第一篇：希特勒最著名演講

這個時代，中國的基礎教育取得了巨大的成就，但質疑聲音也是不斷。

●有人說，素質教育已成為社會共識，但高考是更大的社會現實，共識與現實之間如何才能化干戈為玉帛；

●有人說，中國的教育面臨著人才培養和社會需求的脫節，如何培養真正有用的人才已成為教育改革的難點；

●有人說，80后是垮掉的一代，90后更不敢奢望，今天的教育如何能夠承擔起明天的希望；

●有人說，今天的小孩更有個性，自我意識更強，再加上獨生子女社會的來臨，如何對他們進行教育將成為曠古難題；

●還有人說……

提出問題的人很多，回答問題的人卻不多。

這個時代的教育，需要解決的問題實在不少。我認為教育孩子應該有以下幾點：

1.贊美

每個孩子都希望自己做的事能被人認可，作為父母的我們如果能在孩子做了一件事后對孩子給予肯定和贊美，那么能激發出他們內心深處的努力。

例：黑人司機載了一對白人母子，孩子問：為什么司機伯伯的膚色和我們不同？母親答：上帝為了讓世界繽紛，創造了不同顏色的人。到目的地黑人司機堅持不收錢，他說：小時曾問過母親同樣的問題，母親說我們是黑人，注定低人一等，如果她換成你的回答，今天我定會有不同的成就。2.愛他們 孩子將來能不能成事其中一個關鍵的因素是作為家長的我們是否真的愛他們，對他們認可不認可，一次鼓勵比一次職責，更容易讓孩子接受，更容易讓孩子成才，家長應該根絕孩子不同時期的心里特點和生理特點進行有效的教育，而不是按照自己認為對的觀點進行教育

3.按照孩子興趣進行培養，并有效的制止不正確的思想

在這個世界上，每個兒童都有不同的夢想，都有不同的興趣愛好，作為家長的我們應該讓孩子充分發揮他們的想象力，有興趣的東西他們互更加努力的去做。如果當中有一些不好的行為習慣的時候，作為家長的我們應該通過故事給予講解。4.告訴孩子做人的道理

現在的很多小孩，越來越叛逆，不聽話，作為家長的我們應該循循善誘，告訴孩子做人的道理，在晚上的時候和他一起多讀一起朗朗上口的經典，比如弟子規，千字文......讓他在其中學會一些道理也可以，我們和孩子一起學習，這樣他們也會更加有濃厚的興趣。

【親子關系13戒】一戒過分保護；二戒溺愛；三戒拔苗助長；四戒專制；五戒太嚴厲；六戒忽略孩子優點；七戒忽略孩子說話；八戒嘲笑；九戒無益的嘮叨；十戒亂發脾氣；十一戒低估孩子的能力；十二戒以偏概全；十三戒對孩子漠不關心。

【父母教孩子這8件事】1：公平——游戲時遵守規則；2：感激——謝謝別人的好意；3：助人——在需要時幫助別人；4：涼解——原諒他人的過失；5：誠實——把真話告訴大家；6：尊重——對別人心存敬意；7：慷慨——樂于同他人分享；8：友善——友好對待周圍的人。

第二篇：希特勒最著名的演講

希特勒最著名的演講----給中國的領導們上一課

今天，我們站在這里！站在德國的土地上！站在柏林，這塊我們祖先用鮮血和尊嚴澆灌的土地上！我的身后，是安德烈.柯里昂的雕像！他是全世界公認的自由斗士！他是全世界的光！

我的面前，站著的是一個民族，一個在屈辱中呻吟的民族！那場戰爭結束之后，我們這個民族的驕傲就沒有了！那些戰勝者們騎在我們的脖子上作威作福，他們隨意 踐踏我們的尊嚴，一個歐洲大陸上最高貴的民族的尊嚴！你們告訴我，你們是選擇像本杰明.馬丁一樣去做一個自由的斗士，還是一個奴隸？！

你們或許要說：希特勒先生，我需要一個工作，一塊面包。是的，你的說法很對，生命實在是太重要了。但是我要告訴你們，這世界上還有一種東西比生命更重要，那就是自由！那就是尊嚴！

只要阿爾薩斯和洛林上空一日還飄揚著法國的國旗，我們的尊嚴就不存在！只要那些法國人、英國人在我們的國土上橫行霸道，我們的尊嚴就不存在！只要在歐洲的 版圖上，這個叫德國的國家四分五裂積弱不堪，我們的尊嚴就不存在！只要其他國家的人，在聊天的時候說到德國這個字眼的時候會發出一聲輕蔑的笑聲，我們的尊 嚴就不存在！

我們需要的，不是一塊面包！而是一個生存空間！一個民族的生存空間！這生存空間，不是靠乞求和抗議來實現的，而是靠鐵和血來實現的！

別人欺辱我們，哪怕是最弱小的民族也來踐踏我們，我們只會叫著：我們表示強烈的憤慨和抗議，這樣的人，是沒有骨頭的！這樣的人，是低賤的！我們應該用大炮的震耳欲聾聲讓敵人顫抖！我們應該碾壓他們的尊嚴、生命，讓他們知道我們不是一群只知道抗議的懦夫！

你們要記住，一個只懂得抗議的國家，是一個沒有骨頭的國家！一個只懂得抗議的政府，是一個沒有骨頭的政府！當我們地尊嚴、領土和生存的空間都遭受踐踏的時候，還不知羞恥地抗議地政府，我們是不需要的！你們最后也會拋棄它們的！

我很驕傲，在你們這些人中，這樣沒有骨頭的人，少之又少！我的面前，是一個留著千年不屈血液的軍團！這血液，曾經在我們祖先的血管里面流淌過，他們沒有屈服過！現在，它們在我們的身體里面汩汩奔涌，你們告訴我，你們愿意它冷卻嗎！？

能夠團結人們的，有兩件東西：共同的理想和共同的敵人！我們有雕刻在德意志旗幟上面的偉大理想，我們會為這理想流盡我們的最后一滴血！在今天的柏林。沒有 任何東西能夠拯救我們的祖國，只有這理想！凡爾賽條約，是一個極大的恥辱！我們有拒絕執行它的決心和理由！做你們想做的吧！就像本杰明.馬丁拿起槍，就像 他帶領著他的同胞們高舉著那面自由的大旗英勇殺敵一樣！假如你們期望戰斗，那就去戰斗吧！然后我就能夠看到你們是七千萬奴隸還是七千萬堅貞不屈的日耳曼 人！

如果有那么一天，我，阿道夫.希特勒，也會像本杰明.馬丁那樣，舉著屬于我們德意志的大旗沖在最前方！哪怕是戰死，我也會微笑著進入天堂！我會見到那些德 意志的榮耀的祖先們，我可以昂著頭顱走到偉大的腓特烈大帝跟前，我可以驕傲地對他說：我，你的子孫，沒有給你丟臉，我為偉大的德意志流盡了最后一滴血！

我們為不被奴役而戰！我們為自由而戰！我們不是機器，不是牛馬，我們是人！是從來沒有屈服過的日耳曼人！

我們以自由的名義團結起來！為一個新的、公平的世界而戰！我們為人人有工作而戰！為那些奴役我們的人滾出德國人的土地而戰！為我們不需要整天喊著抗議而 戰！為我們的尊嚴而戰！為我們的諾言而戰！為解放這個國家而戰！日耳曼人，我們為我們的祖先的榮耀而戰！為我們的子孫后代能夠驕傲地宣傳：我們是從來不屈 服的日耳曼人而戰！

我的同胞們，德國和德國人民萬歲！自由，萬歲！

第三篇：希特勒激情演講

希特勒激情演講

導讀：我根據大家的需要整理了一份關于《希特勒激情演講》的內容，具體內容：軍人，是對在國家軍隊中服役的軍職人員的稱呼，包括戰斗人員和非戰斗人員，類似古代的武士，騎士。其職責是保衛國家安全，保衛及守護國家邊境，政府政權穩定，社會安定，有時亦參與非戰斗性的包括救災...軍人，是對在國家軍隊中服役的軍職人員的稱呼，包括戰斗人員和非戰斗人員，類似古代的武士，騎士。其職責是保衛國家安全，保衛及守護國家邊境，政府政權穩定，社會安定，有時亦參與非戰斗性的包括救災等工作。

口才并不是一種天賦的才能，它是靠刻苦訓練得來的。古今中外歷史上一切口若懸河、能言善辯的演講家、雄辯家。他們無一不是靠刻苦訓練而獲得成功的。有學者將口才更加明確地進定義為：在口語交際的過程中，表達主體運用準確、得體、生動、巧妙、有效的口語表達策略，達到特定的交際目的，取得圓滿交際效果的口語表達的藝術和技巧......目前而言，立足于運轉高速的現代生活，口才在一定程度上發揮著比文才更重要的作用，更符合當今社會的生活節奏，也越來越受人們重視。

軍人演講稿：

女士們，先生們：

我們站在這里!站在德國人的土地上!站在柏林，這塊我們祖先用鮮血和尊嚴澆灌的土地上!我的身后，是安德烈.柯里昂的雕像!他是全世界公認的自由斗士!他是全世界的光!我的面前，站著的是一個民族，一個在屈辱中呻吟的民族!那場戰爭結束之后，我們這個民族的驕傲就沒有了!那些戰勝者們騎在我們的脖子上作威作福，他們隨意踐踏我們的尊嚴，一個歐洲大陸上最高貴的民族地尊嚴!你們告訴我，你們是選擇像本杰明.馬丁一樣去做一個自由的斗士，還是一個奴隸?!

