧

篇2：哲學讀后感

哲學讀后感精選

當真正用理性思考經驗之后，就能知道自己應該如何做，知道哪一種人生更為理想，也更適合自己。理想代表針對未來，哲學的思考就是要讓人能夠在過去、現在、未來三個時間向度中連貫起來，讓自己的生命不再只是活在當下那片片斷斷，剎那生滅的過程中而已。”

愛因斯坦曾說過“專家只是訓練有素的狗。”這句話的用意并不在罵人，而是要提醒我們，不要只是做一個專家，還要設法透過自己的知識進一步體驗到智慧。智慧也有其自身的特點，總結為兩點：“完整”與“根本”。

因為人體是物質的，有重量、有惰性同時也是軟弱的。這種軟弱會妨礙人類擁有智慧。比如，有時候我們希望自己能夠早起，卻怎么也爬不起來，這時候會覺得身體實在是自己最大的敵人。身體如此沉重，就是因為它是物質，所以有惰性。又有時候我們很愿意幫助別人，這代表心靈上的美好，卻可能因為需要花時間、花力氣，所以懶得行動。由此可知，人的身體是軟弱的。人應該減少身體的控制程度，亦即要讓身體的惰性無法對個人產生影響力。如此，才能讓心靈自由地追求智慧。

“人生所有一切都不能帶走，故要與人分享。這種分享不單指財務，還應包括關懷、信念、尊重等。”是啊，人本是赤條條地來又赤條條地去，何必一定要固守自己的東西，封閉自己的心靈呢？這樣或許守住了自己的財產，卻錯失了許多機會，但與人分享后也許就不同了

煩惱不值得擔心，因為能磨練出智慧；死亡不值得害怕，害怕的是不知為何而死。”這很值得我們深思，現在人們多把擁有大量金錢和物質的人當作自己的偶像，以至于許多人接受教育的目的就是為了掙錢。其實擁有越多并不見得就越快樂，傅先生在介紹存在主義時就說，“一個人‘有’的越多越不‘是’他自己。因為擁有越多，越沒有時間做自己。”在介紹道家思想時又說，“一個人若多思多欲就不可能快樂，因為欲望沒有滿足會痛苦，一旦滿足之后，又生出更多欲望，更多痛苦。”

“一個人活在世界上，可以沒有豐富的物質享受，可以沒有良好的制度，卻不能沒有正確的理念”。――

很多人不快樂，就是因為找不到人生的意義。然而，人生的意義又是什么？一個人在念中學的時候，人生的'意義是要考大學；念大學的時候，人生的意義則是要順利畢業或繼續深造。這樣的意義一直往后推延，最后總是要碰到結束，而在這個關卡上，不能在以一個具體的東西作為意義了（如賺到多少錢、當到什么官）。這個意義是一個人在生命過程中無法達成的，因此不能向外探求，只能內向尋找，也就是一種對自己的要求，要求自己達成一種最高的、圓滿的境界。”

篇3：哲學讀后感600字

人生就好象航海一樣，如果你沒有羅盤，就不知道自己往哪里走。羅盤就是哲學，哲學是對人生的經驗做全面的反省。人們可以向哲學家借這樣的一個羅盤或者指南針，參考他們思考后的見解，也可以在自己內心里面啟發這樣的智慧，其實每個人的內心都有他的羅盤，只不過他不一定經過嚴格的訓練或者是適當地去反省而找到。

所以離開人生，哲學是空洞的，它沒有內容。如果離開哲學的話，人生是盲目的，人生變成找不到方向，不知道該往哪里走。

很多時候教師不知不覺的在給學生們說“你要懂人生的道理，要走好人生的每一步”，這里就有哲學的含義在里面。所以，人生的智慧，它歸結為生命歷程中不同的抉擇。

書的作者傅佩榮用三句話來描寫哲學：第一句，培養智慧，這跟西方的傳統很接近。第二，發現真理。因為人常常發現變化的事物，覺得非常迷惘，你就要發現變化背后有沒有不變真實的東西。比如道家，道就是最后的真實，讓你知道這些變化有來源，有歸宿。第三，驗證價值。價值不能離開主體，不能離開你我他每一個人。

前面培養智慧，然后發現真理，然后去驗證價值。這樣就會使生活產生具體的改變，懂得自己往哪里走，就像在航海的時候我有指南針，別人說這個路線不好，但是自己知道自己為什么這樣選擇。人最怕不知道，這樣選擇是受風氣的影響，受別人的影響，甚至是別人的操縱，結果走的路好像很多人都走，到最后不見得是自身愿意走的路。

由此看來哲學是人在早或者晚一定要碰到的題材。在生命的階段，尤其是遇到重大的轉折點、重大的痛苦、罪惡或者是災難，在這種情況下，人們特別需要能不能有一個方向讓我知道我這樣做是對的，或者給自身這樣一個選擇的機會，讓自身可以改變生命不同的路線。

哲學讀后感600字范文