你們或許要說：希特勒先生，我需要一個工作，一塊面包。是的。你的說法很對，生命實在是太重要了。但是我要告訴你們。這世界上還有一種東西比生命更重要，那是自由!那就是尊嚴!

只要阿爾薩斯和洛林上空一日還飄揚著法國的國旗，我們的尊嚴就不存在!只要那些法國人、英國人在我們的國土上橫行霸道，我們地尊嚴就不存在!只要在歐洲的版圖上，這個叫德國的國家四分五裂積弱不堪。我們地尊嚴就不存在!只要其他國家的人，在聊天的時候說到德國這個字眼的時候會發出一聲輕蔑的笑聲，我們的尊嚴就不存在!

我們需要的，不是一塊面包!而是一個生存空間!一個民族地生存空間!這生存空間，不是靠乞求和抗議來實現的，而是靠鐵和血來實現的!

別人欺辱我們，哪怕是最弱小的民族也來踐踏我們，我們只會叫著：我們表示強烈的憤慨和抗議，這樣的人。是沒有骨頭的!這樣的人，是低賤的!我們應該用大炮地震耳欲聾聲讓敵人顫抖!我們應該碾壓他們的尊嚴、生命，讓他們知道我們不是一群只知道抗議的懦夫!

你們要記住，一個只懂得抗議的國家，是一個沒有骨頭的國家!一個只懂得抗議的政府，是一個沒有骨頭的政府!當我們地尊嚴、領土、生存地空間都遭受踐踏的時候，還不知羞恥地抗議地政府，我們是不需要的!你

們最后也會拋棄它們的!我很驕傲，在你們這些人中。這樣沒有骨頭的人，少之又少!我的面前，是一個留著千年不屈血液的軍團!這血液，曾經在我們祖先的血管里面流淌過，他們沒有屈服過!現在，它們在我們的身體里面汩汩奔涌，你們告訴我。你們愿意它冷卻嗎!?

能夠團結人們的。有兩件東西：共同的理想和共同的犯罪。我們有雕刻在德意志旗幟上面的偉大理想，我們會為這理想流盡我們的最后一滴血!在今天的柏林。沒有任何東西能夠拯救我們的祖國，只有這理想!凡爾賽條約，是一個極大的恥辱!我們有拒絕執行它的決心和理由!做你們想做的吧!就像本杰明.馬丁拿起槍，就像他帶領著他的同胞們高舉著那面自由的大旗英勇殺敵一樣!假如你們期望戰斗，那就去戰斗吧!然后我就能夠看到你們是七千萬奴隸還是七千萬堅貞不屈的日耳曼人!

如果有那么一天，我，阿道夫.希特勒，也會想本杰明.馬丁那樣，舉著屬于我們德意志的大旗沖在最前方!哪怕是戰死，我也會微笑著進入天堂!我會見到那些德意志的榮耀的祖先們，我可以昂著頭顱走到偉大的腓特烈大帝跟前，我可以驕傲地對他說：我，你的子孫，沒有給你丟臉，我為偉大的德意志流盡了最后一滴血!

我們不為奴役而戰!我們為自由而戰!我們不是機器，不是牛馬，我們是人!是從來沒有屈服過的日耳曼人!

我們以自由的名義團結起來!為一個新的、公平的世界而戰!我們為人人有工作而戰!為那些奴役我們的人滾出德國人的土地而戰!為我們不需要整天喊著抗議而戰!為我們的尊嚴而戰!為我們的諾言而戰!

為解放這個國家而戰!日耳曼人，我們為我們的祖先的榮耀而戰!為我們的子孫后代能夠驕傲地宣傳：我們是從來不屈服的日耳曼人而戰!

我的同胞們，德國和德國人民萬歲!自由，萬歲!

第四篇：希特勒著名演講

篇一：希特勒最著名的演講

希特勒最著名的演講----給中國的領導們上一課

今天，我們站在這里！站在德國的土地上！站在柏林，這塊我們祖先用鮮血和尊嚴澆灌的土地上！我的身后，是安德烈.柯里昂的雕像！他是全世界公認的自由斗士！他是全世界的光！我的面前，站著的是一個民族，一個在屈辱中呻吟的民族！那場戰爭結束之后，我們這個民族的驕傲就沒有了！那些戰勝者們騎在我們的脖子上作威作福，他們隨意 踐踏我們的尊嚴，一個歐洲大陸上最高貴的民族的尊嚴！你們告訴我，你們是選擇像本杰明.馬丁一樣去做一個自由的斗士，還是一個奴隸？！

你們或許要說：希特勒先生，我需要一個工作，一塊面包。是的，你的說法很對，生命實在是太重要了。但是我要告訴你們，這世界上還有一種東西比生命更重要，那就是自由！那就是尊嚴！

只要阿爾薩斯和洛林上空一日還飄揚著法國的國旗，我們的尊嚴就不存在！只要那些法國人、英國人在我們的國土上橫行霸道，我們的尊嚴就不存在！只要在歐洲的 版圖上，這個叫德國的國家四分五裂積弱不堪，我們的尊嚴就不存在！只要其他國家的人，在聊天的時候說到德國這個字眼的時候會發出一聲輕蔑的笑聲，我們的尊 嚴就不存在！

我們需要的，不是一塊面包！而是一個生存空間！一個民族的生存空間！這生存空間，不是靠乞求和抗議來實現的，而是靠鐵和血來實現的！

別人欺辱我們，哪怕是最弱小的民族也來踐踏我們，我們只會叫著：我們表示強烈的憤慨和抗議，這樣的人，是沒有骨頭的！這樣的人，是低賤的！我們應該用大炮的震耳欲聾聲讓敵人顫抖！我們應該碾壓他們的尊嚴、生命，讓他們知道我們不是一群只知道抗議的懦夫！你們要記住，一個只懂得抗議的國家，是一個沒有骨頭的國家！一個只懂得抗議的政府，是一個沒有骨頭的政府！當我們地尊嚴、領土和生存的空間都遭受踐踏的時候，還不知羞恥地抗議地政府，我們是不需要的！你們最后也會拋棄它們的！

我很驕傲，在你們這些人中，這樣沒有骨頭的人，少之又少！我的面前，是一個留著千年不屈血液的軍團！這血液，曾經在我們祖先的血管里面流淌過，他們沒有屈服過！現在，它們在我們的身體里面汩汩奔涌，你們告訴我，你們愿意它冷卻嗎！？

能夠團結人們的，有兩件東西：共同的理想和共同的敵人！我們有雕刻在德意志旗幟上面的偉大理想，我們會為這理想流盡我們的最后一滴血！在今天的柏林。沒有 任何東西能夠拯救我們的祖國，只有這理想！凡爾賽條約，是一個極大的恥辱！我們有拒絕執行它的決心和理由！做你們想做的吧！就像本杰明.馬丁拿起槍，就像 他帶領著他的同胞們高舉著那面自由的大旗英勇殺敵一樣！假如你們期望戰斗，那就去戰斗吧！然后我就能夠看到你們是七千萬奴隸還是七千萬堅貞不屈的日耳曼 人！

如果有那么一天，我，阿道夫.希特勒，也會像本杰明.馬丁那樣，舉著屬于我們德意志的大旗沖在最前方！哪怕是戰死，我也會微笑著進入天堂！我會見到那些德 意志的榮耀的祖先們，我可以昂著頭顱走到偉大的腓特烈大帝跟前，我可以驕傲地對他說：我，你的子孫，沒有給你丟臉，我為偉大的德意志流盡了最后一滴血！

我們為不被奴役而戰！我們為自由而戰！我們不是機器，不是牛馬，我們是人！是從來沒有屈服過的日耳曼人！

我們以自由的名義團結起來！為一個新的、公平的世界而戰！我們為人人有工作而戰！為那些奴役我們的人滾出德國人的土地而戰！為我們不需要整天喊著抗議而 戰！為我們的尊嚴而戰！為我們的諾言而戰！為解放這個國家而戰！日耳曼人，我們為我們的祖先的榮耀而戰！為我們的子孫后代能夠驕傲地宣傳：我們是從來不屈 服的日耳曼人而戰！我的同胞們，德國和德國人民萬歲！自由，萬歲！篇二：希特勒著名的演講文本

im sorry but i dont want to be an emperori dont want to rule or conquer anyone.i should like to help everyone if possible, jew, gentile, black man, white.we all want to help one another, human beings are like that.we want to live by each others happiness, not by each others misery.we dont want to hate and despise one another.in this world there is room for everyone and the good earth is rich and can provide for everyone.the way of life can be free and beautiful.but we have lost the way.greed has poisoned mens soulsdont give yourselves to brutes, men who despise you, enslave youonly the unloved hatedont fight for slavery, fight for liberty!in the seventeenth chapter of saint luke it is written thekingdomofgodis within manbut in all menlet us all unite！!let us fight for a new world, a decent world that will give men a chance to work, that will give you the future and old age and security.by the promise of these things, brutes have risen to power, but they lie!they do not fulfil their promise, they never will!dictators free themselves but they enslave the people!now let us fight to fulfil that promise!let us fight to free the world, to do away with national barriers, to do away with greed, with hate and intolerance!let us fight for a world of reason, a world where science and progress will lead to all mens happiness.soldiersdont need other help-can win the war, they also invented several kind of means and methods to force them to surrender, we empire usaf remorseless fierce fried densely populated areas, and take the hunger tactics.although i warned them over and over again, ill take the hot air for three months, i have warned them in.but these warning was churchill in one ear and out the other.strange? the man did not spare others life? he only those culture and architecture? i promise, when i have time, if he gives us a bomb, bomb with a necessary when i return them, but still could not make him about his behavior is the man of god gongzhu.he claimed that he never depressed, even he assured us that, no matter how we fierce attacks, the british people will put him back in london stands array.in recent years, the fool in europe has been like a madman, jumping, hoping to find the opportunity to fire.unfortunately, he has repeatedly discovered the vampire has all the domestic put fire in them.his last winter disorderly check-kiting, big lie, make americans believe that by german empire, in the past several months of war, and now they were alive, he also know so, so he is necessary in europe, then a war.this plan in early 1939 he yijiusilingnian autumn and spring is reflected.at that time, britains situation that he can mobilize around a hundred division.but last may and june, we saw the british suddenly rout, make him seriously attempt this plan.but in the last autumn, winston churchill and want to begin to solve this problem.due to the army tanks and anti-tank weapons are obvious advantage, make war reversed, churchill believed north now is the best time for the war, he can be transferred from libya stage in greece.he ordered the therefore, it is also churchill in this war that the biggest strategic errors.i know a british dont intend to take in the balkans, more taken after the stronghold of the necessary steps.germany to the false gentleman trick is a more often, and raised the necessary force to hit him.german no consciousness in the balkans.instead, we use as far as possible, and the method of justice, of course, the greek settle disputes with these methods are in italy legislation hope.italian leaders agreed to support us and not to make peace with our goal of yugoslavia signing bilateral agreements.finally, the yugoslav government agreed to join the hegemony of convention, yugoslavia, what need not only for our obligation to borrow word is enough.so, this year march 26, we guarantee in vienna in future, yugoslavia, and external interference is not a guarantee of balkan peace.gentlemen, you believe or not, i will depart from the city of beautiful unexpectedly filled with happiness, not only because he is eight years of foreign policy, also because i believe from this moment, germany may need to reach the balkans.we were ruling group the news frightened, the news is a group of better-bribed rebel against convicted without authorization, also make the british prime minister with excitement testimony that he may have the good news for the first time across the uk.24.gentlemen, im sure you can understand, i heard the news, i immediately ordered against yugoslavia.german empire will never allow take years to other parties, signed the contract, but the beneficial overnight found one-sided, but they also destroyed insulted us ambassador to the imperial german, threatening the and god know i was peaceful.but thanks to god, it gave me the optional use means to defend germanys interests.i was very calm in the determination of underground.because i know that i shall not be moved to china in bulgarias loyalty to germany, and play a loyal hungarian knows it after the indignation.26 the battle was very special results.by signing a battle-hardened bell part can also cause intercontinental uneasy this fact, we immediately removed the danger, it is to eliminate the causes of the parent of many injuries tensions across europe.28 for moderate repair due to world war ii and infringement, the front of these places is not made in germany take unfair greed.at the political level, we are only the regional peace, protection and in economic terms, we hope to see the social order, in order to build up cargo, and to everyone.29.however, the use of justice should accord with the highest except outside, still must consider ethnography, history or economic conditions.30 i can guarantee to you, i for our future, also extremely confident.german empire and his allies, whether in power, military, economic, especially the moral aspect, more than any other in the world.to the federal the german army, if necessary, whenever they were not afraid challenge.the german confidence should always篇三：希特勒最著名的演講

希特勒最著名的演講----給中國的領導們上一課 來源： 華定平的日志

今天，我們站在這里！站在德國的土地上！站在柏林，這塊我們祖先用鮮血和尊嚴澆灌的土地上！我的身后，是安德烈.柯里昂的雕像！他是全世界公認的自由斗士！他是全世界的光！我的面前，站著的是一個民族，一個在屈辱中呻吟的民族！那場戰爭結束之后，我們這個民族的驕傲就沒有了！那些戰勝者們騎在我們的脖子上作威作福，他們隨意 踐踏我們的尊嚴，一個歐洲大陸上最高貴的民族的尊嚴！你們告訴我，你們是選擇像本杰明.馬丁一樣去做一個自由的斗士，還是一個奴隸？！

你們或許要說：希特勒先生，我需要一個工作，一塊面包。是的，你的說法很對，生命實在是太重要了。但是我要告訴你們，這世界上還有一種東西比生命更重要，那就是自由！那就是尊嚴！

只要阿爾薩斯和洛林上空一日還飄揚著法國的國旗，我們的尊嚴就不存在！只要那些法國人、英國人在我們的國土上橫行霸道，我們的尊嚴就不存在！只要在歐洲的 版圖上，這個叫德國的國家四分五裂積弱不堪，我們的尊嚴就不存在！只要其他國家的人，在聊天的時候說到德國這個字眼的時候會發出一聲輕蔑的笑聲，我們的尊 嚴就不存在！

我們需要的，不是一塊面包！而是一個生存空間！一個民族的生存空間！這生存空間，不是靠乞求和抗議來實現的，而是靠鐵和血來實現的！

別人欺辱我們，哪怕是最弱小的民族也來踐踏我們，我們只會叫著：我們表示強烈的憤慨和抗議，這樣的人，是沒有骨頭的！這樣的人，是低賤的！我們應該用大炮的震耳欲聾聲讓敵人顫抖！我們應該碾壓他們的尊嚴、生命，讓他們知道我們不是一群只知道抗議的懦夫！你們要記住，一個只懂得抗議的國家，是一個沒有骨頭的國家！一個只懂得抗議的政府，是一個沒有骨頭的政府！當我們地尊嚴、領土和生存的空間都遭受踐踏的時候，還不知羞恥地抗議地政府，我們是不需要的！你們最后也會拋棄它們的！

我很驕傲，在你們這些人中，這樣沒有骨頭的人，少之又少！我的面前，是一個留著千年不屈血液的軍團！這血液，曾經在我們祖先的血管里面流淌過，他們沒有屈服過！現在，它們在我們的身體里面汩汩奔涌，你們告訴我，你們愿意它冷卻嗎！？

能夠團結人們的，有兩件東西：共同的理想和共同的敵人！我們有雕刻在德意志旗幟上面的偉大理想，我們會為這理想流盡我們的最后一滴血！在今天的柏林。沒有 任何東西能夠拯救我們的祖國，只有這理想！凡爾賽條約，是一個極大的恥辱！我們有拒絕執行它的決心和理由！做你們想做的吧！就像本杰明.馬丁拿起槍，就像 他帶領著他的同胞們高舉著那面自由的大旗英勇殺敵一樣！假如你們期望戰斗，那就去戰斗吧！然后我就能夠看到你們是七千萬奴隸還是七千萬堅貞不屈的日耳曼 人！

如果有那么一天，我，阿道夫.希特勒，也會像本杰明.馬丁那樣，舉著屬于我們德意志的大旗沖在最前方！哪怕是戰死，我也會微笑著進入天堂！我會見到那些德 意志的榮耀的祖先們，我可以昂著頭顱走到偉大的腓特烈大帝跟前，我可以驕傲地對他說：我，你的子孫，沒有給你丟臉，我為偉大的德意志流盡了最后一滴血！

我們為不被奴役而戰！我們為自由而戰！我們不是機器，不是牛馬，我們是人！是從來沒有屈服過的日耳曼人！

我們以自由的名義團結起來！為一個新的、公平的世界而戰！我們為人人有工作而戰！為那些奴役我們的人滾出德國人的土地而戰！為我們不需要整天喊著抗議而 戰！為我們的尊嚴而戰！為我們的諾言而戰！為解放這個國家而戰！日耳曼人，我們為我們的祖先的榮耀而戰！為我們的子孫后代能夠驕傲地宣傳：我們是從來不屈 服的日耳曼人而戰！我的同胞們，德國和德國人民萬歲！自由，萬歲！

第五篇：巴菲特最著名的演講

巴菲特最著名的演講——價值投資為什么能夠持續戰勝市場

每個人都期望自己能成功，但是我們后來者的成功建立在大師的肩膀上才能少走彎路，才能有所突破。自然科學的發展也證明了這一點，就像愛因斯坦不可能出現在 原始社會的部落中一樣，原始社會沒有發現相對論的基礎，也不會出現這么偉大的科學家了。人類發展的歷史永遠是螺旋式的上升，可以有反復、甚至有倒退，向上 的趨勢將永遠不變，直到最后的崩潰，崩潰的結果是另一個智慧生命的開始，宇宙間的一切都是周而復始。

有些朋友會說，前人的東西往往是不對的，是應該批判的。但是我們能夠批判的依據和思想從哪里來，不要告訴我，你從沒受過人類的教育，就能夠批判，其實也是來自于前人思想的積累。希望朋友們能認真的讀，如果能有所收獲也就達到目的了，能夠突破的話就要恭喜你了！

巴菲特最著名的演講：價值投資為什么能夠持續戰勝市場

每個價值投資人的投資業績都來自于利用企業股票市場價格與其內在價值之間的差異。

——巴菲特

價值投資策略最終要歸根于本杰明·格雷厄姆（Benjamin Graham）的思想。1934年年底，他與戴維·多德（David Dodd）合作完成了他醞釀已久的《證券分析》（Security Analysis）。這部劃時代的著作標志著證券分析業和價值投資思想的誕生。這本巨著在過去70年間共發行了五版，被譽為投資者的“圣經”。

紐約證券分析協會強調，格雷厄姆“對于投資的意義就像歐幾里得對于幾何學、達爾文對于生物進化論一樣重要“。格雷厄姆“給這座令人驚嘆而為之卻步的城市 ——股票市場繪制了第一張可以依賴的地圖，他為價值投資奠定了方XX的基礎，而在此之前，股票投資與賭博幾乎毫無差別。價值投資沒有格雷厄姆，就如同共產 主義沒有馬克思——原則性將不復存在。”人們通常認為是格雷厄姆確立了證券分析的原則，所以格雷厄姆被尊稱為”現代證券分析之父“。

1984年，在哥倫比亞大學紀念格雷厄姆與多德合著的《證券分析》出版50周年的慶祝活動中，巴菲特——這位格雷厄姆在哥倫比亞大學的投資課上唯一給了 “A＋”的最優秀的學生進行了一次演講，他在演講中回顧了50年來格雷厄姆的追隨者們采用價值投資策略持續戰勝市場的無可爭議的事實，總結歸納出價值投資 策略的精髓，在投資界具有非常大的影響力...編者：

“格雷厄姆—多德都市的超級投資者們”作為巴菲特最著名的演講名留青史，廣為流傳。巴菲特在中國十周年紀念八，從英文原版入手，盡可能羅列相關資料推出此次中英文對照的饕餮盛宴。敬請各位入席。

格雷厄姆-多德都市的超級投資者們

THE SUPERINVESTORS OF GRAHAM-AND-DODDSVILLE －巴菲特1984年在哥倫比亞大學的著名演講

１９８４ 年在慶祝格雷罕姆與多德合著的《證券分析》發行５０周年大會上，巴菲特－這位格雷厄姆在哥倫比亞大學的投資課上唯一給了“A＋”的最優秀的學生進行了一次 題為“格雷厄姆-多德都市的超級投資者們”(The Superinvestors of Graham-and-Doddsville)”的演講，在他演講中回顧了50年來格雷厄姆的追隨者們采用價值投資策略持續戰勝市場的無可爭議的事實，總結歸納出價值投資策略的精髓，在投資界具有非常大的影響力。

THE SUPERINVESTORS OF GRAHAM-AND-DODDSVILLE Tilsonfunds EDITOR'S NOTE: This article is an edited transcript of a talk given at Columbia University in 1984 commemorating the fiftieth anniversary of Security Analysis , written by Benjamin Graham and David L.Dodd.This specialized volume first introduced the ideas later popularized in The Intelligent Investor.Buffett's essay offers a fascinating study of how Graham's disciples have used Graham's value investing approach to realize phenomenal success in the stock market.Is the Graham and Dodd ”look for values with a significant margin of safety relative to prices“ approach to security analysis out of date? Many of the professors who write textbooks today say yes.They argue that the stock market is efficient;that is, that stock prices reflect everything that is known about a company's prospects and about the state of the economy.There are no undervalued stocks, these theorists argue, because there are smart security analysts who utilize all available information to ensure unfailingly appropriate prices.Investors who seem to beat the market year after year are just lucky.”If prices fully reflect available information, this sort of investment adeptness is ruled out,“ writes one of today's textbook authors.格雷厄姆與多德追求“價值遠超過價格的安全保障”，這種證券分析方法是否已經過時?目前許多撰寫教科書的教授認為如此。他們認為，股票市場是有效率的市場； 換言之，股票價格已經充分反應了公司一切己知的事實以及整體經濟情況：這些理論家認為，市場上沒有價格偏低的股票，因為聰明的證券分析師將運用全部的既有 資訊，以確保適當的價格。投資者能經年累月地擊敗市場，純粹是運氣使然。“如果價格完全反應既有的資訊，則這類的投資技巧將不存在。”一位現今教科書的作 者如此與寫道。

Well, maybe.But I want to present to you a group of investors who have, year in and year out, beaten the Standard & Poor's 500 stock index.The hypothesis that they do this by pure chance is at least worth examining.Crucial to this examination is the fact that these winners were all well known to me and pre-identified as superior investors, the most recent identification occurring over fifteen years ago.Absent this condition215 egotistical orangutans with 20 straight winning flips.但是，某商學院的教授可能會粗魯地提出—項事實，如果2．25億只猩猩參加這場大賽，結果大致上也是如此——有215只自大的猩猩將連續贏得20次的投擲。

I would argue, however, that there are some important differences in the examples I am going to present.For one thing, if(a)you had taken 225 million orangutans distributed roughly as the U.S.population is;if(b)215 winners were left after 20 days;and if(c)you found that 40 came from a particular zoo in Omaha, you would be pretty sure you were on to something.So you would probably go out and ask the zookeeper about what he's feeding them, whether they had special exercises, what books they read, and who knows what else.That is, if you found any really extraordinary concentrations of success, you might want to see if you could identify concentrations of unusual characteristics that might be causal factors.然而，我必須說明，前述事例和我即將提出 的案例，兩者之間存在著若干重大差異。旨先，如果(a)你所選擇的2．25億只猩猩的分布狀況大致上和美國的人口分布相同；如果(b)經過20天的競賽，只剩下215只贏家；如果(c)你發現其中有40只猩猩來自于奧瑪哈的某個動物園，則其中必有蹊蹺。于是，你會詢問猩猩管理員各種問題，它們吃什么飼料、是否做特殊的運動、閱讀什么書籍??換言之，如果你發現成功案例有非比尋常的集中現象，則你希望判定此異常的特色是否是成功的原因。

Scientific inquiry naturally follows such a pattern.If you were trying to analyze possible causes of a rare type of cancer--with, say, 1,500 cases a year in the United States--and you found that 400 of them occurred in some little mining town in Montana, you would get very interested in the water there, or the occupation of those afflicted, or other variables.You know it's not random chance that 400 come from a small area.You would not necessarily know the causal factors, but you would know where to search.科學的調查也遵循此一形態。如果你試圖分析某種罕見的癌癥原因——例如，美國每年只有1500個病例——而你發現蒙大拿州的某個礦區小鎮便產生400個病例，則你必然對當地的飲水、病患的職業或其他種種變數產生興趣。你知道，在—個小鎮中發生400個病例，絕不是隨機因素所造成。雖然你未必了解病因，但你知道從哪里著手調查。

I submit to you that there are ways of defining an origin other than geography.In addition to geographical origins, there can be what I call an intellectual origin.I think you will find that a disproportionate number of successful coin-flippers in the investment world came from a very small intellectual village that could be called Graham-and-Doddsville.A concentration of winners that simply cannot be explained by chance can be traced to this particular intellectual village.除了地理國家，還有其他方式可以界定起源。除了地理的起源，還有我所謂“智力的起源”。我認為各位將在投資領域發現，不 成比例的銅板投擲贏家來自于一個極小的智力村莊．它可以稱為“格雷厄姆多德都市”。這個特殊智力村存在著許多贏家．這種集中現象絕非巧合所能夠解釋。

Conditions could exist that would make even that concentration unimportant.Perhaps 100 people were simply imitating the coin-flipping call of some terribly persuasive personality.When he called heads, 100 followers automatically called that coin the same way.If the leader was part of the 215 left at the end, the fact that 100 came from the same intellectual origin would mean nothing.You would simply be identifying one case as a hundred cases.Similarly, let's assume that you lived in a strongly patriarchal society and every family in the United States conveniently consisted of ten members.Further assume that the patriarchal culture was so strong that, when the 225 million people went out the first day, every member of the family identified with the father's call.Now, at the end of the 20-day period, you would have 215 winners, and you would find that they came from only 21.5 families.Some naive types might say that this indicates an enormous hereditary factor as an explanation of successful coin-flipping.But, of course, it would have no significance at all because it would simply mean that you didn't have 215 individual winners, but rather 21.5 randomly distributed families who were winners.在某些情況下，即使非比尋常的集中現象也可能不重要。或許有100個只是模仿某一位極具說服力的領導者，而依其主張來猜測銅板的投擲結果。當他猜正面，100個追隨者也會自動地做相同的猜測。如果這一位領導者是屬于最后215位贏家之一，則這100也便屬于同一個智力起源，這項事實便不具有任何意義，因 為100個案例實際上只代表一個案例。同理，假定你生活在一個父權結構極為嚴密的社會，而美國每一個家庭都恰好以父親馬首是瞻。20天之后，你將發現 215位贏家是來自于21．5個家庭。若干天真的分析師可能因此而認為，成功地猜測鋼板投擲的結果，其中具有高度的遺傳因素。當然，這實際上不具有任何意 義，因為你所擁有的不是215位個別贏家，而只是21．5個隨機分布的家庭。

In this group of successful investors that I want to consider, there has been a common intellectual patriarch, Ben Graham.But the children who left the house of this intellectual patriarch have called their ”flips“ in very different ways.They have gone to different places and bought and sold different stocks and companies, yet they have had a combined record that simply cannot be explained by the fact that they are all calling flips identically because a leader is signaling the calls for them to make.The patriarch has merely set forth the intellectual theory for making coin-calling decisions, but each student has decided on his own manner of applying the theory.我所要考慮的這一群成功投資者，共有一位共同的智力族長——本杰明·格雷 厄姆。但是，這些離開此智力家族的孩童，都是依據非常不同的方法猜測他們自己的“銅板”。他們各自前往不同的地方，買賣不同的股票和企業，但他們的綜合績 效絕對無法用隨機因素加以解釋。他們做相同的猜測，并不是因為領導者下達某一項指令，因此也無法用這種方式解釋他們的表現。族知只提供了猜測銅板的智力理 論，每位學生都必須自行決定如何運用這項理論。

The common intellectual theme of the investors from Graham-and-Doddsville is this: they search for discrepancies between the value of a business and the price of small pieces of that business in the market.Essentially, they exploit those discrepancies without the efficient market theorist's concern as to whether the stocks are bought on Monday or Thursday, or whether it is January or July, etc.Incidentally, when businessmen buy businesses, which is just what our Graham & Dodd investors are doing through the purchase of marketable stocks--I doubt that many are cranking into their purchase decision the day of the week or the month in which the transaction is going to occur.If it doesn't make any difference whether all of a business is being bought on a Monday or a Friday, I am baffled why academicians invest extensive time and effort to see whether it makes a difference when buying small pieces of those same businesses.Our Graham & Dodd investors, needless to say, do not discuss beta, the capital asset pricing model, or covariance in returns among securities.These are not subjects of any interest to them.In fact, most of them would have difficulty defining those terms.The investors simply focus on two variables: price and value.來自“格雷厄姆多德都市”的投資者所具備的共同智力結構是：他們探索企業的價值與該企業市場價格之間的差異。事實上，他們利用其間的差異，卻不在意效率市 場理論家所關心的問題：股票究竟在星期一或星期—：買進，或是在一月份或七月份買進??。當企業家買進某家公司時——這正是格雷厄姆多德都市的投資者透 過上市股票所從事的行為——我懷疑有多少人會在意交易必須發生于某個月份或某個星期的第一天。如果企業的買進交易發生在星期一或星期五沒有任何差別，則我 無法了解學術界人士為何要花費大量的時間和精力，探討代表該企業部分股權的交易發生時的差異。毋庸多說，格雷厄姆多德都市的投資者并不探討bate、資 本資產定價模型、證券投資報酬本的變異數。這些都不足他們所關心的議題。事實上，他們大多數難以界定上述學術名詞。他們只在乎兩項實數：價格與價值。

I always find it extraordinary that so many studies are made of price and volume behavior, the stuff of chartists.Can you imagine buying an entire business simply because the price of the business had been marked up substantially last week and the week before? Of course, the reason a lot of studies are made of these price and volume variables is that now, in the age of computers, there are almost endless data available about them.It isn't necessarily because such studies have any utility;it's simply that the data are there and academicians have [worked] hard to learn the mathematical skills needed to manipulate them.Once these skills are acquired, it seems sinful not to use them, even if the usage has no utility or negative utility.As a friend said, to a man with a hammer, everything looks like a nail.面對圖形分 析師所研究的價量行為，我始終感覺驚訝。你是否會僅僅因為某家公司的市場價格在本周或前一周劇揚．便決定購買該企業呢?在日前電腦化的時代，人們之所以會 大量研究價格與成交量的行為，理由是這兩項變數擁有了無數的資料。研究未必是因為其具任何功用；而只是因為資料既然存在，學術界人士便必須努力學習操作這 些資料所需要的數學技巧。—旦擁有這些技巧，不去運用它們便會帶來罪惡感，即使這些技巧的運用沒有任何功用，或只會帶來負面功用．也在所不惜。如同一位朋 友所說的，對一位持鐵錘的人來說，每—樣事看起來都像是釘子。

I think the group that we have identified by a common intellectual home is worthy of study.Incidentally, despite all the academic studies of the influence of such variables as price, volume, seasonality, capitalization size, etc., upon stock performance, no interest has been evidenced in studying the methods of this unusual concentration of value-oriented winners.我認為，這一群具有共同智力起源的投資者非常值得我們研究。雖然學術界不斷地對價格、成交量、季節性、資本規模以及其他變數，研究它們對股票績效的影響，但這群以價值為導向贏家的方法卻毫不受人關心。

I begin this study of results by going back to a group of four of us who worked at Graham-Newman Corporation from 1954 through 1956.There were only four--I have not selected these names from among thousands.I offered to go to work at Graham-Newman for nothing after I took Ben Graham's class, but he turned me down as overvalued.He took this value stuff very seriously!After much pestering he finally hired me.There were three partners and four of us as the ”peasant“ level.All four left between 1955 and 1957 when the firm was wound up, and it's possible to trace the record of three.關于這一項績效的研究，我首先要追溯到從 1954年到1956年間，工作于Greham—Newman公司的四位伙伴。我們總共四個人——我并不是從數以千計的對象中挑選這四個人。在我選修本杰 明·格雷厄姆的課程之后，我要求進人Graham—Newman公司擔任無給職的工作，但格雷厄姆卻以價值高估而拒絕了我的要求。他對價值看得非常嚴重！經我不斷地懇求，他最后答應雇我。當時公司有三位合伙股東，以及我們四位“學徒”。公司結束經營之后，我們四個人陸續在1955年到1957年間離開公 司，目前只能夠追蹤其中三個人的投資記錄。

The first example(see Table 1*正文不附表格，可參考查詢文末所附的英文PDF文件)is that of Walter Schloss.Walter never went to college, but took a course from Ben Graham at night at the New York Institute of Finance.Walter left Graham-Newman in 1955 and achieved the record shown here over 28 years.Here is what ”Adam Smith“--after I told him about Walter--wrote about him in Supermoney(1972): 第一個案例（*正文不附表格，可參考查詢文末所附的英文PDF文件）是華特·史洛斯。華特從來沒有念過大學，但他 在紐約金融協會參加了本杰明·葛雷厄姆的夜間課程。華特在1955年離開Greham—Newman公司。以下是“亞當·史密斯”——在我和他談論有關華 特的事跡之后——在《超級金錢》(Supermoney，1972年)一書中對他所做的描述：

He has no connections or access to useful information.Practically no one in Wall Street knows him and he is not fed any ideas.He looks up the numbers in the manuals and sends for the annual reports, and that's about it.他從來不運用或接觸有用的資訊。在華爾街幾乎沒有人認識他，所以沒有人提供他有關投資的觀念。他只參考手冊上的數字，并要求企業寄年報給他，情況便是如此。

In introducing me to(Schloss)Warren had also, to my mind, described himself.”He never forgets that he is handling other people's money, and this reinforces his normal strong aversion to loss.“ He has total integrity and a realistic picture of himself.Money is real to him and stocks are real--and from this flows an attraction to the ”margin of safety“ principle.當華特介紹我們認識時，他曾經描述“他從來沒有忘記自己是在管理別人的資金，這進一步強化了他對于風險的厭惡。”他有高尚的品格．并以務實的態度自持。對他來說．金錢是真實的，股票也真實的——并從此而接受了“安全邊際”的原則。

Walter has diversified enormously, owning well over 100 stocks currently.He knows how to identify securities that sell at considerably less than their value to a private owner.And that's all he does.He doesn't worry about whether it it's January, he doesn't worry about whether it's Monday, he doesn't worry about whether it's an election year.He simply says, if a business is worth a dollar and I can buy it for 40 cents, something good may happen to me.And he does it over and over and over again.He owns many more stocks than I do--and is far less interested in the underlying nature of the business;I don't seem to have very much influence on Walter.That's one of his strengths;no one has much influence on him.華特的投資組合極為分散，目前擁有的股票遠越過 100支。他了解如何選股，將價格遠低于其價值者出售給私人投資者。這便是他所做的一切。他不擔心目前是不是一月份，不在乎今天是不是星期一，也不關心今 年是不是大選年。他的想法非常單純，如果某家公司值一美元，若我能夠以40美分買進，我遲早會獲利。他便是如此不斷地行動：他所持有的股票種類遠比我的多 ——而且比我更不關心企業的本質；我對華特似乎沒有太大的影響力。這是他的長處之—，沒有人能夠對他產生足夠的影響力。

The second case is Tom Knapp, who also worked at Graham-Newman with me.Tom was a chemistry major at Princeton before the war;when he came back from the war, he was a beach bum.And then one day he read that Dave Dodd was giving a night course in investments at Columbia.Tom took it on a noncredit basis, and he got so interested in the subject from taking that course that he came up and enrolled at Columbia Business School, where he got the MBA degree.He took Dodd's course again, and took Ben Graham's course.Incidentally, 35 years later I called Tom to ascertain some of the facts involved here and I found him on the beach again.The only difference is that now he owns the beach!第二個案例是湯姆· 科納普，他曾經和我一起在Greham—Newman公司工作。湯姆于大戰之前曾在普林斯頓大學主修化學，大戰結束之后，他經常在海灘游蕩。某一天，他得 知大衛·多德將在可倫比亞大學開夜間投資課程。湯姆以旁聽方式選修該課程，之后他對投資學科產生了濃厚的興趣，于是正式注冊進入哥倫比亞大學商學院，并且 獲得了MBA學位。35年之后，我撥電話給湯姆，確定某些有關此一主題的事，我發現他仍然在海灘游蕩。惟—的差別是．他目前擁有一片海灘！

In 1968, Tom Knapp and Ed Anderson, also a Graham disciple, along with one or two other fellows of similar persuasion, formed Tweedy, Browne Partners, and their investment results appear in Table 2.Tweedy, Browne built that record with very wide diversification.They occasionally bought control of businesses, but the record of the passive investments is equal to the record of the control investments.在1968年，湯姆與艾德·安德生——也是葛拉漢的信徒——以及其他

一、兩位有共同信念的人，組成了帝地布朗合伙公司。帝地布朗合伙公司的投資高度分散。他們偶爾會從事控制股權的投資，但其被動式的投資績效約略等于控權式投資的表現。

Table 3 describes the third member of the group who formed Buffett Partnership in 1957.The best thing he did was to quit in 1969.Since then, in a sense, Berkshire Hathaway has been a continuation of the partnership in some respects.There is no single index I can give you that I would feel would be a fair test of investment management at Berkshire.But I think that any way you figure it, it has been satisfactory.表3是格雷厄姆－紐曼公司第三位員工的投資業績記錄。他在1957年成立巴菲特合伙公司。他做出的最明智的決策是 在1969年結束合伙公司。從此之后，伯克夏.哈撒韋公司在某種程度上成為合伙公司的延續。我無法給各位單一的指數，用以合理地測試伯克夏公司的投資管 理。但是，我認為各位不論如何考驗它，它的表現一直都令人滿意。

Table 4 shows the record of the Sequoia Fund, which is managed by a man whom I met in 1951 in Ben Graham's class, Bill Ruane.After getting out of Harvard Business School, he went to Wall Street.Then he realized that he needed to get a real business education so he came up to take Ben's course at Columbia, where we met in early 1951.Bill's record from 1951 to 1970, working with relatively small sums, was far better than average.When I wound up Buffett Partnership I asked Bill if he would set up a fund to handle all our partners, so he set up the Sequoia Fund.He set it up at a terrible time, just when I was quitting.He went right into the two-tier market and all the difficulties that made for comparative performance for value-oriented investors.I am happy to say that my partners, to an amazing degree, not only stayed with him but added money, with the happy result shown here.表四是紅杉基金經理人比爾·盧昂的投資業績記錄，我在 1951年格雷厄姆的講座中認識他。哈佛商學院畢業之后，他進入華爾街。稍后，他發覺需要接受真正的商業教育，于是參加了格雷厄姆在哥倫比亞大學開辦的講 座，我們便相逢于1951年初。從1951年到1970年間。比爾所管理的資金規模相當小，績效卻遠比大盤來得好。當我結束巴菲特合伙公司的業務時，我要 求比爾成立—個基金公司，來管理我們合伙股東的資金，他于是成立了紅杉基金。他成立基金的時機非常不利。他面臨兩個層次的市場，以及以價值為導向的投資者 相當難以運作的情況。我十分樂于提及一點．我的合伙股東不僅繼續委托他管理，還投入更多的資金，而且對他的表現十分贊賞。

There's no hindsight involved here.Bill was the only person I recommended to my partners, and I said at the time that if he achieved a four-point-per-annum advantage over the Standard & Poor's, that would be solid performance.Bill has achieved well over that, working with progressively larger sums of money.That makes things much more difficult.Size is the anchor of performance.There is no question about it.It doesn't mean you can't do better than average when you get larger, but the margin shrinks.And if you ever get so you're managing two trillion dollars, and that happens to be the amount of the total equity valuation in the economy, don't think that you'll do better than average!其中并不涉及后見之明。比爾是我介紹給合伙股東的惟一人選，我當時就表示，如果他的績效能夠高出史坦普指數四個百分點，這便 是非常穩固的表現。比爾的績效遠甚于此，而且所管理的資金規模不斷地擴大。這使得管理愈來愈困難。資金規模是績效的拖累，這是毫無疑問的。這并不意味當資 金規模擴大，你的表現便無法超越平均水準，只是超越的幅度會縮小。如果你所管理的資金是2兆美元，則你的表現必然無法超越平均水準，因為你的資金規模便是 整個股票市場的總市值。（未完）

參考資料：

* 英文來源http://www.tmdps.cn

《THE INTELLIGENT INVESTOR》(The Fourth Revised Edition)*中文翻譯：《巴菲特投資策略全書》、《投資與投機-拉近巴菲特與索羅斯》、羅伯特.P.邁斯《全面解讀巴菲特》、VALUE雜志2006年4月號：劉建位編譯:巴菲特最著名的演講――價值投資為什么能夠持續戰勝市場

相關背景資料

本文依據1984年沃倫.巴菲特在哥倫比亞大學發表的演講編輯而成，這次講演是為了紀念本杰明.格雷厄姆和大衛.多德合著的《證券分析》發行50周年。這本專業的著作最先引入了一些理念，這些理念此后在本杰明.格雷厄姆的《聰明的投資者》一書中被發揚光大。

――沃倫.巴菲特

《證券分析》一書是全球公認的一部經典著作。在經過5次再版，并發表60多年之后，它們被大量印刷。它對現代投資界的影響，以及格雷厄姆對這一行業的巨大貢獻 無論怎么評價卻不為過。在這部獨創性的著作發表50周年的紀念日，哥倫比亞商學院(Columbia school of Business)召開了一次研討會．紀念這部由兩位杰出的本學院教師擔綱的具有創見性的作品的發表。巴菲特，作為學院最著名的校友之一，同對也是格雷厄 姆價值學說的最著名的現代倡導者，被應邀做演講。出席1984年那天的研討會的人當中有大學教授、研究員、其他學術界人士以及許多投資專業人士。他們中許 多人仍堅信現代證券投資理論和有效市場理論的正確性。巴菲特，如我們所知，仍然堅定地反對這一理論。在這次題為“格雷厄姆—多德都市的超級投資者們”(The superinvestors of Greham-and-Doddsville)的演講中，巴菲特講了一些故事，開了一些并非花俏的玩笑．靜靜地但卻堅決地毀滅了有效市場理論賴以生存的基 礎。這是一篇沃倫·巴菲特式的經典演講。

I should add that in the records we've looked at so far, throughout this whole period there was practically no duplication in these portfolios.These are men who select securities based on discrepancies between price and value, but they make their selections very differently.Walter's largest holdings have been such stalwarts as Hudson Pulp & Paper and Jeddo Highland Coal and New York Trap Rock Company and all those other names that come instantly to mind to even a casual reader of the business pages.Tweedy Browne's selections have sunk even well below that level in terms of name recognition.On the other hand, Bill has worked with big companies.The overlap among these portfolios has been very, very low.These records do not reflect one guy calling the flip and fifty people yelling out the same thing after him.我必須補充說明一下，截至目前我們所觀察的記錄，投資組合在整段期間都幾乎沒有重疊。他 們都是根據價格與價值間的差異來選股，選擇的標的也截然不同。華特的最重要持股都是扎實的企業，如Hudson Pulp&Paper、Jeddo HighHand Coal、New York Trap Rock Company，即使是偶爾閱讀金融版新聞的人，對這些企業的名稱也耳熟能詳。帝地布朗公司所選擇的標的則更是名不見經傳的企業。另一方面，比爾的選擇標 的則是大型企業。這些投資組合極少出現重疊現象。他們的記錄并非由某人主導的猜測銅板，其他人則只聽命附和。

Table 5 is the record of a friend of mine who is a Harvard Law graduate, who set up a major law firm.I ran into him in about 1960 and told him that law was fine as a hobby but he could do better.He set up a partnership quite the opposite of Walter's.His portfolio was concentrated in very few securities and therefore his record was much more volatile but it was based on the same discount-from-value approach.He was willing to accept greater peaks and valleys of performance, and he happens to be a fellow whose whole psyche goes toward concentration, with the results shown.Incidentally, this record belongs to Charlie Munger, my partner for a long time in the operation of Berkshire Hathaway.When he ran his partnership, however, his portfolio holdings were almost completely different from mine and the other fellows mentioned earlier.表5的投資業 績來自于我的—位朋友，他畢業于哈佛法學院，并且成立了一家主要的法律事務所。我大約在1960年認識他，并且建議說，法律作為嗜好是件好事，但是他應該 做得更好。于是，他成立了一家合伙公司，他的操作方式和華特迥異，他的投資組合集中在極少數的證券，因此績效的變動比較激烈，但他仍然依據相同的價值折價 法從事投資。他愿意接受績效的上下震蕩，而他恰好是一位精神極度集中的人。他的名字是查理·蒙格，他是我在柏克夏公司從事操作的長期合伙股東。當他自己經 營合伙事業時，他的投資組合和我或任何先前所提到的人完全都不同。

Table 6 is the record of a fellow who was a pal of Charlie Munger's--another non-business school type--who was a math major at USC.He went to work for IBM after graduation and was an IBM salesman for a while.After I got to Charlie, Charlie got to him.This happens to be the record of Rick Guerin.Rick, from 1965 to 1983, against a compounded gain of 316 percent for the S&P, came off with 22,200 percent, which probably because he lacks a business school education, he regards as statistically significant.表6 的投資業績屬于查理的一位好朋友——另一位非商學系出身的人——他畢業于南加州大學的數學系。畢業之后，他進入IBM，曾經擔任推銷員的工作。在我網羅查 理之后，查理又網羅他。他的名字是瑞克·吉林。從1965年到]983年，史坦普指數的復利成長率為316％，而瑞克的績效為22200％，這或許是因為 他缺乏商學教育背景，他可以視為具有統計上的顯著性。One sidelight here: it is extraordinary to me that the idea of buying dollar bills for 40 cents takes immediately to people or it doesn't take at all.It's like an inoculation.If it doesn't grab a person right away, I find that you can talk to him for years and show him records, and it doesn't make any difference.They just don't seem able to grasp the concept, simple as it is.A fellow like Rick Guerin, who had no formal education in business, understands immediately the value approach to investing and he's applying it five minutes later.I've never seen anyone who became a gradual convert over a ten-year period to this approach.It doesn't seem to be a matter of IQ or academic training.It's instant recognition, or it is nothing.在此撇開主題：以40美分的價格買進一美元的紙鈔，人若不能夠立即接受這項概 念，就永遠不會接受它。它就像注射藥劑。如果它無法立即抓住這個人，則我認為即使你長期地說服他，并且展示各種記錄，你也無法讓他接受。這是很單純的概 念，但他們就是無法領悟。類似瑞克這樣的人，他完全沒有正式商學教育的背景，卻可以立即領會價值投資法，并且在五分鐘之后便加以利用。我從來不曾見過任何 人，會在10年之后才逐漸地皈依這種方法。它似乎和智商或學術訓練無關。它是頓悟，否則就是拒絕。

Table 7 is the record of Stan Perlmeter.Stan was a liberal arts major at the University of Michigan who was a partner in the advertising agency of Bozell & Jacobs.We happened to be in the same building in Omaha.In 1965 he figured out I had a better business than he did, so he left advertising.Again, it took five minutes for Stan to embrace the value approach.表7是史坦.波爾米塔（Stan Perlmeter）的投資業績。他畢業于密西根大學藝術系，是Bozell＆Jacobs廣告公司的合伙股東之—。我們的辦公室恰好于奧瑪哈市的同一幢 大樓。1965年，他認為我所經營的事業比他的行業要好，于是他離開廣告業。再—次地，史坦于五分鐘之內就接受了價值投資法。

Perlmeter does not own what Walter Schloss owns.He does not own what Bill Ruane owns.These are records made independently.But every time Perlmeter buys a stock it's because he's getting more for his money than he's paying.That's the only thing he's thinking about.He's not looking at quarterly earnings projections, he's not looking at next year's earnings, he's not thinking about what day of the week it is, he doesn't care what investment research from any place says, he's not interested in price momentum, volume, or anything.He's simply asking: what is the business worth? 史坦所持有的股票與華特的不同。他所持有的股票也和比爾不同。他們都是獨立的記錄。但是，史坦買進每—支股票時，都是因為他所獲得的價值高于他所支付的價格。這是他惟一的考慮。他既不參考每一季的盈余預估值，也不參考明年的盈余項估值，他不在乎當時是星期幾，也不關心任何的投資研究報告，他無視價格動能、成交量與其他類似的變數。他只提出一個問題：該企業值多少錢? Table 8 and Table 9 are the records of two pension funds I've been involved in.They are not selected from dozens of pension funds with which I have had involvement;they are the only two I have influenced.In both cases I have steered them toward value-oriented managers.Very, very few pension funds are managed from a value standpoint.Table 8 is the Washington Post Company's Pension Fund.It was with a large bank some years ago, and I suggested that they would do well to select managers who had a value orientation.表8與表9的投資業績記錄分別屬于我參與的兩家退休基金，它們 并非是從我所參與的十幾種退休基金中選擇出來的，他是唯一兩家我能夠影響其投資決策的退休基金。在這兩家基金中，我引導他們轉變為價值導向的投資管理人，只胡非常少數的基金是基于價值進行投資管理的。表8是華盛頓郵報公司退休基金（the Washington Post Company's Pension Fund）的投資業績記錄。幾年之前，他們委托一家大型銀行管理基金，后來，我建議他們聘請以價值為導向的基金經理，這樣能夠使投資業績更好。*本段采用 劉建位的翻譯

As you can see, overall they have been in the top percentile ever since they made the change.The Post told the managers to keep at least 25 percent of these funds in bonds, which would not have been necessarily the choice of these managers.So I've included the bond performance simply to illustrate that this group has no particular expertise about bonds.They wouldn't have said they did.Even with this drag of 25 percent of their fund in an area that was not their game, they were in the top percentile of fund management.The Washington Post experience does not cover a terribly long period but it does represent many investment decisions by three managers who were not identified retroactively.正如你在投資記錄中所看到的那樣，從他們更換基金經理之后，其整體投資業績在所有基金中 一直名列前茅。華盛頓郵報公司要求基金經理人至少保持25 %的資金投資于債券，而債券未必是基金經理人的投資選擇。因此，我在表中也將其債券投資業績包括在內，而這些數據表明他們其實并沒有什么特別的債券專業技 巧，他們也從未這樣吹噓進自己，雖然有25%的資金投資于他們并不擅長的債券領域，從而拖累了他們的投資業績，但其基金管理業績水平仍然名列前一百名之 內。華盛頓郵報公司退休基金的投資盡管并沒有經過一個很長的市場低迷時期的考驗，但仍然足以證明三位基金經理的許多投資決策并非后見之明。*本段為編輯增 加，采用劉建位的翻譯

Table 9 is the record of the FMC Corporation fund.I don't manage a dime of it myself but I did, in 1974, influence their decision to select value-oriented managers.Prior to that time they had selected managers much the same way as most larger companies.They now rank number one in the Becker survey of pension funds for their size over the period of time subsequent to this ”conversion“ to the value approach.Last year they had eight equity managers of any duration beyond a year.Seven of them had a cumulative record better than the S&P.The net difference now between a median performance and the actual performance of the FMC fund over this period is $243 million.FMC attributes this to the mindset given to them about the selection of managers.Those managers are not the managers I would necessarily select but they have the common denominators of selecting securities based on value.表9的投資業績屬于FMC公司退休基金，我本人沒有管理過這家基金的一分錢，但我的確在1974年影響了他們 的決策，說服他們選擇以價值為導向的基金經理。在此之前，他們采取與其他大型企業相同的方式來選擇基金經理。在他們轉向價值投資策略之后，其投資業績目前 在貝克退休基金調查報告（the Becker survey of pension funds）中超越其他同等規模基金而名列第一。1983年時，該基金共有8位任職1年以上的基金經理，其中7位累積投資業績超過標準普爾指數。在此期 間，FMC基金的實際業績表現與基金平均業績表現的凈回報差額是2.43億美元，FMC將此歸功于他們與眾不同的基金經理選擇傾向，這些基金經理未必會是 我個人中意的選擇，但他們都具有一個共同的特點，即基于價值來選擇股票。*本段采用劉建位的翻譯 So these are nine records of ”coin-flippers“ from Graham-and-Doddsville.I haven't selected them with hindsight from among thousands.It's not like I am reciting to you the names of a bunch of lottery winners--people I had never heard of before they won the lottery.I selected these men years ago based upon their framework for investment decision-making.I knew what they had been taught and additionally I had some personal knowledge of their intellect, character, and temperament.It's very important to understand that this group has assumed far less risk than average;note their record in years when the general market was weak.While they differ greatly in style, these investors are, mentally, always buying the business, not buying the stock.A few of them sometimes buy whole businesses.Far more often they simply buy small pieces of businesses.Their attitude, whether buying all or a tiny piece of a business, is the same.Some of them hold portfolios with dozens of stocks;others concentrate on a handful.But all exploit the difference between the market price of a business and its intrinsic value.以上這9項投資業績記錄都來自于“格雷厄姆一多德都市” 的“銅板投擲者”，是我根據他們的投資決策架構，在多年前便選定了他 們。我了解他們所接受過的訓練，而且知道他們的智慧、個性和脾氣。我們務必了解，這群人只承擔了一般水準以下的風險；留意他們在股市疲弱期間的記錄。他們 的投資風格雖然大不相同，但心態上始終恪守：買進的標的是企業，而非企業的股票。他們當中有些人偶爾會買下整個企業，但是他們經常只是購買企業的—小部 分。不論買進整體或一部分的企業，他們所秉持的態度完全相同。在投資組合，有些人持有幾十種的股票；有些人則集中少數幾支股票。但是，每個人都受惠于企業 市場價格與其內含價值之間的差值。

I'm convinced that there is much inefficiency in the market.These Graham-and-Doddsville investors have successfully exploited gaps between price and value.When the price of a stock can be influenced by a ”herd“ on Wall Street with prices set at the margin by the most emotional person, or the greediest person, or the most depressed person, it is hard to argue that the market always prices rationally.In fact, market prices are frequently nonsensical.我相信市場上存在著許多沒有效率的現象。這些來自于“格雷厄姆一多德都市”的投資人成功地掌握了價格與價值之間的缺口。華爾街的“群眾”可以影響股票價格，當最情緒化的人、最貪婪的或最沮喪的人肆意驅動股價時，我們很難辯稱市場價格是理性的產物。事實上，市場經常是不合理的。

I would like to say one important thing about risk and reward.Sometimes risk and reward are correlated in a positive fashion.If someone were to say to me, ”I have here a six-shooter and I have slipped one cartridge into it.Why don't you just spin it and pull it once? If you survive, I will give you $1 million." I would decline--perhaps stating that $1 million is not enough.Then he might offer me $5 million to pull the trigger twice--now that would be a positive correlation between risk and reward!我想提出有關報酬與風險之間的重要關系。在某些情況下，報酬與風 險之間存在著正向關系。如果有人告訴我“我有一支六發彈裝的左輪槍，并且填裝一發子彈。你可以任意地撥動轉輪，然后朝自己扣一次扳機。如果你能夠逃過一 功，我就賞你100萬美元。”我將會拒絕這項提議——或許我的理由是100萬美元太少了。然后，他可能建議將獎金提高為500萬美元，但必須扣兩次扳機 ——這便是報酬與風險之間的正向關系!The exact opposite is true with value investing.If you buy a dollar bill for 60 cents, it's riskier than if you buy a dollar bill for 40 cents, but the expectation of reward is greater in the latter case.The greater the potential for reward in the value portfolio, the less risk there is.在價值投資法當中，情況恰巧相反。如果你以60美分買進一美元的紙鈔，其風險大于以40美分買進一美元的紙鈔，但后者報酬的期望值卻比較高。以價值為導向的投資組合，其報酬的潛力愈高，風險愈低。

One quick example: The Washington Post Company in 1973 was selling for $80 million in the market.At the time, that day, you could have sold the assets to any one of ten buyers for not less than $400 million, probably appreciably more.The company owned the Post , Newsweek , plus several television stations in major markets.Those same properties are worth $2 billion now, so the person who would have paid $400 million would not have been crazy.我可以舉一個簡單的例子：在1973年，華盛頓郵報公司的總市值為8千萬美元。在這一天，你可以將其資產賣給十位買家之一，而且價格不低于4億美元，甚至還能更高。該公司擁有華盛頓郵報、商業周刊以及數家重要的電視臺。這些資產目前的價值為4億美元，因此愿意支付4億美元的買家并非瘋子。

Now, if the stock had declined even further to a price that made the valuation $40 million instead of $80 million, its beta would have been greater.And to people that think beta measures risk, the cheaper price would have made it look riskier.This is truly Alice in Wonderland.I have never been able to figure out why it's riskier to buy $400 million worth of properties for $40 million than $80 million.And, as a matter of fact, if you buy a group of such securities and you know anything at all about business valuation, there is essentially no risk in buying $400 million for $80 million, particularly if you do it by buying ten $40 million piles of $8 million each.Since you don't have your hands on the $400 million, you want to be sure you are in with honest and reasonably competent people, but that's not a difficult job.現在，如果股價繼續下跌，該企業的市值從8千萬美元跌到4 千萬美元，其bate值也上升。對于用bate值衡量風險的人來說，更低的價格使它受得更有風險。這真是仙境中的愛麗絲。我永遠無法了解，用4千萬美元，而非8千萬美元購買價值4億美元的資產，其風險竟然更高。事實上，如果你買進一堆這樣的證券，而且稍微了解所謂的企業評價，則用8千萬美元的價格買進4億 美元的資產，這筆交易基本上沒有風險，尤其是分別以800萬美元的價格買進10種價值4000萬美元的資產，其風險更低。因為你不擁有4億美元，所以你希 望能夠確實找到誠實而有能力的人，這并不困難。

You also have to have the knowledge to enable you to make a very general estimate about the value of the underlying businesses.But you do not cut it close.That is what Ben Graham meant by having a margin of safety.You don't try and buy businesses worth $83 million for $80 million.You leave yourself an enormous margin.When you build a bridge, you insist it can carry 30,000 pounds, but you only drive 10,000 pound trucks across it.And that same principle works in investing.另外，你必須有知識，而且能夠粗略地估計企業的價值。但 是，你不需要精密的評價知識。這便是本杰明·葛拉厄姆所謂的安全邊際。你不必試圖以8000萬美元的價格購買價值8300萬美元的企業。你必須讓自己保有 相當的緩沖。架設橋梁時，你堅持載重量為3萬磅，但你只準許1萬磅的卡車穿梭其間。相同的原則也適用于投資領域。

In conclusion, some of the more commercially minded among you may wonder why I am writing this article.Adding many converts to the value approach will perforce narrow the spreads between price and value.I can only tell you that the secret has been out for 50 years, ever since Ben Graham and Dave Dodd wrote Security Analysis , yet I have seen no trend toward value investing in the 35 years that I've practiced it.There seems to be some perverse human characteristic that likes to make easy things difficult.The academic world, if anything, has actually backed away from the teaching of value investing over the last 30 years.It's likely to continue that way.Ships will sail around the world but the Flat Earth Society will flourish.There will continue to be wide discrepancies between price and value in the marketplace, and those who read their Graham & Dodd will continue to prosper.有些具備商業頭腦的人可能會懷疑我撰寫本文的動機：更多人皈依價值投資法，將會縮小價值與價格之間的差距。我只能夠如此告訴各位，自從本杰明·格雷厄姆與大衛 ·多德出版《證券分析》，這個秘密已經流傳了50年，在我奉行這項投資理論的35年中，我不曾目睹價值投資法蔚然成風。人的天性中似乎存在著偏執的特色，喜歡把簡單的事情弄得更復雜。最近30年來，學術界如果有任何作為的話，乃完全背離了價值投資的教訓。它很可能繼續如此。船只將環繞地球而行。但地平之說 仍會暢行無阻。在市場上，價格與價值之間還會存在著寬廣的差值，而奉行格雷厄姆與多德理論的人也會繁榮不絕。